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Chapter 1: Overview (John F. Helliwell,
Richard Layard, and Jeffrey D. Sachs)
The first World Happiness Report was published
in April, 2012, in support of the UN High Level
Meeting on happiness and well-being. Since
then we have come a long way. Happiness is
increasingly considered the proper measure
of social progress and the goal of public policy.
In June 2016, the OECD committed itself “to
redefine the growth narrative to put people’s
well-being at the centre of governments’
efforts”.1 In a recent speech, the head of the UN
Development Program (UNDP) spoke against
what she called the “tyranny of GDP”, arguing
that what matters is the quality of growth.“
Paying more attention to happiness should be
part of our efforts to achieve both human and
sustainable development” she said.
In February 2017, the United Arab Emirates
held a full-day World Happiness meeting, as part
of the World Government Summit. Now International Day of Happines, March 20th, provides
a focal point for events spreading the influence
of global happiness research. The launch of this
report at the United Nations on International
Day of Happines is to be preceded by a World
Happiness Summit in Miami, and followed
by a three-day meeting on happiness research
and policy at Erasmus University in Rotterdam.
Interest, data, and research continue to build in
a mutually supporting way.

Chapter 2: The Social Foundations of World
Happiness (John F. Helliwell, Haifang Huang,
and Shun Wang)
This report gives special attention to the social
foundations of happiness for individuals and
nations. The chapter starts with global and
regional charts showing the distribution of
answers, from roughly 3000 respondents in
each of more than 150 countries, to a question
asking them to evaluate their current lives on a
ladder where 0 represents the worst possible life
and 10 the best possible. When the global
population is split into ten geographic regions,
the resulting distributions vary greatly in both
shape and average values. Average levels of
happiness also differ across regions and countries. A difference of four points in average life
evaluations, on a scale that runs from 0 to 10,
separates the ten happiest countries from the
ten unhappiest countries.

This is the fifth World Happiness Report. Thanks
to generous long-term support from the Ernesto
Illy Foundation, we are now able to combine
the timeliness of an annual report with adequate
preparation time by looking two or three years
ahead when choosing important topics for
detailed research and invited special chapters.
Our next report for 2018 will focus on the issue
of migration.

Although the top ten countries remain the same
as last year, there has been some shuffling of
places. Most notably, Norway has jumped into
first position, followed closely by Denmark,
Iceland and Switzerland. These four countries
are clustered so tightly that the differences
among them are not statistically significant,
even with samples averaging 3,000 underlying
the averages. Three-quarters of the differences
among countries, and also among regions, are
accounted for by differences in six key variables,
each of which digs into a different aspect of life.
These six factors are GDP per capita, healthy
years of life expectancy, social support (as
measured by having someone to count on in
times of trouble), trust (as measured by a
perceived absence of corruption in government
and business), perceived freedom to make life
decisions, and generosity (as measured by recent
donations). The top ten countries rank highly on
all six of these factors.

In the remainder of this introduction, we highlight the main contributions of each chapter in
this report.

International differences in positive and
negative emotions (affect) are much less fully
explained by these six factors. When affect
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measures are used as additional elements in
the explanation of life evaluations, only positive
emotions contribute significantly, appearing to
provide an important channel for the effects of
both perceived freedom and social support.
Analysis of changes in life evaluations from
2005-2007 to 2014-2016 continue to show big
international differences in the dynamics of
happiness, with both the major gainers and the
major losers spread among several regions.
The main innovation in the World Happiness
Report 2017 is our focus on the role of social
factors in supporting happiness. Even beyond
the effects likely to flow through better health
and higher incomes, we calculate that bringing
the social foundations from the lowest levels
up to world average levels in 2014-2016 would
increase life evaluations by almost two points
(1.97). These social foundations effects are
together larger than those calculated to follow
from the combined effects of bottom to average
improvements in both GDP per capita and
healthy life expectancy. The effect from the
increase in the numbers of people having
someone to count on in times of trouble is by
itself equal to the happiness effects from the
16-fold increase in average per capita annual
incomes required to shift the three poorest
countries up to the world average (from about
$600 to about $10,000).
Chapter 3: Growth and Happiness in China,
1990-2015 (Richard A. Easterlin, Fei Wang,
and Shun Wang)
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While Subjective well-being (SWB) is receiving
increasing attention as an alternative or complement to GDP as a measure of well-being. There
could hardly be a better test case than China for
comparing the two measures. GDP in China has
multiplied over five-fold over the past quarter
century, subjective well-being over the same
period fell for 15 years before starting a recovery
process. Current levels are still, on average, less
than a quarter of a century ago. These disparate

results reflect the different scope of the two
measures. GDP relates to the economic side of
life, and to just one dimension—the output of
goods and services. Subjective well-being, in
contrast, is a comprehensive measure of individual
well-being, taking account of the variety of
economic and noneconomic concerns and
aspirations that determine people’s well-being.
GDP alone cannot account for the enormous
structural changes that have affected people’s
lives in China. Subjective well-being, in contrast,
captures the increased anxiety and new concerns
that emerge from growing dependence on the
labor market. The data show a marked decline in
subjective well-being from 1990 to about 2005,
and a substantial recovery since then. The chapter
shows that unemployment and changes in the
social safety nets play key roles in explaining both
the post-1990 fall and the subsequent recovery.
Chapter 4: ‘Waiting for Happiness’ in Africa
(Valerie Møller, Benjamin J. Roberts, Habib
Tiliouine, and Jay Loschky)
This chapter explores the reasons why African
countries generally lag behind the rest of the
world in their evaluations of life. It takes as its
starting point the aspirations expressed by the
Nigerian respondents in the 1960s Cantril study
as they were about to embark on their first
experience of freedom from colonialism. Back
then, Nigerians stated then that many changes,
not just a few, were needed to improve their
lives and those of their families. Fifty years on,
judging by the social indicators presented in this
chapter, people in many African countries are
still waiting for the changes needed to improve
their lives and to make them happy. In short,
African people’s expectations that they and their
countries would flourish under self-rule and
democracy appear not yet to have been met.
Africa’s lower levels of happiness compared to
other countries in the world, therefore, might
be attributed to disappointment with different
aspects of development under democracy.
Although most citizens still believe that democracy
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is the best political system, they are critical of
governance in their countries. Despite significant
improvement in meeting basic needs according to
the Afrobarometer index of ‘lived poverty’, population pressure may have stymied infrastructure and
youth development.
Although most countries in the world project
that life circumstances will improve in future,
Africa’s optimism may be exceptional. African
people demonstrate ingenuity that makes life
bearable even under less than perfect circumstances. Coping with poor infrastructure, as in
the case of Ghana used in the chapter, is just one
example of the remarkable resilience that African
people seem to have perfected. African people
are essentially optimistic, especially the youth.
This optimism might serve as a self-fulfilling
prophecy for the continent in the years ahead.
Chapter 5: The Key Determinants of Happiness
and Misery (Andrew Clark, Sarah Flèche,
Richard Layard, Nattavudh Powdthavee, and
George Ward)
This chapter uses surveys from the United
States, Australia, Britain and Indonesia to cast
light on the factors accounting for the huge
variation across individuals in their happiness
and misery (both of these being measured in
terms of life satisfaction). Key factors include
economic variables (such as income and employment), social factors (such as education and
family life), and health (mental and physical).
In all three Western societies, diagnosed mental
illness emerges as more important than income,
employment or physical illness. In every country,
physical health is also important, yet in no
country is it more important than mental health.
The chapter defines misery as being below a
cutoff value for life satisfaction, and shows by
how much the fraction of the population in
misery would be reduced if it were possible to
eliminate poverty, low education, unemployment, living alone, physical illness and mental
illness. In all countries the most powerful effect

would come from the elimination of depression
and anxiety disorders, which are the main form
of mental illness.
The chapter then uses British cohort data to ask
which factors in child development best predict
whether the resulting adult will have a satisfying
life, and finds that academic qualifications are a
worse predictor than the emotional health and
behaviour of the child. In turn, the best predictor of the child’s emotional health and behaviour
is the mental health of the child’s mother. Schools
are also crucially important determinants of
children’s well-being.
In summary, mental health explains more of the
variance of happiness in Western countries than
income. Mental illness also matters in Indonesia,
but less than income. Nowhere is physical illness
a bigger source of misery than mental illness.
Equally, if we go back to childhood, the key
factors for the future adult are the mental health
of the mother and the social ambiance of primary
and secondary school.
Chapter 6: Happiness at Work
(Jan-Emmanuel De Neve and George Ward)
This chapter investigates the role of work and
employment in shaping people’s happiness,
and studies how employment status, job type,
and workplace characteristics affect subjective
well-being.
The overwhelming importance of having a job
for happiness is evident throughout the analysis,
and holds across all of the world’s regions.
When considering the world’s population as a
whole, people with a job evaluate the quality of
their lives much more favorably than those who
are unemployed. The clear importance of employment for happiness emphasizes the damage
caused by unemployment. As such, this chapter
delves further into the dynamics of unemployment to show that individuals’ happiness adapts
very little over time to being unemployed and
that past spells of unemployment can have a
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lasting impact even after regaining employment.
The data also show that rising unemployment
negatively affects everyone, even those still
employed. These results are obtained at the
individual level, but they also come through at
the macroeconomic level, as national unemployment levels are negatively correlated with average national well-being across the world.
This chapter also considers how happiness
relates to the types of job that people do, and finds
that manual labor is systematically correlated
with lower levels of happiness. This result holds
across all labor-intensive industries such as
construction, mining, manufacturing, transport,
farming, fishing, and forestry.
Finally, the chapter studies job quality by considering how specific workplace characteristics relate
to happiness. Beyond the expected finding that
those in well-paying jobs are happier and more
satisfied with their lives and their jobs, a number
of further aspects of people’s jobs are strongly
predictive of greater happiness—these include
work-life balance, autonomy, variety, job security,
social capital, and health and safety risks.
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Chapter 7: Restoring American Happiness
(Jeffrey D. Sachs)
This chapter uses happiness history over the
past ten years to show how the Report’s emphasis
on the social foundations of happiness plays out
in the case of the United States. The observed
decline in the Cantril ladder for the United
States was 0.51 points on the 0 to 10 scale. The
chapter then decomposes this decline according
to the six factors. While two of the explanatory
variables moved in the direction of greater
happiness (income and healthy life expectancy),
the four social variables all deteriorated—the
United States showed less social support, less
sense of personal freedom, lower donations,
and more perceived corruption of government
and business. Using the weights estimated in
Chapter 2, the drops in the four social factors
could explain 0.31 points of the total drop of 0.51
points. The offsetting gains from higher income
and life expectancy were together calculated to
increase happiness by only 0.04 points, leaving
almost half of the overall drop to be explained by
changes not accounted for by the six factors.
Overall, the chapter concludes that falling
American happiness is due primarily to social
rather than to economic causes.
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Introduction
It is now five years since the publication of the
first World Happiness Report in 2012. Its central
purpose was to survey the science of measuring
and understanding subjective well-being. Subsequent World Happiness Reports updated and
extended this background. To make this year’s
World Happiness Report more useful to those who
are coming fresh to the series, we repeat enough
of the core analysis in this chapter to make it
understandable. We also go beyond previous
reports in exploring more deeply the social
foundations of happiness.
Our analysis of the levels, changes, and determinants of happiness among and within nations
continues to be based chiefly on individual life
evaluations, roughly 1,000 per year in each
of more than 150 countries, as measured by
answers to the Cantril ladder question: “Please
imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from 0
at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the
ladder represents the best possible life for you
and the bottom of the ladder represents the
worst possible life for you. On which step of
the ladder would you say you personally feel
you stand at this time?”1 We will, as usual,
present the average life evaluation scores for
each country, based on averages from surveys
covering the most recent three-year period, in
this report including 2014-2016.
This will be followed, as in earlier editions, by
our latest attempts to show how six key variables
contribute to explaining the full sample of national
annual average scores over the whole period
2005-2016. These variables include GDP per
capita, social support, healthy life expectancy,
social freedom, generosity, and absence of corruption. Note that we do not construct our happiness
measure in each country using these six factors—
rather we exploit them to explain the variation
of happiness across countries. We shall also show
how measures of experienced well-being, especially
positive emotions, add to life circumstances in
explaining higher life evaluations.

We shall then turn to consider how different
aspects of the social context affect the levels and
distribution of life evaluations among individuals
within and among countries. Previous World
Happiness Reports have shown that of the international variation in life evaluations explainable
by the six key variables, about half comes from
GDP per capita and healthy life expectancy, with
the rest flowing from four variables reflecting
different aspects of the social context. In World
Happiness Report 2017 we dig deeper into these
social foundations, and explore in more detail
the different ways in which social factors can
explain differences among individuals and
nations in how highly they rate their lives. We
shall consider here not just the four factors that
measure different aspects of the social context,
but also how the social context influences the
other two key variables—real per capita incomes
and healthy life expectancy.
This chapter begins with an updated review of
how and why we use life evaluations as our
central measure of subjective well-being within
and among nations. We then present data for
average levels of life evaluations within and
among countries and global regions. This will
be followed by our latest efforts to explain the
differences in national average evaluations,
across countries and over time. This is followed
by a presentation of the latest data on changes
between 2005-2007 and 2014-2016 in average
national life evaluations. Finally, we turn to
our more detailed consideration of the social
foundations of world happiness, followed by
a concluding summary of our latest evidence
and its implications.
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Measuring and Understanding
Happiness
Chapter 2 of the first World Happiness Report
explained the strides that had been made during
the preceding three decades, mainly within
psychology, in the development and validation
of a variety of measures of subjective well-being.
Progress since then has moved faster, as the
number of scientific papers on the topic has
continued to grow rapidly,2 and as the measurement of subjective well-being has been taken
up by more national and international statistical
agencies, guided by technical advice from experts
in the field.
By the time of the first report, there was already
a clear distinction to be made among three main
classes of subjective measures: life evaluations,
positive emotional experiences (positive affect),
and negative emotional experiences (negative

affect) (see Technical Box 1). The Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) subsequently released Guidelines on
Measuring Subjective Well-being,3 which included
both short and longer recommended modules of
subjective well-being questions.4 The centerpiece
of the OECD short module was a life evaluation
question, asking respondents to assess their
satisfaction with their current lives on a 0 to 10
scale. This was to be accompanied by two or
three affect questions and a question about the
extent to which the respondents felt they had a
purpose or meaning in their lives. The latter
question, which we treat as an important support
for subjective well-being, rather than a direct
measure of it, is of a type that has come to be
called “eudaimonic,” in honor of Aristotle, who
believed that having such a purpose would be
central to any reflective individual’s assessment
of the quality of his or her own life.5

Technical Box 1: Measuring Subjective Well-Being

The OECD (2013, p.10) Guidelines on Measuring
of Subjective Well-being define and recommend
the following measures of subjective well-being:
“Good mental states, including all of the various
evaluations, positive and negative, that people
make of their lives and the affective reactions of
people to their experiences.
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… This definition of subjective well-being hence
encompasses three elements:
1. Life evaluation—a reflective assessment on a
person’s life or some specific aspect of it.
2. Affect—a person’s feelings or emotional
states, typically measured with reference to
a particular point in time.
3. Eudaimonia—a sense of meaning and purpose
in life, or good psychological functioning.”

Almost all OECD countries6 now contain a life
evaluation question, usually about life satisfaction, on a 0 to 10 rating scale, in one or more of
their surveys. However, it will be many years before the accumulated efforts of national statistical offices will produce as large a number of
comparable country surveys as is now available
through the Gallup World Poll (GWP), which
has been surveying an increasing number of
countries since 2005 and now includes almost
all of the world’s population. The GWP contains
one life evaluation as well as a range of positive
and negative experiential questions, including
several measures of positive and negative affect,
mainly asked with respect to the previous day.
In this chapter, we make primary use of the life
evaluations, since they are, as shown in Table
2.1, more international in their variation and
more readily explained by life circumstances.

WORLD HAPPINESS REPORT 2017

Analysis over the past ten years has clarified
what can be learned from different measures
of subjective well-being.7 What are the main
messages? First, all three of the commonly
used life evaluations (specifically Cantril ladder,
satisfaction with life, and happiness with life in
general) tell almost identical stories about the
nature and relative importance of the various
factors influencing subjective well-being. For
example, for several years it was thought (and
is still sometimes reported in the literature)
that respondents’ answers to the Cantril ladder
question, with its use of a ladder as a framing
device, were more dependent on their incomes
than were answers to questions about satisfaction with life. The evidence for this came from
comparing modeling using the Cantril ladder in
the Gallup World Poll (GWP) with modeling
based on life satisfaction answers in the World
Values Survey (WVS). But this conclusion was
due to combining survey and method differences
with the effects of question wording. When it
subsequently became possible to ask both
questions8 of the same respondents on the
same scales, as was the case in the Gallup
World Poll in 2007, it was shown that the
estimated income effects and almost all other
structural influences were identical, and a more
powerful explanation was obtained by using an
average of the two answers.9
People also worried at one time that when
questions included the word “happiness” they
elicited answers that were less dependent on
income than were answers to life satisfaction
questions or the Cantril ladder.10 For this
important question, no definitive answer was
available until the European Social Survey (ESS)
asked the same respondents “satisfaction with
life” and “happy with life” questions, wisely
using the same 0 to 10 response scales. The
answers showed that income and other key
variables all have the same effects on the “happy
with life” answers as on the “satisfied with life”
answers, so much so that once again more
powerful explanations come from averaging the
two answers.

A related strand of literature, based on GWP
data, compared happiness yesterday, which is
an experiential/emotional response, with the
Cantril ladder, which is equally clearly an evaluative measure. In this context, the finding that
income has more purchase on life evaluations
than on emotions seems to have general applicability, and stands as an established result.11
Another previously common view was that
changes in life evaluations at the individual level
were largely transitory, returning to their baseline
as people rapidly adapt to their circumstances.
This view has been rejected by four independent
lines of evidence. First, average life evaluations
differ significantly and systematically among
countries, and these differences are substantially
explained by life circumstances. This implies
that rapid and complete adaptation to different
life circumstances does not take place. Second,
there is evidence of long-standing trends in the
life evaluations of sub-populations within the
same country, further demonstrating that life
evaluations can be changed within policy-relevant time scales.12 Third, even though individual-level partial adaptation to major life events is
a normal human response, there is very strong
evidence of continuing influence on well-being
from major disabilities and unemployment,
among other life events.13 The case of marriage
has been subject to some debate. Some results
using panel data from the UK suggested that
people return to baseline levels of life satisfaction
several years after marriage, a finding that has
been argued to support the more general applicability of set points.14 However, subsequent
research using the same data has shown that
marriage does indeed have long-lasting well-being benefits, especially in protecting the married
from as large a decline in the middle-age years
that in many countries represent a low-point in
life evaluations.15 Fourth, and especially relevant
in the global context, are studies of migration
showing migrants to have average levels and
distributions of life evaluations that resemble
those of other residents of their new countries
more than of comparable residents in the
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countries from which they have emigrated.16
This confirms that life evaluations do depend
on life circumstances, and are not destined to
return to baseline levels as required by the set
point hypothesis.

Why Use Life Evaluations for
International Comparisons of
the Quality of Life?
We continue to find that experiential and evaluative measures differ from each other in ways
that help to understand and validate both, and
that life evaluations provide the most informative
measures for international comparisons because
they capture the overall quality of life as a whole
in a more complete and stable way than do
emotional reports based on daily experiences.
For example, experiential reports about happiness
yesterday are well explained by events of the
day being asked about, while life evaluations
more closely reflect the circumstances of life as
a whole. Most Americans sampled daily in the
Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index Survey feel
happier on weekends, to an extent that depends
on the social context on and off the job. The
weekend effect disappears for those employed in
a high trust workplace, who regard their superior
more as a partner than a boss, and maintain their
social life during weekdays.17
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By contrast, life evaluations by the same respondents in that same survey show no weekend
effects.18 This means that when they are answering the evaluative question about life as a whole,
people see through the day-to-day and hour-tohour fluctuations, so that the answers they give
on weekdays and weekends do not differ.
On the other hand, although life evaluations do
not vary by the day of week, they are much more
responsive than emotional reports to differences
in life circumstances. This is true whether the
comparison is among national averages19 or
among individuals.20

Furthermore, life evaluations vary more between
countries than do emotions. Thus almost
one-quarter of the global variation in life
evaluations is among countries, compared to
three-quarters among individuals in the same
country. This one-quarter share for life evaluations is far higher than for either positive affect
(7 percent) or negative affect (4 percent). This
difference is partly due to the role of income,
which plays a stronger role in life evaluations
than in emotions, and is also more unequally
spread among countries than are life evaluations,
emotions, or any of the other variables used
to explain them. For example, more than 40
percent of the global variation among household
incomes is among nations rather than among
individuals within nations.21
These twin facts—that life evaluations vary
much more than do emotions across countries,
and that these life evaluations are much more
fully explained by life circumstances than are
emotional reports– provide for us a sufficient
reason for using life evaluations as our central
measure for making international comparisons.22
But there is more. To give a central role to life
evaluations does not mean we must either
ignore or downplay the important information
provided by experiential measures. On the
contrary, we see every reason to keep experiential
measures of well-being, as well as measures
of life purpose, as important elements in our
attempts to measure and understand subjective
well-being. This is easy to achieve, at least in
principle, because our evidence continues to
suggest that experienced well-being and a sense
of life purpose are both important influences
on life evaluations, above and beyond the critical
role of life circumstances. We provide direct
evidence of this, and especially of the importance
of positive emotions, in Table 2.1. Furthermore,
in Chapter 3 of World Happiness Report 2015 we
gave experiential reports a central role in our
analysis of variations of subjective well-being
across genders, age groups, and global regions.
Although we often found significant differences
by gender and age, and that these
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patterns varied among the different measures,
these differences were far smaller than the
international differences in life evaluations.
We would also like to be able to compare
inequality measures for life evaluations with
those for emotions, but this is unfortunately
not currently possible as the Gallup World Poll
emotion questions all offer only yes and no
responses. Thus we can know nothing about
their distribution beyond the national average
shares of yes and no answers. For life evaluations,
however, there are 11 response categories, so we
were able, in World Happiness Report 2016 Update
to contrast distribution shapes for each country
and region, and see how these evolved with the
passage of time.
Why do we use people’s actual life evaluations
rather than some index of factors likely to influence
well-being? We have four main reasons:
First, we attach fundamental importance to the
evaluations that people make of their own lives.
This gives them a reality and power that no
expert-constructed index could ever have. For a
report that strives for objectivity, it is very important
that the rankings depend entirely on the basic
data collected from population-based samples of
individuals, and not at all on what we think might
influence the quality of their lives. The average
scores simply reflect what individual respondents
report to the Gallup World Poll surveyors.
Second, the fact that life evaluations represent
primary new knowledge about the value people
attach to their lives means we can use the data as
a basis for research designed to show what helps
to support better lives. This is especially useful
in helping us to discover the relative importance
of different life circumstances, thereby making
it easier to find and compare alternative ways to
improve well-being.

Third, the fact that our data come from population-based samples in each country means that
we can present confidence regions for our
estimates, thus providing a way to see if the
rankings are based on differences big enough to
be statistically meaningful.
Fourth, all of the alternative indexes depend
importantly, but to an unknown extent, on the
index-makers’ opinions about what is important.
This uncertainty makes it hard to treat such an
index as an overall measure of well-being, since
the index itself is just the sum of its parts, and
not an independent measure of well-being.
We turn now to consider the population-weighted
global and regional distributions of individual
life evaluations, based on how respondents rate
their lives. In the rest of this Chapter, the Cantril
ladder is the primary measure of life evaluations
used, and “happiness” and “subjective well-being” are used interchangeably. All the global
analysis on the levels or changes of subjective
well-being refers only to life evaluations, specifically, the Cantril ladder.

Life Evaluations Around the World
The various panels of Figure 2.1 contain bar
charts showing for the world as a whole, and
for each of 10 global regions23, the distribution
of the 2014-2016 answers to the Cantril ladder
question asking respondents to value their lives
today on a 0 to 10 scale, with the worst possible
life as a 0 and the best possible life as a 10.
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Figure 2.1: Population-Weighted Distributions of Happiness, 2014-2016
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In Table 2.1 we present our latest modeling of
national average life evaluations and measures
of positive and negative affect (emotion) by
country and year. For ease of comparison, the
table has the same basic structure as Table 2.1
in the World Happiness Report Update 2016. The
major difference comes from the inclusion of
data for late 2015 and all of 2016, which increases
by 131 (or about 12 percent) the number of
country-year observations.24 The resulting
changes to the estimated equation are very
slight.25 There are four equations in Table 2.1.
The first equation provides the basis for
constructing the sub-bars shown in Figure 2.2.
The results in the first column of Table 2.1
explain national average life evaluations in terms
of six key variables: GDP per capita, social
support, healthy life expectancy, freedom to
make life choices, generosity, and freedom from
corruption.26 Taken together, these six variables
explain almost three-quarters of the variation in
national annual average ladder scores among
countries, using data from the years 2005 to
2016. The model’s predictive power is little
changed if the year fixed effects in the model are
removed, falling from 74.6% to 74.0% in terms
of the adjusted R-squared.
The second and third columns of Table 2.1 use
the same six variables to estimate equations for
national averages of positive and negative affect,
where both are based on averages for answers
about yesterday’s emotional experiences. In
general, the emotional measures, and especially
negative emotions, are much less fully explained
by the six variables than are life evaluations. Yet,
the differences vary greatly from one circumstance to another. Per capita income and healthy
life expectancy have significant effects on life
evaluations, but not, in these national average
data, on either positive or negative affect. The
situation changes when we consider social
variables. Bearing in mind that positive and
negative affect are measured on a 0 to 1 scale,
while life evaluations are on a 0 to 10 scale,
social support can be seen to have a similar

proportionate effect on positive and negative
emotions as on life evaluations. Freedom and
generosity have even larger influences on
positive affect than on the ladder. Negative
affect is significantly reduced by social support,
freedom, and absence of corruption.
In the fourth column we re-estimate the life
evaluation equation from column 1, adding
both positive and negative affect to partially
implement the Aristotelian presumption that
sustained positive emotions are important
supports for a good life.27 The most striking
feature is the extent to which the results
buttress a finding in psychology that the existence of positive emotions matters much more
than the absence of negative ones. Positive affect
has a large and highly significant impact in the
final equation of Table 2.1, while negative affect
has none.
As for the coefficients on the other variables in
the final equation, the changes are material only
on those variables—especially freedom and
generosity—that have the largest impacts on
positive affect. Thus we can infer first, that
positive emotions play a strong role in support
of life evaluations, and second, that most of the
impact of freedom and generosity on life evaluations is mediated by their influence on positive
emotions. That is, freedom and generosity have
large impacts on positive affect, which in turn
has a major impact on life evaluations. The
Gallup World Poll does not have a widely available measure of life purpose to test whether it
too would play a strong role in support of high
life evaluations. However, newly available data
from the large samples of UK data does suggest
that life purpose plays a strongly supportive role,
independent of the roles of life circumstances
and positive emotions.

15

Table 2.1: Regressions to Explain Average Happiness across Countries (Pooled OLS)
Independent Variable
Log GDP per capita

Cantril Ladder
0.341
(0.06)***

Dependent Variable
Positive Affect Negative Affect
-.002
0.01
(0.009)
(0.008)

Cantril Ladder
0.343
(0.06)***

Social support

2.332
(0.407)***

0.255
(0.051)***

-0.258
(0.047)***

1.813
(0.407)***

Healthy life expectancy at birth

0.029
(0.008)***

0.0002
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

0.028
(0.008)***

1.098
(0.31)***

0.325
(0.039)***

-.081
(0.043)*

0.403
(0.301)

0.842
(0.273)***

0.164
(0.031)***

-.006
(0.029)

0.482
(0.275)*

-.533
(0.287)*

0.029
(0.028)

0.095
(0.025)***

-.607
(0.276)**

Freedom to make life choices
Generosity
Perceptions of corruption
Positive affect

2.199
(0.428)***

Negative affect
Year fixed effects
Number of countries
Number of obs.
Adjusted R-squared

0.153
(0.474)
Included
155
1,249
0.746

Included
155
1,246
0.49

Included
155
1,248
0.233

Included
155
1,245
0.767

Notes: This is a pooled OLS regression for a tattered panel explaining annual national average Cantril ladder
responses from all available surveys from 2005 to 2016. See Technical Box 2 for detailed information about each of
the predictors. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
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Technical Box 2: Detailed Information About Each of the Predictors in Table 2.1

1. GDP per capita is in terms of Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP) adjusted to constant 2011
international dollars, taken from the World
Development Indicators (WDI) released by
the World Bank in August 2016. See the
appendix for more details. GDP data for 2016
are not yet available, so we extend the GDP
time series from 2015 to 2016 using country-specific forecasts of real GDP growth from
the OECD Economic Outlook No. 99 (Edition
2016/1) and World Bank’s Global Economic
Prospects (Last Updated: 01/06/2016), after
adjustment for population growth. The equation uses the natural log of GDP per capita, as
this form fits the data significantly better than
GDP per capita.
2. The time series of healthy life expectancy at
birth are constructed based on data from the
World Health Organization (WHO) and
WDI. WHO publishes the data on healthy life
expectancy for the year 2012. The time series
of life expectancies, with no adjustment for
health, are available in WDI. We adopt the
following strategy to construct the time series
of healthy life expectancy at birth: first we
generate the ratios of healthy life expectancy
to life expectancy in 2012 for countries with
both data. We then apply the country-specific
ratios to other years to generate the healthy
life expectancy data. See the appendix for
more details.
3. Social support is the national average of the
binary responses (either 0 or 1) to the Gallup
World Poll (GWP) question “If you were in
trouble, do you have relatives or friends you
can count on to help you whenever you need
them, or not?”

4. Freedom to make life choices is the national
average of binary responses to the GWP
question “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied
with your freedom to choose what you do
with your life?”
5. Generosity is the residual of regressing the
national average of GWP responses to the
question “Have you donated money to a charity
in the past month?” on GDP per capita.
6. Perceptions of corruption are the average of
binary answers to two GWP questions: “Is
corruption widespread throughout the
government or not?” and “Is corruption
widespread within businesses or not?”
Where data for government corruption
are missing, the perception of business
corruption is used as the overall corruption-perception measure.
7. P
 ositive affect is defined as the average of
previous-day affect measures for happiness,
laughter, and enjoyment for GWP waves 3-7
(years 2008 to 2012, and some in 2013). It is
defined as the average of laughter and enjoyment for other waves where the happiness
question was not asked.
8. Negative affect is defined as the average of
previous-day affect measures for worry, sadness, and anger for all waves. See the appendix
for more details.
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Ranking of Happiness by Country
Figure 2.2 (pp. 20-22) shows the average ladder
score (the average answer to the Cantril ladder
question, asking people to evaluate the quality
of their current lives on a scale of 0 to 10) for
each country, averaged over the years 2014-2016.
Not every country has surveys in every year; the
total sample sizes are reported in the statistical
appendix, and they are reflected in Figure 2.2
by the horizontal lines showing the 95 percent
confidence regions. The confidence regions
are tighter for countries with larger samples.
To increase the number of countries ranked, we
also include one that had no 2014-2016 surveys,
but did have one in 2013. This brings the number of countries shown in Figure 2.2 to 155.
The length of each overall bar represents the
average score, which is also shown in numerals.
The rankings in Figure 2.2 depend only on
the average Cantril ladder scores reported by
the respondents.
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Each of these bars is divided into seven segments, showing our research efforts to find
possible sources for the ladder levels. The first
six sub-bars show how much each of the six key
variables is calculated to contribute to that
country’s ladder score, relative to that in a
hypothetical country called Dystopia, so named
because it has values equal to the world’s lowest
national averages for 2014-2016 for each of
the six key variables used in Table 2.1. We use
Dystopia as a benchmark against which to
compare each other country’s performance in
terms of each of the six factors. This choice of
benchmark permits every real country to have
a non-negative contribution from each of the
six factors. We calculate, based on estimates in
Table 2.1, that Dystopia had a 2014-2016 ladder
score equal to 1.85 on the 0 to 10 scale. The final
sub-bar is the sum of two components: the
calculated average 2014-2016 life evaluation in
Dystopia (=1.85) and each country’s own prediction error, which measures the extent to which
life evaluations are higher or lower than predicted

by our equation in the first column of
Table 2.1. The residuals are as likely to
be negative as positive.28
Returning to the six sub-bars showing the
contribution of each factor to each country’s
average life evaluation, it might help to show in
more detail how this is done. Taking the example
of healthy life expectancy, the sub-bar for this
factor in the case of Mexico is equal to the
amount by which healthy life expectancy in
Mexico exceeds the world’s lowest value, multiplied by the Table 2.1 coefficient for the influence
of healthy life expectancy on life evaluations.
The width of these different sub-bars then
shows, country-by-country, how much each of
the six variables is estimated to contribute to
explaining the international ladder differences.
These calculations are illustrative rather than
conclusive, for several reasons. First, the selection
of candidate variables is restricted by what is
available for all these countries. Traditional
variables like GDP per capita and healthy life
expectancy are widely available. But measures of
the quality of the social context, which have been
shown in experiments and national surveys to
have strong links to life evaluations, have not
been sufficiently surveyed in the Gallup or other
global polls, or otherwise measured in statistics
available for all countries. Even with this limited
choice, we find that four variables covering
different aspects of the social and institutional
context—having someone to count on, generosity,
freedom to make life choices and absence of
corruption—are together responsible for more
than half of the average difference between each
country’s predicted ladder score and that in
Dystopia in the 2014-2016 period. As shown in
Table 18 of the Statistical Appendix, the average
country has a 2014-2016 ladder score that is
3.5 points above the Dystopia ladder score of
1.85. Of the 3.5 points, the largest single part
(34 percent) comes from social support, followed
by GDP per capita (28 percent) and healthy life
expectancy (16 percent), and then freedom (12
percent), generosity (7 percent), and corruption
(4 percent).29
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Our limited choice means that the variables we
use may be taking credit properly due to other
better variables, or to un-measurable other
factors. There are also likely to be vicious or
virtuous circles, with two-way linkages among
the variables. For example, there is much
evidence that those who have happier lives are
likely to live longer, be most trusting, be more
cooperative, and be generally better able to meet
life’s demands.30 This will feed back to improve
health, GDP, generosity, corruption, and sense
of freedom. Finally, some of the variables are
derived from the same respondents as the life
evaluations and hence possibly determined by
common factors. This risk is less using national
averages, because individual differences in
personality and many life circumstances tend to
average out at the national level.

others lower. The residual simply represents that
part of the national average ladder score that is
not explained by our model; with the residual
included, the sum of all the sub-bars adds up to
the actual average life evaluations on which the
rankings are based.

To provide more assurance that our results are
not seriously biased because we are using the
same respondents to report life evaluations,
social support, freedom, generosity, and
corruption, we have tested the robustness of
our procedure this year (see Statistical Appendix
for more detail). We did this by splitting each
country’s respondents randomly into two
groups, and using the average values for one
group for social support, freedom, generosity,
and absence of corruption in the equations to
explain average life evaluations in the other half
of the sample. The coefficients on each of the
four variables fall, just as we would expect. But
the changes are reassuringly small (ranging
from 1% to 5%) and are far from being statistically significant.31
The seventh and final segment is the sum of
two components. The first component is a fixed
number representing our calculation of the
2014-2016 ladder score for Dystopia (=1.85). The
second component is the average 2014-2016
residual for each country. The sum of these two
components comprises the right-hand sub-bar
for each country; it varies from one country
to the next because some countries have life
evaluations above their predicted values, and
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Figure 2.2: Ranking of Happiness 2014-2016 (Part 1)
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Switzerland (7.494)
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Netherlands (7.377)
Canada (7.316)
New Zealand (7.314)
Australia (7.284)
Sweden (7.284)
Israel (7.213)
Costa Rica (7.079)
Austria (7.006)
United States (6.993)
Ireland (6.977)
Germany (6.951)
Belgium (6.891)
Luxembourg (6.863)
United Kingdom (6.714)
Chile (6.652)
United Arab Emirates (6.648)
Brazil (6.635)
Czech Republic (6.609)
Argentina (6.599)
Mexico (6.578)
Singapore (6.572)
Malta (6.527)
Uruguay (6.454)
Guatemala (6.454)
Panama (6.452)
France (6.442)
Thailand (6.424)
Taiwan Province of China (6.422)
Spain (6.403)
Qatar (6.375)
Colombia (6.357)
Saudi Arabia (6.344)
Trinidad and Tobago (6.168)
Kuwait (6.105)
Slovakia (6.098)
Bahrain (6.087)
Malaysia (6.084)
Nicaragua (6.071)
Ecuador (6.008)
El Salvador (6.003)
Poland (5.973)
Uzbekistan (5.971)
Italy (5.964)
Russia (5.963)
Belize (5.956)
Japan (5.920)
Lithuania (5.902)
Algeria (5.872)
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Figure 2.2: Ranking of Happiness 2014-2016 (Part 2)
54. Latvia (5.850)
55. South Korea (5.838)
56. Moldova (5.838)
57. Romania (5.825)
58. Bolivia (5.823)
59. Turkmenistan (5.822)
60. Kazakhstan (5.819)
61. North Cyprus (5.810)
62. Slovenia (5.758)
63. Peru (5.715)
64. Mauritius (5.629)
65. Cyprus (5.621)
66. Estonia (5.611)
67. Belarus (5.569)
68. Libya (5.525)
69. Turkey (5.500)
70. Paraguay (5.493)
71. Hong Kong S.A.R., China (5.472)
72. Philippines (5.430)
73. Serbia (5.395)
74. Jordan (5.336)
75. Hungary (5.324)
76. Jamaica (5.311)
77. Croatia (5.293)
78. Kosovo (5.279)
79. China (5.273)
80. Pakistan (5.269)
81. Indonesia (5.262)
82. Venezuela (5.250)
83. Montenegro (5.237)
84. Morocco (5.235)
85. Azerbaijan (5.234)
86. Dominican Republic (5.230)
87. Greece (5.227)
88. Lebanon (5.225)
89. Portugal (5.195)
90. Bosnia and Herzegovina (5.182)
91. Honduras (5.181)
92. Macedonia (5.175)
93. Somalia (5.151)
94. Vietnam (5.074)
95. Nigeria (5.074)
96. Tajikistan (5.041)
97. Bhutan (5.011)
98. Kyrgyzstan (5.004)
99. Nepal (4.962)
100. Mongolia (4.955)
101. South Africa (4.829)
102. Tunisia (4.805)
103. Palestinian Territories (4.775)
104. Egypt (4.735)
105. Bulgaria (4.714)
106. Sierra Leone (4.709)
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Figure 2.2: Ranking of Happiness 2014-2016 (Part 3)
107. Cameroon (4.695)
108. Iran (4.692)
109. Albania (4.644)
110. Bangladesh (4.608)
111. Namibia (4.574)
112. Kenya (4.553)
113. Mozambique (4.550)
114. Myanmar (4.545)
115. Senegal (4.535)
116. Zambia (4.514)
117. Iraq (4.497)
118. Gabon (4.465)
119. Ethiopia (4.460)
120. Sri Lanka (4.440)
121. Armenia (4.376)
122. India (4.315)
123. Mauritania (4.292)
124. Congo (Brazzaville) (4.291)
125. Georgia (4.286)
126. Congo (Kinshasa) (4.280)
127. Mali (4.190)
128. Ivory Coast (4.180)
129. Cambodia (4.168)
130. Sudan (4.139)
131. Ghana (4.120)
132. Ukraine (4.096)
133. Uganda (4.081)
134. Burkina Faso (4.032)
135. Niger (4.028)
136. Malawi (3.970)
137. Chad (3.936)
138. Zimbabwe (3.875)
139. Lesotho (3.808)
140. Angola (3.795)
141. Afghanistan (3.794)
142. Botswana (3.766)
143. Benin (3.657)
144. Madagascar (3.644)
145. Haiti (3.603)
146. Yemen (3.593)
147. South Sudan (3.591)
148. Liberia (3.533)
149. Guinea (3.507)
150. Togo (3.495)
151. Rwanda (3.471)
152. Syria (3.462)
153. Tanzania (3.349)
154. Burundi (2.905)
155. Central African Republic (2.693)
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What do the latest data show for the 2014-2016
country rankings? Two features carry over from
previous editions of the World Happiness Report.
First, there is a lot of year-to-year consistency
in the way people rate their lives in different
countries. Thus there remains a four-point
gap between the 10 top-ranked and the 10
bottom-ranked countries. The top 10 countries
in Figure 2.2 are the same countries that were
top-ranked in World Happiness Report 2016
Update, although there has been some swapping
of places, as is to be expected among countries
so closely grouped in average scores. The top
four countries are the same ones that held the
top four positions in World Happiness Report 2016
Update, with Norway moving up from 4th place
to overtake Denmark at the top of the ranking.
Denmark is now in 2nd place, while Iceland
remains in 3rd, Switzerland is now 4th, and
Finland remains in 5th position. Netherlands
and Canada have traded places, with Netherlands
now 6th, and Canada 7th. The remaining three
in the top ten have the same order as in the
World Happiness Report 2016 Update, with New
Zealand 8th, Australia 9th, and Sweden 10th. In
Figure 2.2, the average ladder score differs only
by 0.25 points between the top country and the
10th country, and only 0.043 between the 1st
and 4th countries. The 10 countries with the
lowest average life evaluations are somewhat
different from those in 2016, partly due to some
countries returning to the surveyed group—the
Central African Republic, for example, and some
quite large changes in average ladder scores, up
for Togo and Afghanistan, and down for Tanzania, South Sudan, and Yemen. Compared to the
top 10 countries in the current ranking, there is
a much bigger range of scores covered by the
bottom 10 countries. Within this group, average
scores differ by as much as 0.9 points, more
than one-quarter of the average national score in
the group. Tanzania and Rwanda have anomalous
scores, in the sense that their predicted values,
which are based on their performance on the six
key variables, are high enough to rank them
much higher than do the survey answers.

Despite the general consistency among the top
countries scores, there have been many significant changes in the rest of the countries. Looking
at changes over the longer term, many countries
have exhibited substantial changes in average
scores, and hence in country rankings, between
2005–2007 and 2014–2016, as shown later in
more detail.
When looking at average ladder scores, it is also
important to note the horizontal whisker lines
at the right-hand end of the main bar for each
country. These lines denote the 95 percent
confidence regions for the estimates, so that
countries with overlapping error bars have
scores that do not significantly differ from each
other. Thus it can be seen that the five topranked countries (Norway, Denmark, Iceland,
Switzerland, and Finland) have overlapping
confidence regions, and all have national average
ladder scores either above or just below 7.5. The
remaining five of the top ten countries are closely
grouped in a narrow range from 7.377 for
Netherlands in 6th place, to 7.284 for Sweden in
10th place.
Average life evaluations in the top 10 countries
are thus more than twice as high as in the
bottom 10. If we use the first equation of Table
2.1 to look for possible reasons for these very
different life evaluations, it suggests that of the
4 point difference, 3.25 points can be traced to
differences in the six key factors: 1.15 points
from the GDP per capita gap, 0.86 due to
differences in social support, 0.57 to differences
in healthy life expectancy, 0.33 to differences in
freedom, 0.2 to differences in corruption, and
0.13 to differences in generosity. Income differences are more than one-third of the total
explanation because, of the six factors, income is
the most unequally distributed among countries.
GDP per capita is 25 times higher in the top 10
than in the bottom 10 countries.32
Overall, the model explains quite well the life
evaluation differences within as well as between

23

regions and for the world as a whole.33 On
average, however, the countries of Latin America
still have mean life evaluations that are higher
(by about 0.6 on the 0 to 10 scale) than predicted
by the model. This difference has been found in
earlier work and been considered to represent
systematic personality differences, some unique
features of family and social life in Latin countries,
or some other cultural differences.34 In partial
contrast, the countries of East Asia have average
life evaluations below those predicted by the

model, a finding that has been thought to
reflect, at least in part, cultural differences in
response style. It is also possible that both
differences are in substantial measure due to
the existence of important excluded features of
life that are more prevalent in those countries
than elsewhere.35 It is reassuring that our
findings about the relative importance of the
six factors are generally unaffected by whether
or not we make explicit allowance for these
regional differences.36

Technical Box 3: Country Happiness Averages are Based on Resident Populations,
Sometimes Including Large Non-national Populations

The happiness scores used in this report are intended to be representative of resident populations of each country regardless of their citizenship. This reflects standard census practice, and
thereby includes all of the world’s population in
the survey frame, as appropriate for a full accounting of world happiness. Some countries
have very large shares of residents who are not
citizens (non-Nationals). This is especially true
for member countries of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC). In United Arab Emirates and
Qatar, for example, non-Nationals are estimated
to comprise well over 80% of the country’s total
population. The following table compares the
happiness scores of GCC countries’ Nationals
and non-Nationals over the period from 20142016, focusing on those that have sufficiently
large numbers of survey respondents in both
categories of Nationals and non-Nationals (exceeding 300 over the 3-year period).
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Country

Total
population

Nationals
only

Non-Nationals

Bahrain
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
UAE

6.09
6.10
6.34
6.65

5.64
6.58
6.45
7.11

6.41
5.85
6.13
6.57

The table does not include Oman because it was
not surveyed between 2014 and 2016. It does
not include Qatar because there was only one
survey in the period, with the number of Nationals surveyed being less than 100. We are grateful
to Gallup for data and advice on tabulations.
The sources and nature of the differences in life
evaluations between migrants and non-migrants
deserve more research in a world with increasingly mobile populations. We are planning in
World Happiness Report 2018 to do a deeper analysis of migration and its consequences for the
happiness of migrants and others in the nations
from which and to which they move.
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Gallup World Poll are available. We present
first the changes in average life evaluations. In
Figure 2.3 we show the changes in happiness
levels for all 126 countries having sufficient
numbers of observations for both 2005-2007
and 2014-2016.37

Changes in the Levels of Happiness
In this section we consider how life evaluations
have changed. For life evaluations, we consider
the changes from 2005-2007 before the onset
of the global recession, to 2014-2016, the most
recent three-year period for which data from the

Figure 2.3: Changes in Happiness from 2005-2007 to 2014-2016 (Part 1)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Nicaragua (1.364)
Latvia (1.162)
Sierra Leone (1.103)
Ecuador (0.998)
Moldova (0.899)
Bulgaria (0.870)
Russia (0.845)
Slovakia (0.833)
Chile (0.773)
Uzbekistan (0.739)
Uruguay (0.714)
Peru (0.702)
Macedonia (0.681)
Serbia (0.645)
Romania (0.606)
Cameroon (0.595)
Georgia (0.595)
Azerbaijan (0.584)
Thailand (0.581)
Philippines (0.576)
China (0.552)
Tajikistan (0.519)
El Salvador (0.507)
Paraguay (0.491)
Germany (0.442)
Argentina (0.406)
Mongolia (0.346)
Palestinian Territories (0.342)
Guatemala (0.341)
Trinidad and Tobago (0.336)
Kyrgyzstan (0.334)
Benin (0.327)
Turkey (0.327)
Bolivia (0.323)
Zimbabwe (0.321)
Cambodia (0.306)
Nepal (0.304)
South Korea (0.299)
Togo (0.292)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (0.283)
Colombia (0.275)
Nigeria (0.273)
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Estonia (0.260)
Hungary (0.249)
Indonesia (0.243)
Poland (0.236)
Taiwan Province of China (0.233)
Kazakhstan (0.222)
Israel (0.204)
Mali (0.176)
Kosovo (0.175)
Brazil (0.157)
Lebanon (0.154)
Kenya (0.153)
Chad (0.148)
Dominican Republic (0.145)
Mauritania (0.143)
Czech Republic (0.138)
Bangladesh (0.135)
Burkina Faso (0.122)
Norway (0.121)
Zambia (0.100)
Sri Lanka (0.061)
Montenegro (0.041)
Kuwait (0.029)
Niger (0.029)
Mexico (0.025)
Switzerland (0.021)
Lithuania (0.020)
Albania (0.010)
Senegal (-0.012)
Uganda (-0.015)
Sweden (-0.025)
Australia (-0.026)
Hong Kong S.A.R., China (-0.040)
Slovenia (-0.053)
Malaysia (-0.053)
Panama (-0.059)
Honduras (-0.065)
Singapore (-0.068)
Belarus (-0.068)
Netherlands (-0.081)
United Arab Emirates (-0.086)
Austria (-0.116)
New Zealand (-0.118)
Canada (-0.129)
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Figure 2.3: Changes in Happiness from 2005-2007 to 2014-2016 (Part 3)
87. Haiti (-0.151)
88. Mozambique (-0.163)
89. Ireland (-0.167)
90. Liberia (-0.169)
91. United Kingdom (-0.172)
92. Costa Rica (-0.178)
93. Finland (-0.203)
94. Armenia (-0.210)
95. Portugal (-0.210)
96. Pakistan (-0.237)
97. Vietnam (-0.285)
98. Namibia (-0.312)
99. South Africa (-0.316)
100. Madagascar (-0.336)
101. Belgium (-0.349)
102. France (-0.372)
103. United States (-0.372)
104. Malawi (-0.391)
105. Denmark (-0.404)
106. Japan (-0.447)
107. Belize (-0.495)
108. Croatia (-0.528)
109. Jordan (-0.605)
110. Cyprus (-0.617)
111. Egypt (-0.624)
112. Iran (-0.629)
113. Spain (-0.669)
114. Rwanda (-0.744)
115. Italy (-0.749)
116. Ghana (-0.757)
117. Tanzania (-0.776)
118. Saudi Arabia (-0.829)
119. India (-0.839)
120. Yemen (-0.884)
121. Jamaica (-0.897)
122. Ukraine (-0.930)
123. Botswana (-0.973)
124. Greece (-1.099)
125. Central African Republic (-1.467)
126. Venezuela (-1.597)
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Of the 126 countries with data for 2005-2007
and 2014-2016, 95 had significant changes, 58
of which were significant increases, ranging
from 0.12 to 1.36 points on the 0 to 10 scale.
There were 38 showing significant decreases,
ranging from -0.12 to -1.6 points, while the
remaining 30 countries revealed no significant
trend from 2005-2007 to 2014-2016. As shown
in Table 34 of the Statistical Appendix, the
significant gains and losses are very unevenly
distributed across the world, and sometimes
also within continents. For example, in Western
Europe there were 11 significant losses but only
1 significant gain. In Central and Eastern Europe,
by contrast, these results were reversed, with 12
significant gains against 1 loss. Two other regions
had many more significant gainers than losers,
as measured by country counts. Latin America
and the Caribbean had 13 significant gainers
against 4 losses, and the Commonwealth of
Independent States had 8 gains against 2 losses.
In all other world regions, the numbers of
significant gains and losses were much more
equally divided.
Among the 20 top gainers, all of which showed
average ladder scores increasing by 0.50 or
more, eleven are in the Commonwealth of
Independent States, Central and Eastern Europe,
five in Latin America, two in sub-Saharan Africa,
Thailand and Philippines in Asia. Among the 20
largest losers, all of which showed ladder reductions of 0.5 or more, five were in the Middle East
and North Africa, five in sub-Saharan Africa,
four in Western Europe, three in Latin America
and the Caribbean, and one each in South Asia,
Central and Eastern Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent States.
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These gains and losses are very large, especially
for the 10 most affected gainers and losers.
For each of the 10 top gainers, the average life
evaluation gains exceeded those that would be
expected from a doubling of per capita incomes.
For each of the 10 countries with the biggest
drops in average life evaluations, the losses were
more than would be expected from a halving of

GDP per capita. Thus the changes are far more
than would be expected from income losses or
gains flowing from macroeconomic changes,
even in the wake of an economic crisis as large
as that following 2007.
On the gaining side of the ledger, the inclusion
of five transition countries among the top 10
gainers reflects the rising average life evaluations for the transition countries taken as a
group. The appearance of sub-Saharan African
countries among the biggest gainers and the
biggest losers reflects the variety and volatility of
experiences among the sub-Saharan countries
for which changes are shown in Figure 2.3, and
whose experiences are analyzed in more detail
in Chapter 4.
The 10 countries with the largest declines in
average life evaluations typically suffered some
combination of economic, political, and social
stresses. In the World Happiness Report 2016
Update, 3 of the 10 largest losers (Greece, Italy,
and Spain) were among the four hard-hit Eurozone countries whose post-crisis experience was
analyzed in detail in World Happiness Report 2013.
Of the three, Greece, the hardest hit, is the only
one still ranked among the ten largest declines,
with a net decline of 1.1, compared to 1.3 previously.
The other nine countries come from six of the
ten global regions, with separate circumstances
at play in each case.
Figure 18 and Table 33 in the Statistical Appendix
show the population-weighted actual and predicted
changes in happiness for the ten regions of
the world from 2005-2007 to 2014-2016. The
correlation between the actual and predicted
changes is 0.35, with the predicted matching the
actual exactly only for the largest gaining region,
the Commonwealth of Independent States,
which had life evaluations up by 0.43 points on
the 0 to 10 scale. South Asia had the largest drop
in actual life evaluations while predicted to have
a substantial increase. Sub-Saharan Africa was
predicted to have a substantial gain, while the
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actual change was a very small drop. For all
other regions, the predicted and actual changes
were in the same direction, with the substantial
reductions in the United States (the largest
country in the NANZ group), Western Europe,
and the Middle East and North Africa being
larger in each case than predicted. The substantial
happiness gains in Southeast Asia, East Asia, and
Central and Eastern Europe were all predicted
to be substantial, while the Latin American gain
was not predicted by the equation. As Figure 18
shows, changes in the six factors are only moderately successful in capturing the evolving
patterns of life over what have been tumultuous
times for many countries. Most of the directions
of change were predicted, but generally not the
amounts of change.

Social Foundations of Happiness
In this central section of the chapter we examine
the social foundations of world happiness.
Within the six-factor explanatory framework we
have adopted to explain levels and changes of
life evaluations, four—social support, freedom
to make life choices, generosity, and absence of
corruption in government and business—are
best seen as representative of different aspects
of the social foundations of well-being. The
other two—GDP per capita and healthy life
expectancy—both long-established as goals for
development, are not themselves measures of
the quality of a nation’s social foundations, but
they are nonetheless strongly affected by the
social context. So where do we start in attempting to understand the importance of the social
context to the quality of life? After toying with
a number of approaches, we come back to the
simplest, and organize our discussion under the
headings provided by our six explanatory variables,
followed by some links to what this method
fails to cover.
We start by reviewing some of the linkages
between the quality of the social context and real
incomes as well as healthy life expectancy. We

then turn to consider the mechanisms whereby
the other four variables, themselves more
plausibly treated as primary measures of the
quality of a society’s social foundations, establish
their additional linkages to the quality of life, as
revealed by individual life assessments. We then
consider how inequality affects the social foundations, and vice versa, followed by some links
to our earlier analysis of the social foundations
of resilience. Finally, we consider new evidence
about the social foundations of well-being over
the life course, arguing that the age-profiles of
happiness in different societies reflect the
relative quality of the social fabric for people at
different ages and stages of life.
Social Foundations of Income
As human lives and technologies have become
more complicated and intertwined over the
centuries, the benefits of a bedrock of stable
social norms and institutions have become
increasingly obvious. There have been many
strands of opinion and research about which
social norms are most favorable for human
development. Adam Smith highlighted two of
these strands. In the Theory of Moral Sentiments,
Smith argued that human beings are inherently
sympathetic to the fates of others beyond themselves, but too imperfect to apply such sympathies
beyond themselves, their friends and family, and
perhaps their countries. The power and responsibility for achieving general happiness of the
world population lay with God, with individuals
and families presumed able to be fully sympathetic
only with those close to themselves. Modern
experimental research in psychology echoes this
view, since the willingness of students to mark
in their own favor has been found to be significant, but reversed by reminders of instructions
from a higher power.38 Smith’s idea of a strong
but limited sense of sympathy underpinned
his later and more influential arguments in
the Wealth of Nations. Therein, he extolled the
capacities of impersonal markets to facilitate
specialization in production, with trade being
used to share efforts and rewards to mutual
advantage as long as these markets were
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sufficiently underpinned by social norms. These
norms are needed to enable people to plan in
some confidence that others would deliver as
promised, as well as to limit the use of coercion.
Much subsequent research in economics has
tended to follow Smith’s presumption that each
individual’s moral sympathy is limited mainly to
family and friends, with individual self-interest
serving to explain their decisions. Over the past
century, there has been increasing realization of
the importance of social norms for any joint
activity, especially including the production and
distribution of goods and services, as measured
by GDP. Indeed, research, including that in this
chapter, shows that people routinely act more
unselfishly than Smith presumed39, and are
happier when they do so40.
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Trust has long been seen as an especially important support for economic efficiency. Trust
among participants is an asset vital to dealing
with the many contingencies that lie beyond the
power of contracts to envisage. It also helps
to ensure that contracts themselves will be
reliable.41 Empirical research over the past
twenty years on the social basis of economic
efficiency has given trust a central role, seen as
an element or consequence of social capital,
which the OECD has defined as “networks
together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or
among groups.”42 Evidence that average levels
of economic performance and rates of economic
growth have been higher in regions or countries
with higher trust levels is accumulating.43 To the
extent that these social norms are present in and
protected by public institutions, their capacity
to support economic performance is thereby
increased.44 There is thus much evidence that
good governance is a key foundation for economic
growth; we shall see later that it has benefits for
happiness that extend beyond its support for
economic progress.

Social Foundations of Health
There is a long-standing research literature on
the social determinants of health. The primary
factors considered to represent social determinants are measures of social and economic
status, primarily income, education, and job
status.45 For all three of these markers, both
within and across societies, those at the top fare
better, in terms of both death and illness, than
do those at the bottom.46 The channels for these
effects are not yet widely understood, but are
thought to include access to health care, better
health behaviors, and better nutrition. There
has also been some evidence that addressing
inequalities of income and education would not
only narrow health inequalities, but also raise
average levels at the same time. This literature
suggests that at least some of the total influence
of income, and perhaps a larger part of the
influence of education, on well-being flows
through its influence on healthy life expectancy.
Another stream of research has tested and found
significant links between social trust and health
status.47 The case was made that inequalities
in income might have effects on health status
through the established linkage between income
inequality and social trust.48 Global evidence also
suggests that two key social variables—social
support and volunteering—are in most countries
consistently associated with better self-reported
health status.49 Furthermore, the quality of social
institutions also has important direct effects
on health, as health outcomes are better where
corruption is less and government quality
generally higher.50
More generally, there are many studies showing
that maintaining or improving the quality of the
social context, whether within the operating
room51, in post-operative care, among those
recovering from trauma52 or hoping to avoid a
new or recurring disease, or among those in
elder care53, is a notable protective and healing
agent. Both the extent and the quality of social
relationships are important. Social support also
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delivers better health by reducing the damage
to health from stressful events. For example, a
prospective study of Swedish men found that
prior exposure to stressful events sharply increased subsequent mortality among previously
healthy men, but that this risk was almost
eliminated for those who felt themselves to have
high levels of emotional support.54 More direct
beneficial health effects of social integration,
without mediation through stressful events, is
revealed by a variety of community-level prospective studies wherein those with more active
social networks had lower subsequent mortality,
even after taking into account initial health
status and a variety of other protective factors.55
Generosity, which we have found to be an
important source of happiness, also turns out to
benefit physical health, with a variety of studies
showing that health benefits are greater for the
givers than for the receivers of peer-to-peer and
other forms of support.56
Experimental evidence has shown that those
with a broader range of social contacts have
significantly lower susceptibility to a common
cold virus to an extent that reflects the range
of social roles they play.57 By similar reasoning,
negative social relations can impose a health
cost. For example, those with enduring social
conflicts were more than twice as likely to
develop a cold from an experimentally delivered
cold virus.58
The bulk of the evidence on the health-giving
powers of social capital relates to the presence
or maintenance of pre-existing natural social
connections. The evidence from social support
interventions for those with serious life-threatening illnesses is more mixed, leading some to
suggest that improving natural social networks
may be more effective than more targeted
patient support.59

The Direct Role of Social Support
Social support has been shown in the previous
section to have strong linkages to happiness
through its effects on physical and mental
health. This is only part of the story, however.
We have already seen in Table 2.1 that having
someone to count on has a very large impact on
life evaluations even after allowing for the effects
flowing through higher incomes and better
health. The percentage of the population who
report that they have someone to count on in
times of trouble ranges from 29% in Dystopia
to almost 99% in Iceland. For a country to have
10% more of its population with someone to
count on, (not a large change given the range of
70% between the highest and lowest countries)
is associated with an increase in average life
evaluations of 0.23 points on the 0 to 10 scale.
An increase of that size in life evaluations is
equivalent to that from a doubling of GDP per
capita, or, for the median country, a ranking
increase of seven places in Figure 2.2. These
effects are above and beyond those that might
flow through higher incomes or better health.
Having just one person to count on is not a very
demanding definition of social support, as
revealed by the large number of countries where
more than 90% of respondents have someone to
count on. We suspect that a more informative
measure of social support might show even
larger effects, and, of course, there are many
other dimensions of the social support available
to people in their homes, on the streets, in their
workplaces, among their neighbors, and within
their social networks. Having someone to count
on is of fundamental importance, but having a
fuller set of supporting friendships and social
contacts must be even better.
How Does a sense of freedom affect happiness?
The Gallup World Poll asks respondents if they
are satisfied or dissatisfied with their freedom to
choose what to do with their lives. The generality
of the question is a virtue, as people are free to
focus on whatever aspects of life they find most
important. The fact that 0 and 1 are the only
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possible answers does pose a problem, as it stops
us from deriving a measure of just how free
people feel, and how evenly this sense of freedom
is spread among the population. Even the simple
measure has considerable power to explain
international differences in life evaluations,
however. The variation across countries is even
larger than for social support, ranging from 26%
to 98%, with an average of 71%. Moving 10%
of the population from dissatisfied to satisfied
with their life-choice freedom is matched by an
increase in average life evaluations of 0.11 points
on the 0 to 10 scale. This is slightly less than
half of what was calculated for having someone
to count on. It is nonetheless a very substantial
effect, equivalent to an increase of 40% in GDP
per capita, or a few places on the ranking tables.
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How do answers to the freedom question relate
to the social foundations of happiness? In some
ways the freedom and social support questions
cover different but tightly related aspects of the
social fabric. To feel secure, people need to feel
that others care for them and will come to their
aid when needed. To some extent, being in such
a network of usually mutual obligations sets
limits on each person’s freedom to make life
choices freely, as the interests of others must
always be borne in mind. It is apparent from our
results that both features are important for a
good life. It is also clear from the data that these
different aspects need not conflict with each
other, as the most successful societies are ones
where both measures of the social fabric are
strong. Indeed, some of the features of the social
fabric that reflect its ability to care for people, in
particular the health and education systems, also
serve to level out the differences in life opportunities that affect the breadth and reality of the life
choices open to each individual. For example,
some Northern European countries ranking
high in both social support and life-choice
freedom have education systems that combine
high average success while also narrowing the
gaps in performance, and hence future life
choices, between children raised in homes with
very different levels of parental education.60

Generosity
The Gallup World Poll asked respondents if
they have given money for a charitable purpose
within the past 30 days. When we use the
resulting national averages to explain happiness,
we first take out whatever variance is explained
by international differences in GDP per capita.
Giving money to others is more prevalent in
richer countries, in part because higher incomes
provide more resources available for sharing. We
adjust for income effects so that we can be sure
that the effect we find is not a consequence of
higher incomes. By doing this, we also increase
the estimated effects of per capita incomes,
since they now include the effects flowing
through greater generosity.
To have 10% more of the population donating
is associated with a 0.084 increase in average
life evaluations. This is roughly equivalent to
the effect of per capita GDP being more than
25% higher.
There are two types of evidence that have been
used to assess the happiness effects of generosity.
Survey evidence can measure average frequency
of generous acts and show how these are related
to life evaluations. In lab experiments used to dig
deeper into the motivations and consequences of
generous acts, the changes under study are too
small and too temporary to affect life evaluations,
so various positive and negative emotions,
measured before, after, and sometimes during
the experiments, are used instead61.
Experimental research has routinely found
people being more benevolent and altruistic
than their self-interest would seem to predict,
defying efforts made to explain this in terms of
expected reciprocity or other longer term versions
of self-interest. But subjective well-being research
is now showing that in all cultures62, and even
from infancy63, people are drawn to pro-social
behavior64, and that they are happier when they
act pro-socially65.
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Corruption, Trust, and Good Governance
Social trust, as we have shown above, has been
found to be an important support for economic
efficiency and physical health. But beyond these
channels, the evidence shows that high-trust
communities and societies are happier places
to live, even after allowing for the effects of
higher incomes and better health. The Gallup
World Poll does not include the social trust
question on a regular basis, so we must rely on
the regularly asked questions about perceptions
of corruption in business and government to
provide a proxy measure.
Respondents are asked separately about corruption in business and government in their own
countries, and we use the average of those
responses in our estimates of the effects of
corruption. Unfortunately, the answers to
whether corruption is a problem in one or the
other aspect of life are simply ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ so
we are unable to properly measure just how bad
the problem is seen to be; nor can we see how
unequally corruption assessments are distributed. Looking at the 2005 to 2016 data as a whole,
the national average corruption assessments
vary from 4% to 98%, with an average of 76%.
To decrease by 10% the share of the population
who think that corruption is a problem is
estimated by our model to increase average life
evaluations by 0.05 points on the 0 to 10
scale—a smaller amount than for social support,
freedom, and generosity, but still substantial,
equivalent to an increase of GDP per capita of
almost 20%. These happiness gains lie above
and beyond the well-established effects of
corruption on real GDP per capita.
The full happiness effects of a trustworthy
environment are likely to be significantly greater
than can be captured by a simple measure of the
presence or absence of corruption in business
and government. It has already been established
that even beyond social trust and absence of
corruption there are several different aspects of
life where trust is important for well-being—in

the workplace, on the streets, in neighborhoods,
in business dealings, and in several aspects of
government. The European Social Survey (ESS)
has several different measures of trust, making it
possible to see to what extent they have independent impacts on happiness. If all trust measures
are tapping into the same space, then one measure might be as good as another, and it might
not matter which is used. The ESS evidence
shows that several different measures of trust
have independently important consequences for
well-being, and that the total effects of improvements in several types of trust are significantly
higher than would be estimated using a single
measure to stand in for all measures. The ESS
also helpfully asks for trust assessments on a 0
to 10 scale, which provides better measures of
the levels and distribution of trust, while also
increasing the chances for distinguishing the
effects of different sorts of trust. The ESS individual-level results show that five different sorts
of trust contribute independently to life satisfaction. The two most important are social trust and
trust in police, each of which increases life
satisfaction by about .08 points for a 1-point
improvement on the 0 to 10 scale used for trust
assessments in the ESS. Smaller contributions,
each about one-third as great as for social trust
and trust in police, come from trust in the legal
system, trust in parliament, and trust in politicians. Single-point increases in all five types of
trust are estimated to increase an individual’s
satisfaction with life by 0.23 points on the 0 to 10
scale. If social trust is used on its own to stand in
for all forms of trust, the estimated effect is less
than half as great, at 0.11 points.66
Even if only social trust is used as a basis for
estimating the aggregate value of a nation’s
social capital, evidence from 132 countries, using
wealth-equivalent trust valuations from three
different international surveys, shows that social
trust represents a substantial share of national
wealth in all countries and regions. There are
nonetheless big differences among world
regions, ranging from 12% of total wealth in
Latin America to 28% in the OECD countries.67

33

34

While absence of corruption and presence of
trust are both useful measures of the quality of
a country’s institutions, they are clearly much
too limited in scope to provide a broader view of
how the quality of governance affects life evaluation beyond the effects flowing through income
and health. In looking at the quality of governance
more generally, there is a useful distinction to be
drawn between the formal structure of institutions
and the way they operate on a day-to-day basis.
The former is much more frequently studied
than the latter, partly because it is more easily
measured and categorized. But even when we
consider the formal structure of national institutions, such as a country’s parliament, courts, or
electoral systems, their effects on life evaluations
depend less on what is said in the laws that set
them up than in how well they are seen to
perform.68 At the aggregate level, several studies
have compared the well-being links between two
major sets of government characteristics and
average life evaluations. The first set of characteristics relates to the reliability and responsiveness
of governments in their design and delivery of
services, referred to here as the quality of delivery.
The second set of characteristics relate to the
presence and pervasiveness of key features of
democratic electoral elections and representation.
The quality of delivery was measured as the
average of four World Bank measures: government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of
law, and the control of corruption.69 The quality
of a country’s democratic processes was based
on the average of the remaining two World Bank
measures: voice and accountability, and political
stability and absence of violence. The results
showed that for all countries taken together, the
quality of delivery mattered more for well-being
than did the presence or absence of democracy.70
The quality of delivery was strongly important
for all groups of countries, while the democracy
variable had a zero effect for all countries as a
group, with a positive effect among richer
countries offset by a negative effect among the
poorer countries. Subsequent studies using
larger country samples, and a variety of survey

sources and life evaluations, have generally
supported this ranking of the relative effects of
the delivery and democratic aspects of government quality as supports for happier lives.71
Previous reports considered evidence that good
governance has enabled countries to sustain or
improve happiness, even during an economic
crisis. Results presented there suggested not just
that people are more satisfied with their lives in
countries with better governance, but also that
actual changes in governance quality since 2005
have led to significant changes in the quality of
life. For this report we have updated that analysis using an extended version of the model that
includes country fixed effects, and hence tries to
explain the changes going on from year to year
in each country. Our updated results, in Table 17
of the Statistical Appendix, show both GDP per
capita and changes in governmental quality to
have contributed significantly to changes in life
evaluations over the 2005 to 2016 period.72
How does inequality affect the social
foundations of happiness?
In World Happiness Report Update 2016, we
argued that well-being inequality may be as or
more relevant than the more commonly used
measures of inequality in income and wealth. If
happiness is a better measure of well-being than
is income, then we might expect concerns about
inequality to be focused more on well-being
inequality than on the narrower concept of
income inequality. We discussed evidence from
three international datasets (the World Values
Survey, the European Social Survey, and the
Gallup World Poll) suggesting that well-being
inequality, as measured by the standard deviation
of life satisfaction responses within the sample
populations, does indeed outperform income
inequality as a predictor of life satisfaction
differences among individuals. In addition, the
estimated effects of well-being inequality on life
satisfaction are significantly larger for those
individuals who agree with the statement that
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income inequalities should be reduced.73
Furthermore, well-being inequality performs
much better than income inequality in one of
the key causal roles previously found for income
inequality—as a factor explaining differences
in social trust.74 Thus we find that well-being
inequality is likely to damage social trust, itself
an important index of the strength and quality
of the social fabric.75
Another recently exposed link between the social
foundations and inequality is that improvements
in social trust have been shown to have greater
happiness payoffs for the unemployed, those
with health problems, and those subject to
discrimination, than for others.76 Since these
three conditions are much more prevalent
among those with the lowest life evaluations,
increases in social trust improve average life
evaluations both directly and also indirectly by
reducing the inequality of well-being.
Social Foundations of Resilience
The argument was made in previous World
Happiness Reports that the strength of the underlying social fabric, as represented by levels of
trust and institutional quality, affects a society’s
resilience in response to economic and social
crises. We gave Greece, which is the third
biggest happiness loser in Figure 2.3 (improved
from earlier World Happiness Reports, but still 1.1
points down from 2005-2007 to 2014-2016),
special attention, because the well-being losses
were so much greater than could be explained
directly by economic outcomes. The reports
provided evidence of an interaction between
social capital and economic or other crises, with
the crisis providing a test of the quality of the
underlying social fabric.77 If the fabric is sufficiently strong, then the crisis may even lead to
higher subjective well-being, in part by giving
people a chance to do good works together and
to realize and appreciate the strength of their
mutual social support78, and in part because the
crisis will be better handled and the underlying
social capital improved in use.

For this argument to be convincing, we realized
that we needed examples on both sides of the
ledger. It is one thing to show cases where the
happiness losses were large and where the
erosion of the social fabric appeared to be a part
of the story. But what examples are there on
the other side? With respect to the post-2007
economic crisis, the best examples of happiness
maintenance in the face of large external shocks
were Ireland and especially Iceland.79 Both
suffered decimation of their banking systems
as extreme as anywhere, and yet suffered incommensurately small happiness losses. In the
Icelandic case, the post-shock recovery in life
evaluations has been great enough to put Iceland
third in the global rankings for 2014-2016. That
there is a continuing high degree of social
support in both countries is indicated by the fact
that of all the countries surveyed by the Gallup
World Poll, the percentage of people who report
that they have someone to count on in times of
crisis remains highest in Iceland and very high
in Ireland.80
Social Foundations of the Life Course
of Happiness
In Chapter 3 of World Happiness Report 2015 we
analyzed how several different measures of
subjective well-being, including life evaluations
and emotions, have varied by age and gender.
Chapter 5 of this report makes use of surveys
that follow the same people over time to show
how well-being varies with age in ways that
reflect individual personalities and a variety of
past and current experiences and living conditions. Both these sources as well as a variety of
other research81 have shown that life satisfaction
in many countries exhibits a U-shape over the
life course, with a low point at about the age of
50. Yet there is also much variety, with some
countries showing little or no tendency to rise
after middle age, while elsewhere there is
evidence of an S-shape, with the growing life
evaluations after middle age becoming declines
again in the late 70s.82 The existence and size
of these trends depends on whether they are
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measured with or without excluding the effects
of physical health. Rises in average life evaluations after middle age are seen in many countries
even without excluding the increasing negative
effects due to health status, which gradually
worsens with age. Because the U-shape in age is
quite prevalent, some researchers have thought
that it might represent something beyond the
scope of life experiences, also since it has been
found in a similar form among great apes.83
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We shall consider instead the possibility that
what has been taken as a natural feature of the
life course may be primarily a reflection of a
changing pattern of social relationships, and
hence likely to appear in some places and not
in others, and for some people but not others,
depending on the social circumstances in which
they live.84 Our analysis of this is very preliminary, and based on a few scattered findings,
since the idea itself is fresh and hence largely
unstudied. As the empirical science of well-being has developed, and as the available data
become richer, it is becoming natural to consider
not just the possible separate effects of age,
marriage, employment, income, and the social
context, but also to consider interactions between
them. In the present case, we are asking whether
the U-shape in age applies equally to people in
different social contexts. The simple answer is
that it does not. For example, the U-shape in age
is significantly less for those who are married
than those who are not.85 This suggests that
together spouses can better shoulder the extra
demands that may exist mid-life when career and
other demands coincide. Yet if the U-shape is
partly due to workplace stress and its carry-over
into the rest of life, then we might also expect to
find the U-shape in age smaller for those whose
workplace provides a more welcoming social
context. That indeed seems to be the case, so
much so that among employed respondents to
the Gallup-Healthways Daily Poll who regard
their immediate work superior as a partner
(rather than a boss), life evaluations show no
reduction from the under-30s into middle age.

By contrast, for those whose superior is seen as
a boss, there is a significant U-shape, with life
evaluations significantly lower at ages 45–54
than for those under 30.86
If the U-shape in age is importantly based on the
quality of the social context, we might also expect
to find the U-shape to be less for those who have
lived for longer in their local communities as
social foundations take time to build. Danish
researchers calculated age distributions separately
for those residing for more or less than 15 years
in their communities, and found that there was
some U-shape in age for both groups, with a
much deeper mid-life drop for those who arrived
more recently in the community.87
Summary of Social Foundations
We have seen that the roles of social factors as
supports for happiness are pervasive and encompassing. Wherever we looked, from income and
health to life in the workplace and on the streets,
the quality of the social fabric is seen to be
important. Even the widely investigated U-shape
in life evaluations over the life course has come
to be seen as importantly driven by changes in
the supporting power of the social foundations.
While the importance of social factors is becoming more widely recognized, the underlying
mechanisms are just barely beginning to be
understood. Our brief review of some recent
research covers only a tiny fraction of what has
been done, and a smaller fraction still of what
needs to be known. In the design and delivery of
services, the care for the ailing, and the creation
of purpose and opportunities for those who have
had neither, a deeper understanding of how
people can work better together in achieving
happier lives must be thought of as a primary
objective. Acceptance of this objective would in
turn help to ensure that subjective well-being
data are collected wisely and routinely, that
new ideas are tested more methodically against
currently accepted practice, and that the results
of these experiments are shared across communities, disciplines, and cultures.
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The potential benefits from improving the social
foundations of well-being are enormous. Appendix
Table 18 gives some impression of the scale of
what might be achieved. It reports the improvements in life evaluations if each of the four
social variables we use in Table 2.1 could be
improved from the lowest levels that were
observed in the 2014-2016 period to world
average levels. To do this, we multiply the
lowest-to-average distances for each of the social
variables—social support, freedom, generosity,
and perceived corruption—with the estimated
per-unit contributions of those variables, shown
in Table 2.1.
Even ignoring the effects likely to flow through
better health and higher incomes, we calculate
that bringing the social foundations up to world
average levels would increase life evaluations by
almost two points (1.97) on the 0 to 10 scale.
This comprises 1.19 points from having someone to count on, 0.41 from a greater sense of
freedom to make life choices, 0.25 from living in
a more generous environment, and 0.12 from
less perceived corruption. These social foundation
effects are together larger than those calculated
to follow from the combined effects of bottom
to average improvements in both GDP per
capita and healthy life expectancy. The effects
from the increase in the numbers of people
having someone to count on in times of trouble
are by themselves equal to the happiness effects
from the 16-fold increase in average per capita
incomes required to shift the three poorest
countries up to the world average (from about
$600 to about $10,000).
If the countries with the weakest social foundations for happiness were able not just to improve
to world average standards, but also to match the
performance of the three top countries for each
of four factors, they would harvest another 1.27
points of happiness, for a total of 3.24 points.
Such a move from dystopian to utopian social
circumstances is of course not feasible any time
soon, but it does show the importance of paying

attention to the oft-ignored social foundations.
These calculations do not take into account any
improvements flowing through the better
health and higher incomes made possible
from the better social foundations. Moving
from bottom to top-three levels of healthy life
expectancy (an increase of 34 healthy years) or
GDP per capita (from $600 to $100,000 per
year) are calculated to improve life evaluations
by 0.98 and 1.78 points, respectively.88 Thus
we can see that while all of our six explanatory
factors are important in explaining what life
looks like in Dystopia and Utopia, the four
elements of the social foundations together
comprise the largest part of the story.

Conclusions
In presenting and explaining the national-level
data in this chapter, we continue to highlight
people’s own reports of the quality of their lives,
as measured on a scale with 10 representing the
best possible life and 0 the worst. We average
their reports for the years 2014 to 2016, providing
a typical national sample size of 3,000. We then
rank these data for 155 countries, as shown in
Figure 2.2. The 10 top countries are once again
all small or medium-sized western industrial
countries, of which seven are in Western
Europe. Beyond the first ten, the geography
immediately becomes more varied, with the
second 10 including countries from 4 of the 10
global regions.
In the top 10 countries, life evaluations average
7.4 on the 0 to 10 scale, while for the bottom 10
the average is less than half that, at 3.4. The
lowest countries are typically marked by low
values of all six variables used here to explain
international differences—GDP per capita,
healthy life expectancy, social support, freedom,
generosity, and absence of corruption—and in
addition, often subject to violence and disease.
Of the 4-point gap between the top 10 and
bottom 10 countries, more than three-quarters is
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accounted for by differences in the six variables,
with GDP per capita, social support, and healthy
life expectancy as the largest contributors.
When we turn to consider life evaluation changes
for 126 countries between 2005-2007 and
2014-2016, we see much evidence of movement,
including 58 significant gainers and 38 significant losers. Gainers especially outnumber
losers in Latin America, the Commonwealth of
Independent States, and Central and Eastern
Europe. Losers outnumber gainers in Western
Europe, while in the rest of the world the
numbers of gainers and losers are in rough
balance. Changes in the six key variables
explain a significant proportion of these changes,
although the magnitude and nature of the crises
facing nations since 2005 have been such as
to move some countries into poorly charted
waters. We continue to see evidence that major
crises have the potential to alter life evaluations
in quite different ways according to the quality
of the social and institutional infrastructure. In
particular, as shown in previous World Happiness
Reports, there is evidence that a crisis imposed
on a weak institutional structure can actually
further damage the quality of the supporting
social fabric if the crisis triggers blame and
strife rather than co-operation and repair. On
the other hand, economic crises and natural
disasters can, if the underlying institutions are
of sufficient quality, lead to improvements
rather than damage to the social fabric.89 These
improvements not only ensure better responses
to the crisis, but also have substantial additional
happiness returns, since people place real value
on feeling that they belong to a caring and
effective community.
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In the World Happiness Report Update 2016, we
showed that the inequality of well-being, as
measured by the standard deviation of life
evaluations within each country, varies among
countries quite differently from average
happiness, and from the inequality of income.
We also found evidence that greater inequality
of well-being contributes to lower average

well-being. We noted that broadening the focus
from income to happiness greatly increases
the number of ways of improving lives for the
unhappy without making others worse off, and
further, this can be achieved in more sustainable
and less resource-demanding ways.
This is especially clear for improvements in the
social foundations of happiness, the primary
focus of our chapter this year. Whether we
looked at social support, generosity, or a trustworthy environment, we found that all can be
built in ways that improve the lives of both
givers and receivers, those on both ends of the
handshake or the exchange of smiles, and
whatever the ranks of those who are pooling
ideas or sharing tasks.
Targeting the social sources of well-being, which
is encouraged by considering a broader measure
of well-being, uncovers fresh possibilities for
increasing happiness while simultaneously
reducing stress on scarce material resources.
Much more research is needed to fully understand the interplay of factors that determine the
social foundations of happiness and consider
alternative ways of improving those foundations.
There is every hope, however, that simply changing the focus from the material to the social
foundations of happiness will improve the rate at
which lives can be sustainably improved for all,
throughout the world and across generations.
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those aged 45-54. In the same vein, the age U-shape in
daily happiness ratings is much flatter for reports relating
to weekend days and holidays than for regular weekdays.
See Helliwell (2014, p.128) for the latter evidence.

72 Columns 8 and 9 in Table 17, which include country fixed
effects, show the links between changes in governance
and GDP and those of life evaluations. In these annual
data, causality is much more likely to be flowing from
GDP and delivery quality (both measured independently
from the GWP survey data) to life evaluations than in the
reverse direction.
73 See Goff et al (2016).
74 E
 vidence for a central trust-destroying role for income
inequality is provided by Rothstein and Uslaner (2005).
Goff et al. (2016, Table 6) have since shown, using three
international datasets, that well-being inequality is much
more important than is income inequality as a factor
explaining differences among people in how much they
think that others can be trusted.
75 Of course, the positive linkages between inequality and
social trust are likely to run in both directions. What the
evidence in Goff et al (2016) shows is that the combined
effect of the two-way linkage between social trust and
inequality is larger for well-being inequality than for
income inequality.
76 See Helliwell, Huang & Wang (2016).
77 See Helliwell, Huang, & Wang (2014).
78 S
 ee Ren & Ye (2016), Brown & Westaway (2011), Uchida
et al (2014) and Yamamura et al, (2015).
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81 See, for example, Blanchflower & Oswald (2008).

79 G
 udmundsdottir (2013) presents data from a longitudinal
survey showing stability of life satisfaction ratings in
Iceland from 2007 to 2009.
80 A
 veraging across the 2014-16 GWP surveys, Iceland and
Ireland are ranked first and fourth, respectively, in terms
of social support, with over 98 percent of Icelandic
respondents, and 96% of Irish ones, having someone to
count on, compared to an international average of 80
percent.

87 See Bonke et al (2016).
88 T
 he calculations above, as well as those reported in Tables
18 and 19, are based on country-period averages for 155
countries for the 2014-2016 period. The minimum,
maximum and averages are thus slightly different from
the summary statistics reported in Table 6 of the
Statistical Appendix, which is based on country-year
observations instead of country-period observations.
89 S
 ee Dussaillant & Guzmán (2014). In the wake of the
2010 earthquake in Chile, there was looting in some
places and not in others, depending on initial trust levels.
Trust subsequently grew in those areas where helping
prevailed instead of looting.
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Can’t get no satisfaction!
Rolling Stones, 1965

In the past quarter century China’s real GDP per
capita has multiplied over five times, an unprecedented feat.1 By 2012 virtually every urban
household had, on average, a color TV, air
conditioner, washing machine, and refrigerator.
Almost nine in ten had a personal computer,
and one in five, an automobile. Rural households lagged somewhat behind urban, but these
same symptoms of affluence, which were virtually nonexistent in the countryside in 1990, had
become quite common by 2012.2 In the face of
such new-found plenitude, one would suppose
that the population’s feelings of well-being
would have enjoyed a similar multiplication. Yet,
as will be discussed, well-being today is probably
less than in 1990.
This chapter, which builds on a prior study3,
describes the evolution of China’s well-being
in the quarter century since 1990 and suggests
the likely reasons for the disparate trajectories
of subjective well-being (SWB) and GDP per
capita (hereafter, simply GDP). The terms
subjective well-being, life satisfaction, and
happiness are used here interchangeably, and
refer to people’s overall evaluation of their
lives. The chapter also describes important
differences in subjective well-being among
various groups in the population and notes
some possible reasons for these differences.
As in any historical study of a developing country,
quantitative data are in short supply—though
typically expanding and improving with time.
The task of empirical study is to assemble and
evaluate the quantitative evidence available and
assess its fit with the broader historical context,
as is attempted here. Although the available
measures of China’s SWB in the period under
study tend to be biased toward the urban sector,
the same is true of economic growth.4 Hence
the present data should provide a reasonable
perspective on the course of well-being in an
area experiencing an unparalleled increase

in the per capita output and consumption of
goods and services.

Long Term Movement
Since 1990 China’s SWB has been U-shaped
over time, falling to a 2000-2005 trough and
subsequently recovering (Fig. 3.1).5 This pattern
is found in four different series that reach back
into the 1990s—WVS, Gallup1 and 2, and
Horizon. The fifth series in Figure 3.1, based on
the China General Social Survey (CGSS) only
starts in the 2000s, and trends upward, like
the other series in the same time span. The
series that include 1990s data come from three
different survey organizations, two American
and one Chinese. In every series both pre- and
post-trough values are higher than those in
2000-2005, even though the series differ in
their origin, measure of SWB, and sample size
(see Technical Box 1). The consistency of the
results from these different series strengthens
the finding on the overall movement. Lack of
annual data prevents more precise dating of
the trough in SWB. Additional support for the
U-shape is provided by the 95% confidence
interval bars presented for the WVS data. There
is no overlap between the confidence interval at
the 2000-2005 trough and the corresponding
intervals for the initial value of the series in
1990 and the terminal value in 2012.
The 1990 WVS value of 7.29 for SWB seems
high for what was then a poor country, but
several considerations point to its plausibility.6
China’s urban labor market at that time has
been described as a “mini-welfare state,” its
workers as having an “iron rice bowl.”7 Concerns
about one’s current and future job and family
security were virtually non-existent. Those
employed by public enterprises (which accounted
for the bulk of urban employment) were essentially guaranteed life-time jobs and had benefits
that included subsidized food, housing, health
care, child care, and pensions, as well as assurance of jobs for their grown children. Russia’s
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Fig. 3.1. Mean Subjective Well-Being, Five Series, 1990-2015

Source: Appendix, Table A3.1.
Notes: Horizon series is 3-year moving average, centered, of annual data for 1997-2015; Gallup 2, after 2004, is three-year
moving average, centered, of annual data for 2006-2015; CGSS is three item moving average for dates given in Technical Box
1. Series with response options of 1-4 or 1-5 are plotted to twice the scale of series with response options of 1-10 and 0-10. For
survey questions and response options, see Technical Box 1.
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labor and wage policies served as the model
for communist China, and China’s value of 7.29
is almost identical to the 7.26 value found in
the available data for pre-transition Russia.8 In
1990 life satisfaction differences by socio-economic status in China were very small, as was
true also of former Soviet Union countries prior
to transition.9 In the 1990 survey data for China,
mean values exceeding 7.0 are found across
the distributions by education, occupation,
and income; hence the high overall average
cannot be attributed to a disproportionate
representation in the 1990 survey of those
with high life satisfaction.

It is doubtful that the recovery in SWB by the
end of the period reaches a value equal to that in
1990. In the WVS series, the one covering the
longest time span, the terminal value of 6.85 in
2012 is significantly less than the 1990 value of
7.29. The upper bound of the 95% confidence
interval in 2012 is 6.93, well below the lower
bound of 7.16 in 1990. Another indication that
China has not recovered to its 1990 value is the
slippage in its worldwide ranking by SWB. If
the 2012 high-to-low array of 100 countries with
recent WVS data is taken as a reference,10 China
falls from 28th to 50th between 1990 and 2012.
The middling position of China in the 2012
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Technical Box 3.1. Surveys and Measures of Subjective Well-Being

World Values Survey (Sample Size: c. 1,000–c.
2,000). Life satisfaction: All things considered,
how satisfied are you with your life as a whole
these days? Please use this card to help with
your answer. 1 (dissatisfied) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(satisfied)
Gallup1 (Sample Size: c. 3,500). Life satisfaction: Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are
you with the way things are going in your life
today? Would you say you are 4, very satisfied; 3,
somewhat satisfied; 2, somewhat dissatisfied;
or 1, very dissatisfied?
Gallup2 1999, 2004 (Sample Size: c. 4,000).
Ladder of life: Please imagine a ladder with steps
numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top.
Suppose we say that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you, and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible
life for you. On which step of the ladder would
you say you personally stand at this time?
Gallup2: Gallup World Poll 2006-2015 (Sample
Size: c. 4,000, except 2012 c. 9,000) Ladder of
life: Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered from zero at the bottom to ten at the top.
Suppose we say that the top of the ladder
represents the best possible life for you, and the

WVS ranking is fairly consistent with that in the
current Gallup World Poll ladder-of- life array for
157 countries—in 2013-15 China was 83rd.11
In the research literature on SWB, cross section
studies typically find that happiness varies
positively with GDP, and this finding is
frequently cited as evidence that economic
growth increases subjective well-being.12 The
SWB data for China call into question the
validity of this assertion. Based on the regression
results of such cross section studies, China’s

bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder
would you say you personally stand at this time,
assuming that the higher the step the better you
feel about your life, and the lower the step the
worse you feel about it? Which step comes closest to the way you feel?
Horizon 1997–1999, 2001 (Sample Size:
c. 5,000). (In Chinese) In general, are you satisfied with your current life: very satisfied, fairly
satisfied, fairly dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?
(Single answer). Coded 5, 4, 2, or 1.
Horizon 2000, 2002–2010 (Sample Size:
c. 2,500–c. 5,500). (In Chinese) In general, are
you satisfied with your current life: very satisfied, fairly satisfied, average, fairly dissatisfied,
or very dissatisfied? (Single answer). Coded 5, 4,
3, 2, or 1.
Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) 2003,
2005, 2006, 2008, 2010-2013 (Sample Size:
c. 5,500-c. 12,000). (In Chinese) On the whole,
do you feel happy with your life: very unhappy,
unhappy, so-so, happy, or very happy? (Single
answer). Coded 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5.

striking five-fold multiplication of GDP since
1990 would be expected to increase SWB by
upwards of a full point or more on a 1–10 life
satisfaction scale. It is noteworthy that four
different surveys reaching back to the 1990s fail
to give evidence of an overall increase approaching this magnitude (Figure 3.1).
The positive cross section relation of SWB to
GDP reported in prior happiness research
implies that the growth rates of GDP and SWB
are positively related. Yet China’s GDP growth
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Fig. 3.2. Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita and Price Level, 1988-2015
(3-year moving average, centered)

Sources: PWT and NBS. See Appendix, Table A3.2, cols. 3 and 6.
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rate goes through three cycles between 1990
and 2012 while SWB goes through only one
(compare Figure 3.2, left panel with Figure 3.1).
Moreover, the growth rate of GDP is highest in
2000-2005 when SWB is bottoming out with a
growth rate close to zero. Also noteworthy is
the disparate course of the rate of inflation,
which has typically been found to have an
inverse relation to SWB.13 In China in 20002005, when SWB was at its lowest, the rate
of inflation was also low—lower than in any
other years between 1994 and 2015 (Figure 3.2,
right panel and Table A3.2). Neither GDP nor
inflation has a time series pattern that might
by itself explain the course of SWB. As will be
seen below, the explanation of China’s SWB
rests on different factors.
A number of Eastern European countries have
been transitioning from a socialist to free market economy at the same time as China, and it is
of interest to ask how China’s transition pattern

of life satisfaction compares with that of these
other countries. Indeed, China’s overall trajectory
of SWB is quite similar. For those European
countries whose SWB data extend back into
the socialist period, SWB invariably follows a
U- or V-shaped pattern in the transition.14 Unlike
China, however, where GDP grows at an unprecedented rate, in the European countries GDP
collapses and recovers in a pattern much like
that of SWB, a difference between China and
Europe to be discussed subsequently.

Determinants of the SWB Trajectory
Two factors appear to have been of critical
importance in forming the U-shaped course of
subjective well-being in China—unemployment
and the social safety net. In the 1990s severe
unemployment emerged, and the social safety
net broke down. The “iron rice bowl” was
smashed, giving rise to urgent new concerns
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about jobs, income security, family, and health.
Although incomes rose for most of those who
had jobs, the positive effect on well-being of
income growth was offset by a concurrent rise
in material aspirations. The counteracting effect
to income growth of increasing aspirations has
been pointed out by a number of China specialists. Shenggen Fan et al observe: “Happiness
draws from relative comparisons. As income
increases, people’s aspirations aim for a new
target.”15 Research by John Knight and his
collaborators further provides valuable insights
into the effect of reference groups on happiness
in China.16
In its survey of findings on subjective well-being,
the high profile Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission
states: “One aspect where all research on subjective well-being does agree concerns the high
human costs associated with unemployment.”17
The reason why unemployment has a major
adverse effect on well-being is straightforward—
jobs are of critical importance for sustaining
people’s livelihood, family, and health, and it is
concerns with these personal circumstances that
are foremost in shaping people’s happiness.18
The quantitative evidence on unemployment is
consistent with the view that unemployment has
been an important determinant of China’s SWB
trajectory. The unemployment rate rose sharply
from near-zero shortly before 1990 to double-digit levels in 2000-2005, and then declined
moderately. Although the unemployment
estimates are somewhat rudimentary,19 this
pattern appears consistently in unemployment
data from several different sources (Fig. 3.3).
Subjective well-being largely inversely mirrors
the path of the unemployment rate. As the
unemployment rate rises, SWB declines; as
the rate falls, SWB increases. The 2000-2005
trough in SWB occurs when the unemployment
rate reaches its peak.
The term “massive” is used repeatedly by China
specialists in describing the precipitous upsurge

in unemployment that began in the 1990s.20 In
little more than a decade (1992-93 to 2004) 50
out of 78 million lost their jobs in state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), and another 20 million were
laid off in urban collectives.21 Knight and Song
aptly describe this period as one of “draconian …
labor shedding.”22
The impact of unemployment on SWB was not
confined to those who lost their jobs. As has
been demonstrated in the SWB literature,23
increased unemployment also reduces the
well-being of those who remain employed as
they fear for their own jobs as layoffs increase.
An indication of the widespread anxiety associated
with a high level of unemployment in China is
the answer to a nationally representative survey
question that asked, “Now thinking about our
economic situation, how would you describe the
current economic situation in China: is it very
good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very
bad?” In 2002 when unemployment was at
two-digit levels, almost half of respondents (48
per cent) answered somewhat or very bad; by
2014, when the unemployment rate had markedly improved, only six per cent fell in these two
categories.24 The survey responses demonstrate
that employment is what matters for SWB, not
growth of GDP. The growth rate of GDP was
considerably higher in 2002 than in 2014 (Table
A3.2), but respondents assessed the state of the
economy as much worse in 2002.
Along with the upsurge in unemployment,
the social safety net (with employer-provided
benefits) broke down, aggravating the decline in
SWB. As workers lost jobs, their benefits disappeared, though for a modest fraction temporary
support was provided through an urban layoff
program. Those who found jobs in private firms
no longer enjoyed the benefits that they previously
had in the public sector. Even for those who
retained public jobs, new government policies
abolished guaranteed employment and life-time
benefits. This positive relationship between the
social safety net and SWB has been demonstrated
by both economists and political scientists.25
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The unemployment rate is itself an indicator
of safety net coverage because benefits were
employment-dependent. Survey data on pension
and health care coverage provide additional
quantitative evidence of the course of safety net
benefits (Figure 3.4). Note that the pattern in
these safety net indicators tends to be U-shaped,
and the trough in coverage occurs in 2000-2005
when unemployment peaks and SWB reaches
its lowest point.
The emergence of extensive unemployment and
dissolution of the social safety net were due to
the government-initiated comprehensive policy
of restructuring SOEs, many of which were
inefficient and unprofitable. Although the new
policy was successful in stimulating economic
growth, it marked an abrupt end to the era of
“reform without losers.” As Naughton points
out, urban SOE workers “bore the brunt of
reform-related costs.”26 According to a World
Bank report, “by all measures, SOE restructuring had a profound effect on … the welfare of
millions of urban workers.”27 The quantitative
unemployment, safety net, and SWB patterns
here are consistent with these statements.
Faced with massive and rising urban unemployment, government policy shifted gears.
Beginning in 2004 the rate at which SOEs were
down-sized diminished sharply. Between 1995
and 2003, reduced employment in SOEs far
exceeded increased employment elsewhere in
the urban sector; thereafter, the situation was
reversed, and the unemployment rate improved
(Figure 3.3).28 The safety net, as indexed by
healthcare and pension coverage, also started
to improve (Figure 3.4). The result was a turnaround and gradual recovery of SWB.
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In 2000-2005 the growth rate of GDP was
approaching its highest level at the same time
that unemployment was peaking. How could
output be growing, and so rapidly, when employment was falling? China’s restructuring policy
involved greatly expanded support for a relatively

Fig. 3.3. Urban Unemployment Rate,
Four Series, 1988-2015
(percent of labor force)

Source: Appendix, Table A3.3.

Fig. 3.4. Safety Net Indicators:
Pension and Healthcare Coverage, 1988-2013
(urban households)

Source: CHIP. See Appendix, Table A3.4.
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small proportion of large, capital-intensive,
and high productivity SOEs at the expense
of numerous small, labor-intensive, and low
productivity SOEs, a policy officially labeled
“Grasping the big and letting go of the small.”
As described by Huang:29
“Grasping the big” meant restructuring,
consolidating, and strengthening China’s
largest SOEs…. “Letting go of the small”
meant that the government supported
privatization of individually small but numerically numerous SOEs. These are labor-intensive firms and singling them out
for privatization, with no established social
protection in place, led to massive unemployment, social instability, and wrenching
human costs…. Instead of managing tens of
thousands of small firms scattered around
the country, the Chinese state could now
focus on only a few thousand firms [which
benefitted from] a massive reallocation of
financial, human, and managerial resources
away from the small SOEs to a handful of
the largest SOEs.
This redistribution of resources from low productivity small SOEs to high productivity large
SOEs resulted in a strong upsurge in output at
the same time that small SOEs shed labor,
creating a large pool of unemployed. As Huang
points out, “…GDP growth in the 1990s increasingly was disconnected from the welfare of
Chinese citizens.”30 The survey responses
reported above on the state of the economy in
2002 and 2014 provide concrete evidence of the
continuation of this disconnect. The economy
was viewed by the public as much worse in
2002, even though the GDP growth rate was
considerably higher than in 2014.
As previously noted, China’s GDP in transition
has grown at an unprecedented rate while that
of European transition countries collapsed and
recovered in a pattern similar to SWB. The
difference between China’s GDP trajectory and
that of the European countries appears to be due

to the difference in restructuring policies.
In both cases restructuring led to massive
unemployment. While the European transition
countries abandoned the entire public sector
to privatization and experienced a major GDP
collapse, however, China invested heavily in the
most productive SOEs and was rewarded with
significant output growth.

Other Social and Economic Factors
Is China’s SWB trajectory also a reflection of
societal conditions such as social capital, income
inequality, or environmental pollution? What
about the “predictors” of SWB differences
among countries identified in previous World
Happiness Reports—material, social, and
institutional supports for a good life—do they
explain the time series course of SWB in
China?31 To answer these questions, this section
examines whether changes over time in these
variables conform as expected to the movement
in SWB since 1990. This is the same procedure
as that followed in the previous section on
unemployment and the social safety net.
The measures of social capital examined here—
trust in others and civic cooperation—are those
used in a recent article that seeks to explain the
change in China’s life satisfaction from 1990
to 2007, one of the rare articles addressing
change over time.32 The specific questions and
responses are given in Technical Box 2. The two
indicators of social capital are treated separately
in what follows.
Trust has an overall trajectory fairly similar to
SWB, falling at the beginning of the period and
rising at the end (Figure 3.5). It is plausible that
in the 1990s, as restructuring led to the emergence and growth of unemployment and job
competition, a decline in interpersonal trust
occurred. Correspondingly, the upswing in
employment during the 2000s recovery may
have helped restore trust. The decline and
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Technical Box 3.2. Measures of Social Capital and Freedom of Choice

World Values Survey 1990, 1995, 2001 (Sample Size: ~1,000–1,500). Trust: General speaking, would
you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? 1, most
people can be trusted; 2, can’t be too careful. Recoded 1 or 0.
World Values Survey 2007, 2012 (Sample Size: ~2000). Trust: General speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? 1, most people
can be trusted; 2, need to be very careful. Recoded 1 or 0.
World Values Survey (Sample Size: ~1,000–2000). Civic cooperation: Please tell me for each
of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or
something in between, using this card.
A) Claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to
Never 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 9 / 10 Always
B) Avoiding a fare on public transport
Never 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 9 / 10 Always
C) Cheating on tax if you have the chance
Never 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 9 / 10 Always
D) Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties
Never 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 9 / 10 Always
Recoded 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, or 1 for each item.
World Values Survey (Sample Size: ~1,000–2000). Freedom of choice: Some people feel they have
completely free choice and control over their lives, and other people feel that what they do has no real
effect on what happens to them. Please use the scale to indicate how much freedom of choice and
control you feel you have over the way your life turns out. None at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A great deal

Fig. 3.5. Measures of Social Capital, 1990-2012
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Source: WVS. See Appendix, Table A3.5.

recovery of interpersonal trust may, in turn,
have reinforced the U-shaped trajectory of SWB.
The biggest difference between trust and SWB
centers on the value in the 2000-2005 period.
Trust is slightly higher, but not much different
from that in adjacent years, while SWB is lower.
As noted previously, the lower value of SWB in
the 2000-2005 period is credible because it is
found in four different surveys conducted
independently of each other.
Another measure of social capital is civic cooperation, a term reflecting disapproval of cheating or
bribery in circumstances such as paying taxes or
claiming government benefits (see Technical Box
2). The composite measure presented here is the
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average of four components, each of which has
“a pattern fairly similar to that in the summary
measure (Technical Box 3.2 and Table A3.5). In
each interval from 1990 to 2007, the summary
measure of civic cooperation moves in the same
direction as trust, though the movements in civic
cooperation through 2001 are slight. After 2001,
however, trust and civic cooperation begin to
diverge noticeably and, from 2007 on, in seemingly contradictory directions—a rise in trust
being accompanied by a decline in civic cooperation, i.e., increased acceptance of cheating and
bribery. Unlike trust, the overall pattern of
change in civic cooperation consequently differs
considerably from that in SWB, and casts doubt
on any causal connection between the two.

The results in the general literature on the
relation between income inequality and happiness are mixed—some studies report no
relationship, while others find that an increase
in inequality reduces happiness.33 In China,
income inequality as measured by the Gini
coefficient has trended upward since the early
1980s, increasing when SWB is both falling and
rising (Figure 3.6, panel A).34 It is hard to see
how the course of income inequality could
solely explain the U-shaped movement of SWB.
Indeed, as will be seen subsequently, since the
beginning of the millennium the life satisfaction difference between the lowest and highest
income groups has diminished despite an
increase in income inequality.

Figure 3.6. Indicators of Trends in Income Inequality, Environmental Pollution, and Housing Prices
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Sources: Panel A, reproduced from Xie and Zhou (2014); panels B and C, NBS. See Appendix, Table A3.6.

One might expect that the widely-publicized
environmental pollution problem in China
would have had an adverse impact on happiness.
A recent study based on cross sectional data,
however, finds no relation between pollution and
overall life satisfaction, although there is a
shorter-term effect on day-to-day moods.35 The
time series finding in the present analysis turns
out to be much like the nil cross section finding.
If the trend in coal consumption is taken as a
measure of the course of environmental pollution, one finds that coal consumption trends
upward throughout most of the period, rising
after 2005 at close to its highest rate, while life
satisfaction also rises, rather than falls (Figure
3.6, panel B).

Housing prices are also sometimes mentioned as
a determinant of life satisfaction. The housing
price data only start in 2000, not long after a
housing market becomes widely established in
China.36 Housing prices trend steadily upward
from 2000 onward (Figure 3.6, panel C), a
development that might be expected to reduce life
satisfaction; in fact, life satisfaction rises, not falls.
There are six “predictors” of the annual national
evaluations of SWB presented in the World
Happiness Reports—GDP per capita (in log
form), healthy life expectancy, freedom to
control one’s life, corruption, social support, and
giving to charity. Of these it is possible to obtain
time series measures for China that span the

Figure 3.7. Predictors of SWB in World Happiness Reports, 1990-2012
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Sources: PWT, WB, and WVS. See Appendix, Table A3.7.
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period covered here for the first four. (In the
2016 World Happiness Report the time series
course of healthy life expectancy is based on that
in life expectancy at birth, and the latter is
consequently used in the present analysis.)37
None of these “predictors” has a time series
pattern suggestive of a causal relation to SWB.
GDP and life expectancy, themselves highly
correlated, both trend upward throughout the
period (Figure 3.7). Freedom to choose the
course of one’s life changes very little over time,
and its movements do not conform to those in
SWB. Corruption, approximated here by the
acceptability of bribery, increases somewhat after
2001, but remains at a very low level. The two
measures with the greatest changes—GDP and

life expectancy—reach their highest values at the
end of the period, but SWB does not.
The 2016 World Happiness Report presents a
pooled time series and cross section regression
equation based on data for 156 countries in the
period 2006-2015, in which the six predictors
are found to fit national ladder-of-life evaluations
with an R-squared of 0.74.38 Another way of
examining the predictors here is to ask how
accurately this equation predicts China’s actual
ladder-of-life values from 2006 to 2015. The
answer is, not very well. If China’s values for the
independent variables are entered into the
equation, the predicted values are uniformly
higher, often by a substantial amount (Figure

Figure 3.8. Actual and Predicted Mean Ladder of Life, 2006-2015
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Source: GWP. See Appendix, Table A3.8.

3.8). Moreover, if one leaves aside the year 2006
(for which values for China are available for
only three of the six independent variables) the
predicted values in SWB exhibit a nil trend,
while the actual trend is upward.
As pointed out in the 2016 World Happiness
Report, the choice of “predictors” is constrained
by the limited availability of comparable data for
a large number of countries worldwide, and the
variables that are in fact chosen “may be taking
credit properly due to other better variables.”39
The advantage of a country study, like the
present one, is that it is not inhibited by the
requirement of comparable international data.
This makes it possible to explore the possible
role in determining SWB of a wider range of
variables and consequently develop a deeper
understanding of the mechanisms at work.
Indeed, an analysis of selected countries in the
2016 report moves in the direction of the present study. In evaluating the reasons for a decline
in life satisfaction in four Eurozone countries
hard hit by the Great Recession, the unemployment rate is added to the analysis and found to
have an explanatory effect equal to that of all six
of the present “predictors” combined,40 a result
more similar to the present findings. Unfortunately, it is not possible to include unemployment
as a predictor in the pooled regression equation
for all countries due to lack of comparable
international data.
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As a brief summary of the results to this point,
Table 3.1 presents the bivariate correlation and
corresponding p-value between life satisfaction
and each of the variables discussed in this and
the preceding section. (The housing price
variable is not included because the series spans
only half the period). There are, at best, only five
observations available for computing each
correlation, which means each variable is evaluated singly in a bivariate analysis. Subject to the
qualification that a multivariate analysis might
give a fuller picture, the pattern of results is
generally consistent with the observations based
on the graphs. The unemployment rate and

safety net indicators come quite close to the 0.10
level of significance. Trust and income inequality have the next highest correlation coefficients,
but the p-values are above 0.30. The remaining
variables have even worse p-values, and in some
cases, the sign of the correlation coefficient is
contrary to what might be expected. As a whole,
the correlations uphold the conclusion that
unemployment and the safety net have been the
important forces shaping the course of China’s
life satisfaction.
Table 3.1. Time Series Correlation with WVS Life
Satisfaction of Indicated Variable, 1990-2012
Correlation
Coefficient

p-value

Unemployment rate
Pension coverage
Healthcare coverage

-0.76
0.74
0.89

0.13
0.15
0.11

Trust
Civic cooperation
Gini coefficient
Coal Consumption

0.52
0.17
-0.57
-0.21

0.37
0.79
0.31
0.73

Log GDP per capita
Life expectancy at birth
Freedom of choice
Bribery acceptable

-0.46
-0.50
-0.27
-0.10

0.44
0.40
0.67
0.87

n = 5, except healthcare coverage, n = 4.
Note: The basic data are given in the Online Appendix Table
A3.1, col.1; Table A3.3, col. 3; Table A3.4 rows 1, 6; Table A3.5,
rows 1, 2; and Table A3.6a, cols. 1-4.

Why are unemployment and the social safety net
so important? These two factors bear most
directly on the concerns foremost in shaping
personal happiness—income security, family
life, and the health of oneself and one’s family.
It is these concerns that are typically cited by
people worldwide when asked an open-ended
question as to what is important for their happiness.41 In contrast, broad societal matters such
as inequality, pollution, political and civil liberties, international relations, and the like, which
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most individuals have little ability to influence,
are rarely mentioned. Abrupt changes in these
conditions may affect happiness, but for the
most part, such circumstances are taken as
given. The things that matter most are those that
take up most people’s time day after day, and
which they think they have, or should have,
some ability to control.

Differences by Socio-Economic Status
Although China’s well-being declined on average and then somewhat recovered, there were
significant differences among various groups in
the population. Perhaps most striking was the
severe impact of restructuring on those of lower
socio-economic status (SES). In 1990 the difference in life satisfaction between the third of the
population with the lowest incomes and that
with the highest was quite small (Figure 3.9).
Subsequently life satisfaction of the lowest third
plunged markedly, while that of the highest
actually improved slightly. The result was the
emergence of a marked disparity in life satisfaction
by socio-economic status. Toward the end of the

Fig. 3.9. Mean Life Satisfaction, Top and Bottom
Income Terciles, and Standard Deviation of Life
Satisfaction, 1990 – 2012

period, life satisfaction of the lowest stratum
somewhat recovered, and by 2012 the disparity
in life satisfaction, though still sizeable, had
shrunk considerably.42 The standard deviation of
life satisfaction, a measure reflecting all sources
of life satisfaction differences, not just SES,
follows the SES pattern of rising and decreasing
inequality in life satisfaction (Figure 3.9, bottom).
The course of the life satisfaction difference by
socio-economic status demonstrates the critical
importance of full employment and safety net
policies for the well-being of the most disadvantaged segment of the population. As these
policies were abandoned in the 1990s, the
lowest socio-economic group was the one that
suffered severely. Data by level of education are
indicative of the differential employment and
safety net effects. The unemployment rate of
those with a primary education or less soared to
almost 20 per cent in 2000-2005, while that of
the college-educated group remained at less than
5 per cent (Figure 3.10). Similarly, pension and
healthcare coverage of the less-educated declined
much more than that of the more-educated
(Figure 3.11). Consistent with these differences,
satisfaction with finances and self-rated health
increased for the highest income stratum and
decreased for the lowest (Figure 3.12).43 Eventually,
as economic policy reversed and brought
unemployment down, and substantial efforts
were initiated to repair the social safety net,44
these disparities diminished. Life satisfaction
of the lowest third of the population recovered
as employment and the safety net improved,
though in 2012 it was still less than in 1990
(Figure 3.9).
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Source: WVS. See Appendix, Table A3.9.

Fig. 3.10. Unemployment Rate by Level of Education,a 1988-2013
(percent of labor force)

Source: CHIP. See Appendix, Table A3.10.
a. Persons with college education or more and primary school education or less.

Fig.3.11. Safety Net Indicators by Level of Education,a 1988-2013
(urban households)
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Source: CHIP. See Appendix, Table A3.4.
a. Persons with college education or more and primary school education or less.
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Fig. 3.12. Mean Financial Satisfaction and Mean Self-Reported Health,
Top and Bottom Income Terciles, 1990 – 2012

Source: WVS. See Appendix, Tables A3.11 and A3.12.

Differences by Age and Cohort
Those aged 30 and over experienced large
declines in life satisfaction over the quarter
century studied here; men and women were
about equally affected. In 1990 those aged 30
and over were already on a life course set under
“iron rice bowl” conditions. The collapse of the
traditional environment severely disrupted their
lives, and substantially reduced their well-being.
As economic restructuring took hold, the cohort
of 1946-60, which spanned ages 30-44 in 1990,
suffered the biggest decline in life satisfaction
(Figure 3.13). From an initial situation in which
virtually everyone had jobs, men and women
alike, in 2002 fewer than 70 per cent were
employed. Most of the remainder of the cohort,
21 per cent, had been forced into early retirement, and six per cent were unemployed.45

The next oldest cohort, that of 1936-45, also had
a considerable initial drop in life satisfaction.
The overall decline was somewhat cushioned,
however, as by 2012 most of this cohort had
reached retirement age (55 for women, 60 for
men) and qualified for pensions, though these
were sometimes reduced or in arrears.46
In contrast, the cohort of 1961-70, which in
1990 was merely in its twenties, experienced
only a mild decline in life satisfaction between
1990 and 2002 and ended up with life satisfaction about the same as initially. The members of
this and the successor cohorts were less wedded
to traditional ways and better able to adapt to the
new “free market” conditions, most notably by
acquiring a college education. Thirty-five per
cent of the cohort of 1961-70 had completed a
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Fig. 3.13. Mean Life Satisfaction by Birth Cohort, 1990-2012

Note: In 1990 the birth cohort of 1961-70 was 20 to 29 years old; the birth cohort of
1946-60, 30 to 44; and the birth cohort of 1936-45, 45 to 54.
Source: WVS. See Appendix, Table A3.13.
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college education by the time they were in their
thirties; for the successor cohort, that of 1971-80,
the corresponding figure was 40 per cent.
Among the cohorts born before the 1960s,
however, the percentage with a college education
was only 11 to 15 per cent.47 As seen above, those
belonging to the higher SES group—which
includes those with a college education—largely
escaped the adverse impact on life satisfaction
of economic restructuring; clearly young adults
were among the beneficiaries.

Differences by Residence and
Migration Status

A comparison with the European transition
countries is once again of interest. As has been
seen, the trajectory of life satisfaction for the
population as a whole is quite similar in China
and the European countries. This similarity is
also true of the differentials in life satisfaction
that emerged in both areas. For both China and
the European countries, small SES differences at
the start of the transition were replaced by large
disparities.48 The lowest SES group experienced

Subjective well-being in China’s urban areas has
been greater than in rural on average, a pattern
typical of developing countries.51 The principal
evidence for China is from three sources—the
1995 World Values Survey, CGSS surveys done
almost annually since 2005, and surveys conducted annually since 2006 by the Gallup World
Poll (Table A3.14).52 The urban-rural life satisfaction differential in the 1995 WVS—about half a
point (1-10 scale)—is just about the same as the
average differential in the Gallup World Poll

a severe decline in life satisfaction, while the
upper tier typically enjoyed a mild improvement.
Those under age 30 fared better than their older
counterparts.49 In both China and Europe
adaptation to the new environment was greatly
facilitated by a college education.50
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over the period 2006-15 (0-10 scale). Starting
in 2010, a wider range of surveys is available—
some continue to show the usual excess of
urban over rural SWB, but in a few the urban
and rural areas are about equal.53

Fig. 3.14. Mean Life Satisfaction by Urban-Rural
Residence, 2003-2015

Since 2005, when fairly continuous data become
available, the trend in rural life satisfaction
appears to have largely paralleled urban. Two
different surveys give a highly consistent picture
(Figure 3.14). The improvement in rural life
satisfaction may have been partly due to new
policies strengthening the social safety net in
rural areas. Also, there was a change in government policies that significantly lessened the
burden placed on agriculture to support industrialization.54 Lack of comparable data prevents
generalization of the trend prior to 2005.
The 1990s saw the onset of a substantial population movement from rural to urban areas, as
government restrictions on migration were
increasingly relaxed. According to census data,
between 1990 and 2010 the proportion of
people in cities that had a rural hukou (identifying the holder as a resident of a rural place) rose
from 17 to 36 per cent.
Rural hukou holders in urban areas were initially
treated as second-class citizens but are gradually
being assimilated.55 The few life satisfaction
surveys in the early 2000s that classified the
urban population by hukou status uniformly
found urban hukou holders with higher SWB
than rural migrants.56 The upward trend in life
satisfaction since then has been fairly similar
for the two groups (Figure 3.15). The evidence is
mixed on whether or not the gap in urban areas
between urban and rural hukou holders has
closed. In several surveys the gap persists, but
in others it has disappeared.57 A comparison
between rural migrants and those remaining
in rural areas is less ambiguous—initially the
migrant group was higher, but in recent years
there is no difference.58

Source: Appendix, Table A3.14.
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Fig. 3.15. Mean Life Satisfaction, Urban and Rural Hukou Holders in Urban Areas, 2003-2013

Source: Appendix, Table A3.15.
Legend: U
 H = Urban hukou holders in urban areas
RH = Rural hukou holders in urban areas

Summary and Implications
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China’s soaring GDP growth over the past
quarter century is viewed by many analysts as
the hallmark of a successful transition from
socialism to capitalism. But if the welfare of the
“common man” is taken as a criterion of success, the picture is much less favorable and
more like that of European transition countries.
From 1990 to 2000-2005, life satisfaction in
China, on average, declined. Since then it has
turned upward, but at present it is probably less
than a quarter century ago. China’s ranking in
the international array of countries by SWB
appears to have declined considerably since
1990, although it has improved as of late. There
is no evidence of an increase in China’s life
satisfaction of the sizeable magnitude that would
be expected based on the international point-oftime bivariate relationship of happiness to GDP.

The lower income and older segments of the
population have suffered most, and their life
satisfaction remains below that in 1990. The
upper income and youngest population groups
have, in contrast, enjoyed a fairly constant or
modest improvement in life satisfaction. The
rather small life satisfaction differential by
socio-economic-status that prevailed in 1990 has
been replaced by a considerably larger one,
though there has been some lessening since the
SWB trough of 2000-2005.
The evidence on subjective well-being comes
from four surveys conducted independently by
three different survey organizations and shows
quite consistent results. Further support derives
from the similarity between the course of SWB
during China’s transition and that in the European
transition countries. The U-shaped pattern of
SWB is a transition phenomenon common to
both Europe and China.
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To understand the course of well-being in
China, one must recognize that few societies
have undergone such wrenching change in
such a short period of time. Isabelle Attané and
Baochang Gu succinctly convey the essence of
this transformation:
[T]he dismantling of collective structures
under the reform and opening-up policy …
overturned the social organization that had
prevailed in previous decades, producing an
impact that extended far beyond the economy alone. Previously, each individual had
depended on the state, through his or her
work unit, for all aspects of daily life.
Everyone enjoyed guaranteed access to
employment, housing, health, education of
children, and for urban dwellers, retirement
and social insurance. Gradually transferred
to the private sector, these areas are now
governed by the market, which makes
access to them less systematic, and therefore
increasingly unequal.59
The data on life satisfaction herein provide a
summary indication of the overall impact of this
social transformation on people’s lives. The
circumstances through which SWB was most
directly affected were labor market conditions
and the social safety net. Briefly put, the dynamics of change are as follows. In the first part of
the transition, as economic restructuring is
undertaken, jobs and safety net benefits shrink
markedly for the disadvantaged members of the
population, and their well-being suffers severely,
especially for those who are older or in the
lowest economic stratum. In contrast, life
satisfaction of those who are in the highest
economic stratum tends to improve slightly,
while that of young adults, who are typically
more-educated and better able to cope with the
new economic environment, remains fairly
constant. The difference in life satisfaction by
socio-economic status, which initially was quite
small, widens substantially. Eventually, as
economic recovery takes hold, the job market
improves. In addition, the government, in

response to symptoms of economic distress,
starts to mend the social safety net. The result is
that life satisfaction, on average, turns upward,
and the disparity in life satisfaction between the
more and less affluent shrinks somewhat. Life
satisfaction of the disadvantaged, however,
remains below its 1990 level.
The evidence supporting this interpretation is
three-fold. The first is quantitative time series on
unemployment and the social safety net. These
series move as one might expect in relation to
SWB, in terms of both average levels and differences by SES. The second type of evidence is
qualitative - descriptions by China specialists of
the state of the economy and society, especially
the job market and social protection. These
qualitative accounts are consistent with the time
series pattern in the quantitative data and
contribute to its understanding. The third is the
fact that the same factors explain the U-shaped
trajectory of life satisfaction in the European
transition countries.
Plausible causal variables other than GDP that
fail the time series test of conformity to the SWB
pattern are civic cooperation (one of the proxies
for social capital), income inequality, environmental pollution, housing prices, life expectancy,
freedom to control one’s life, and corruption
(as indexed by acceptance of bribery). Trust in
others, another social capital proxy, is a borderline case, moving somewhat similarly to SWB,
but less so than unemployment and the social
safety net. The six predictors of differences in
SWB in the World Happiness Reports do not
explain the time series change in China’s SWB.
The preeminence of employment and the safety
net in explaining SWB lies in the evidence that
it is these circumstances that bear most immediately on the concerns that are at the heart of
people’s personal happiness—jobs and income
security, family life, and health. In the 1990s,
the emergence of massive unemployment and
dissolution of the social safety net led to growing
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anxiety regarding these concerns and a marked
decline in overall life satisfaction. Since the
2000-2005 trough, employment conditions and
the social safety net have improved, and life
satisfaction has returned to near its 1990 level.
There remains, however, considerable opportunity for further progress. Of particular importance
is attention to increasing the well-being of the
disadvantaged segment of the population through
improved employment opportunities and safety
net policies.
Within policy circles, subjective well-being is
receiving increasing attention as an alternative
or complement to GDP as a measure of well-being.60 There could hardly be a better test case
than China for comparing the two measures. As
indexed by GDP, well-being in China has multi-
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NBER.
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plied over five-fold; based on SWB, well-being is,
on average, less than a quarter of a century ago.
These disparate results reflect the different
scope of the two measures. GDP relates to the
economic aspect of life, and to just one dimension—the output of goods and services. SWB, in
contrast, is a comprehensive measure of individual
well-being, taking into account the variety
of economic and noneconomic concerns and
aspirations that principally determine people’s
well-being. There is no hint in GDP of the
enormous structural changes that impacted
people’s lives in China. In contrast, SWB
captures the increased anxiety and new concerns
that emerged as a result of growing dependence
on the labor market. If the objective of policy
is to improve people’s well-being, then SWB
is a more meaningful measure than GDP, as
China’s experience attests.61

Explanation
China Family Planning Studies.
Chinese General Social Survey.
China Household Finance Survey.
China Household Income Project.
Gallup World Poll.
National Bureau of Economic Research (United States).
National Bureau of Statistics of China.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Penn World Table.
World Bank, World Development Indicators.
World Values Survey.
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1 Penn World Table (2016).

this Report.

2 National Bureau of Statistics of China (2013).

18 See Cantril (1965), Easterlin (2013), and Radcliff (2013).

3 S
 ee Easterlin et al (2012). There has been a welcome
increase in studies of China’s subjective well-being. The
journal, Social Indicators Research, recently devoted an
entire issue to the subject (see also Abbott et al (2016),
Steele & Lynch (2013)). The article in Social Indicators
Research by Cheng et al (2016) provides a valuable survey of
recent research. Almost all of this work, however, comprises cross section studies. With the important exception of
Bartolini and Sarracino (2015), there are virtually none that
focus on the principal concern here, the nature and
determinants of the change over time in SWB. For a
discussion of time series studies prior to 2012 see Easterlin
et al (2012). Good overviews of the Chinese economy are
Brandt and Rawski (2008), Fan et al (2014a), and Naughton (2007).

19 F
 eng, Hu, and Moffitt (2015); Gustafson and Ding (2011);
Knight and Xue (2006).

4 K
 night and Song (2005), Xu (2011). Speaking of the period
of policy reforms initiated in 1993, Cai et al. (2008), p. 181,
observe that “a large amount of resources have been
extracted from the agricultural and rural sector to support
urban industrialization.”
5 H
 ere and in subsequent figures, vertical broken lines
delimit the period when SWB troughs. Also, in order to
highlight the longer-term movement, a three-year moving
average is plotted for series with annual data.
6 D
 ata and sources for the graphs and numbers cited in the
text are presented in the Appendix.
7 Knight and Song (2005), p. 19.

20 S
 ee Cai, Park, and Zhao (2008), p.182; Naughton (2008),
pp.121-122; Huang (2014), p. 294.
21 Naughton (2008), p. 121.
22 Knight and Song (2005), p. 22.
23 D
 iTella, MacCulloch, and Oswald (2001), Helliwell and
Huang (2014).
24 Pew Research Center (2014).
25 D
 iTella et al. (2003), O’Connor (2016), Pacek and Radcliff
(2008), Radcliff (2013).
26 Naughton (2008), p. 121.
27 W
 orld Bank (2007). See Giles, Park, and Cai (2006) for a
comprehensive study of the impact of economic restructuring on urban workers.
28 OECD 2010, Gustafsson and Ding (2011).
29 Huang (2014), p. 294. Cf. also Huang (2008), pp. 169 ff.
30 Huang (2008), p. 273.
31 Helliwell et al. (2012) pp. 13 ff.; (2013) pp. 11 ff.; (2016), p. 17.

13 DiTella et al. (2001).

32 S
 ee Bartolini and Sarracino (2015). The authors include a
third measure of social capital, social participation, which
is measured as the percentage of the population reporting
(a) membership in or (b) unpaid voluntary work for
various associations. Unfortunately, this measure is not
comparable over time. The number of associations named
in the WVS surveys varies between 8 and 15, and the
question on voluntary work is asked in only two surveys.
As a result, the total number of options presented to a
respondent varies from lows of 8 to 15 (in 1995, 2007, and
2012) to highs of 29 and 30 in 1990 and 2001. Not
surprisingly the highest values for participation occur in
the latter two years, those with the largest number of
respondent options.

14 Easterlin (2009).

33 Layard et al. (2012), pp. 70-71.

15 F
 an et al. (2014b), p. 10. See also Akay et al (2012),
Carlsson and Qui (2010), Chen (2014), and Chapter 5,
Table 5.8 in this Report.

34 X
 ie and Zhou (2014); we are grateful to Professors Xie
and Zhou for providing the data needed to reproduce the
China series in Figure 1 of their paper. See also Cai et al.
(2010), Gustafsson et al. (2008), Knight and Song (2000).

8 Easterlin (2014).
9 Easterlin (2012).
10 Helliwell at al. (2012), p. 39.
11 Helliwell et al (2016), p.21.
12 A
 rrow and Dasgupta (2009), Deaton (2008), Diener et al
(2010), Frey and Stutzer (2002), Guriev and Zhuravskaya
(2009), Inglehart (2002), Stevenson and Wolfers (2008),
Veenhoven (1991).

16 For a good summary, see Knight and Gunatilaka (2011).
17 S
 tiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi (2008), p.149. See also Helliwell
and Huang (2014), Layard et al (2012), and chapter 7 in

35 Zhang et al. (2015).
36 Wang and Zhou (2016).
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37 Helliwell at al. (2016), p. 17.
38 Ibid., p.16.
39 Ibid., p. 19.
40 Helliwell et al. (2013), pp. 15ff., Table 2.2.
41 Cantril (1965), p. 162, Table VIII: 6.
42 I n this and subsequent figures depicting differences by
SES based on WVS data, the 2001 WVS observations are
omitted, because the highest and lowest education groups
were not covered in the 2001 survey. Due to this omission, SES differences in 2001 are much smaller than in
the two adjacent surveys, 1995 and 2007. The mean value
of SWB in 2001, however, does not seem to be affected by
the omission of the highest and lowest education groups.
If the highest and lowest education groups are dropped
from the 1995 and 2007 surveys, one finds that the
overall means in both surveys are virtually identical to
those when the two education groups are included.
43 Graham et al. (2015) report an increase in mental illness
from 2002 to 2012.
44 F
 or a comprehensive overview of China’s new social
protection system see Cai and Du (2015); see also Fang
(2014), Frazier (2014), and Ravallion (2014).
45 See CHIP surveys of 1988 and 2002.
46 Giles, Park, and Cai (2006).
47 C
 ohort data on percentage completing college education
are from CHIP surveys 1988, 2002, and 2013.
48 Easterlin (2012).
49 Easterlin (2009).
50 D
 emographic changes in China differed somewhat from
Europe, primarily because China’s 1990 situation was
governed by public policies and traditional strictures
regarding marriage, divorce, and childbearing. See Davis
(2015) and Attané & Gu (2014).
51 Easterlin et al. (2011).
52 T
 he 1995 WVS figures for mean life satisfaction are:
places <5,000 population, 6.52; places 5,000+, 7.00).
Unfortunately 1995 is the only WVS survey in which
comprehensive size-of-place data are available.
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53 T
 he 2002 CHIP survey is noticeably different from all
other surveys in that rural happiness (3.68 on a 1-5 scale)
considerably exceeds urban (3.47). Unlike the 2013 CHIP
survey, the 2002 survey contained a special rural module
on SWB in which the question preceding that on happiness asked respondents with whom they compared
themselves, offering eight options (Knight and Gunatilaka
2017, p. 20). This question elicited valuable information
on reference groups, but probably tended to channel

responses to the subsequent happiness question toward
social comparison, precluding comparison with one’s past
experience. Neither the 2002 CHIP urban module nor the
2013 CHIP urban and rural modules had this reference
group question before the question on happiness. In the
2013 CHIP survey, urban happiness exceeds rural by 0.14
points, a more typical result.
54 A
 nderson (2014), pp. 152-153. See also Cai et al. (2008),
p. 181.
55 Henderson (2014).
56 See CGSS (2003), CHIP (2002), and Horizon (2003).
57 S
 urveys showing the persistence of the gap are the CGSS
(2010-2013), CFPS (2012), and CHIP (2013); those
showing no gap are CFPS (2010) and (2014), and CHFS
(2011).
58 See CGSS (2005-2013) and CFPS (2010-2014).
59 Attané and Gu (2014), p, 3.
60 See OECD (2013) and Layard and O’Donnell (2015).
61 A
 n objection to SWB sometimes voiced is that the SWB
scale is bounded, while GDP is not. In response, one
might note, first, that there is substantial agreement that
international differences in self-reported SWB, such as
those reported in the series of World Happiness Reports,
are meaningful. The Nordic countries are invariably
leaders in SWB with values in the neighborhood of 8 on
scales with an upper limit of 10, while the lowest values
are down around 3. This suggests that there is plenty of
opportunity to improve the happiness of people worldwide even in the Nordic countries. Moreover, if well-being
is the goal of public policy, then reaching a value of 10
with everyone “completely satisfied” would seem to be a
sign of remarkable policy success. By contrast, if GDP is
the measure of well-being, there is no clear mark of
achievement other than an ever-higher growth rate,
which, as evidenced by China’s experience, says little
about what is really happening to people’s lives.
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Table A3.1. Mean Subjective Well-Being, Five Series, Total Population, China, 1990-2015a

1990
1995
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

WVS
(1-10)

Gallup1
(1-4)

CGSS
(1-5)

CGSS
(MAb)
(1-5)

Gallup2
(0-10)

Gallup2
(MAb)
(0-10)

Horizon
(Cities)
(1-5)

Horizon
(MAb)
(1-5)

4.76
4.72
4.65
4.71
4.93
5.12
5.18
5.25

3.69d
3.48d
3.44d
3.27
3.28d
3.33
3.26
3.38
3.28
3.52
3.35
3.51
3.47
3.41
3.53
3.57
3.49
3.51

3.54
3.40
3.33
3.29
3.29
3.32
3.31
3.39
3.38
3.46
3.44
3.46
3.47
3.50
3.53
3.52
3.61

7.29
6.83
2.82
2.78

4.7c

2.67

4.5c

6.53

2.76

3.41
3.46

3.52

3.68

3.64

3.77
3.86
3.78
3.72

3.77
3.80
3.79

6.76

6.85

4.56
4.86
4.85
4.45
4.65
5.04
5.09
5.24
5.20
5.30

Sources: WVS (World Values Survey: www.worldvaluessurvey.org); Gallup1 and Gallup2: (www.gallup.com); Horizon Research
Consultancy Group, series for “cities” (www.agmr.com/members/horizon.html)
a. For specific questions and response options, see text, Technical Box 1. The scale for each survey is shown above in parentheses.
b. Three-year moving average, centered.
c. 1-10 scale
d. 1-4 scale, mean computed from 5, 4, 2, 1 coding.
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Table A3.2. Real GDP per Capita and Price Level of Household Consumption, 1988-2015
(1)

76

(3)

(4)

Real GDP per Capita
(2011 US dollars)
Rate of Change (%)
Annual
MAc

Year
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

(2)

2408
2361
2386
2505
2687
2896
3095
3439
3523
3735
3706
3901
4118
4401
4866
5243
5796
6400
7126
7858
8034
8709
9456
10205
10945
11673
12473
13271a

-1.94
1.08
4.98
7.24
7.78
6.90
11.09
2.45
6.00
-0.76
5.26
5.56
6.87
10.56
7.75
10.56
10.43
11.33
10.29
2.23
8.41
8.58
7.92
7.25
6.66
6.85
6.40

1.37
4.43
6.66
7.31
8.59
6.82
6.52
2.56
3.50
3.35
5.90
7.66
8.39
9.62
9.58
10.77
10.68
7.95
6.97
6.41
8.30
7.92
7.27
6.92
6.63

(5)

(6)

Price Level
(US 2005 = 100)
Rate of Change (%)
Annual
MAc
13.3
15.6
12.8
12.4
13.2
14.1
12.7
15.6
18.4
19.7
21.7
22.1
23.5
24.3
23.8
24.9
26.2
28.0
29.6
34.3
43.0
44.0
47.8
53.6
57.2
60.8
62.9
64.8b

17.45
-18.05
-3.24
6.29
7.16
-9.87
22.95
17.89
6.74
10.27
1.86
6.67
3.23
-1.90
4.27
5.41
6.84
5.54
16.02
25.43
2.18
8.85
12.02
6.81
6.22
3.45
3.03

-1.28
-5.00
3.40
1.19
6.74
10.32
15.86
11.63
6.29
6.27
3.92
2.67
1.87
2.60
5.51
5.93
9.47
15.66
14.54
12.15
7.68
9.22
8.35
5.49
4.23

Sources: Real GDP per capita 1988-2014 (Penn World Table 9.0, http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/), Real GDP per
capita 2015 (NBS of China, http://www.stats.gov.cn/), Price level 1988-2014 (Penn World Table 9.0, http://www.rug.nl/research/
ggdc/data/pwt/), Price level 2015 (NBS of China, http://www.stats.gov.cn/).
a. Extrapolated by the NBS series, assuming the 2015 growth rate is the same (6.4%) in both series.
b. Extrapolated by the NBS series, assuming the ratio of the NBS CPI (1978=100) to the PWT price level in 2015 is 9.5, following
the decreasing trend of the ratio since 2011.
c. Three-year moving average, centered.
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Table A3.3. Urban Unemployment Rate, Four Series, 1988-2015
(percent of labor force)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Year

NBER

GWP

NBER
(MAa)

GWP
(MAa)

CHIP

Census

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

3.5
3.0
3.9
3.8
3.7
3.5
4.1
4.0
4.1
4.9
4.9
5.6
7.8
8.2
10.4
10.4
9.9
10.0
9.4
8.1
9.1
8.9

0.4
3.5
3.6
3.8
3.7
3.8
3.9
4.1
4.3
4.6
5.1
6.1
7.2
8.8
9.7
10.2
10.1
9.8
9.2
8.9
8.7
8.2
8.7
4.9
5.3
4.7
2.3
5.5

4.3

3.4

11.3/8.3b
11.6

9.6/6.9b
7.9

7.3
6.3
5.0
4.1
4.2

4.8b

4.2

Sources: NBER (urban hukou population): Feng, Hu, and Moffitt 2015; GWP (www.gallup.com);
CHIP (urban households, http://www.ciidbnu.org/chip/index.asp); Census (random samples of
the Census data from the NBS of China, and statistics on http://www.stats.gov.cn/).
a. Three-year moving average, centered.
b. Urban (city + town) population; other census values are for urban hukou population.
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Table A3.4. Safety Net Indicators by Level of Education, 1988-2013
(urban households)
A. Pension Coverage
(percent of males ages 60+ and females ages 55+)
1
2
3
4
5

All
College or more
Middle school or high school
Primary school or less
Row 2 - Row 4

1988

1995

2002

2007

2013

99.5
99.2
99.8
99.9
-0.7

99.5
99.7
99.7
99.1
0.6

79.8
90.9
88.7
63.1
27.8

84.6
95.4
90.6
64.6
30.8

83.1
90.3
86.8
74.9
15.4

1988

1995

2002

2007

2013

(99)a
(99)
(99)
(99)
(0)

75.4
87.4
74.6
61.5
25.9

56.4
71.2
52.8
43.3
27.9

B. Healthcare Coverage
(percent of population ages 15+)
6
7
8
9
10

All
College or more
Middle school or High School
Primary school or less
Row 7 - Row 9

Source: CHIP (urban households, http://www.ciidbnu.org/
chip/index.asp). Healthcare was not asked in 1988 and 2007.
a. Values for 1988 assume coverage was nearly universal,
based on responses on self-rated health (SRH) by income and
education in the 1990 WVS which are very close together. Cf.
Inglehart et al. 1998, V83.

Table A3.5. Measures of Social Capital, 1990-2012
1990

78

1995

2001

2007

2012

Most people can be trusted (% agree)

60.4

52.3

54.4

52.8

63.2

Civic cooperation (10=always; 1=never)
Wrong to falsely claim benefits
Wrong to avoid fare
Wrong to cheat on tax
Bribing not acceptable

9.30
9.42
9.46
9.66

8.63
9.39
9.47
9.79

8.86
9.66
9.42
9.65

7.48
8.96
9.00
9.28

7.33
8.38
8.79
9.03

Mean

9.46

9.34

9.41

8.67

8.36

Source: WVS. Specific questions and response options are given in Technical Box 2.

92.1
91.3
91.9
94.7
-3.4
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Table A3.6. Indicators of Trends in Environmental Pollution and Housing Prices, 1990-2014
Coal
Year

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

Housing
Prices

Consumption

Housing
Prices

(MAa)

(million
tons)

RMB/sq.
meter

RMB/sq.
meter

1948
2017
2092
2197
2608
2937
3119
3645
3576
4459
4725
4993
5430
5850
5933

2019
2102
2299
2581
2888
3234
3447
3893
4253
4726
5049
5424
5738

1055

1377

1357

2434

3490

4244

Sources: Coal Consumption, Department of Energy Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics (2015).
China Energy Statistical Yearbook 2014. China Statistics Press; Housing Prices, NBS of China.
a. Three-year moving average, centered.
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Table A3.7. Predictors of SWB in World Happiness Reports, 1990-2012
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

GDP p.c.
US$ 2011

Life
Expectancy
yrs.

Freedom
of Choice
(1-10)a

Bribery
acceptable
(1-10)b

2386
3439
4401
7858
10945

69.0
69.9
72.2
74.3
75.4

7.04
6.80
7.15
7.29
7.14

1.34
1.21
1.35
1.72
1.97

1990
1995
2001
2007
2012
a.
b.

1 = none; 10 = a great deal.
1 = never; 10 = always.

Source: Col. (1) Table A2, col.1
Col. (2) World Bank, World Development Indicators
Cols. (3), (4) World Values Survey

Table A3.8. Actual and Predicted Mean Ladder of Life, 2006-2015

Year

Actual
ladder

Predicted
ladder

1.96 s.e.

2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

4.56
4.86
4.85
4.45
4.65
5.04
5.09
5.24
5.20
5.30

5.04
5.49
5.52
5.44
5.38
5.46
5.44
5.41
5.42
5.37

0.09
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.06
0.08
0.08
0.08

Sources: Cols. 2 and 4, Gallup World Poll. Col. 3, based on equation
in Helliwell et al (2016), p. 16, Table 2.1, col. 1.
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Table A3.9. Mean Life Satisfaction, Top and Bottom Income Terciles,
and Standard Deviation of Life Satisfaction, 1990-2012
(scale 1-10)

All
Top Tercile
Bottom Tercile
Top minus bottom
Life Satisfaction St. Dev.

(1)
1990

(2)
1995

(3)
2007

(4)
2012

7.29
7.30
7.12
0.18
2.10

6.83
7.77
5.89
1.88
2.42

6.77
7.53
5.53
2.00
2.43

6.86
7.47
6.46
1.01
1.98

Source: World Values Survey.

Table A3.10. Unemployment Rate, by Level of Education, 1988-2013
(per cent of labor force)

All
College or more
Middle school or high school
Primary school or less
Primary minus college

1988

1995

2002

2007

2013

0.4
0.0
0.5
0.1
0.1

3.4
0.8
3.7
3.9
3.1

11.6
3.8
13.8
18.5
14.7

7.9
3.6
8.8
12.5
8.9

4
2.8
5.2
4.2
1.5

Source: World Values Survey.

Table A11. Mean Financial Satisfaction, Top and Bottom Income Terciles, 1990-2012
(scale 1-10)

All
Top third
Bottom third
Top minus bottom
Source: World Values Survey.

(1)
1990

(2)
1995

(3)
2007

(4)
2012

6.10
6.34
5.73
0.61

6.11
7.25
4.90
2.35

6.06
7.38
5.00
2.38

6.18
7.00
5.54
1.46
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Table A3.12. Mean Self-Reported Health, Top and Bottom Income Terciles, 1990-2012
(scale 1-5)

All
Top third
Bottom third
Top minus bottom

(1)
1990

(2)
1995

(3)
2007

(4)
2012

3.82
3.83
3.80
0.03

4.01
4.26
3.80
0.46

3.93
4.13
3.71
0.42

3.86
4.02
3.69
0.33

Source: World Values Survey.

Table A3.13. Mean Life Satisfaction by Birth Cohort, 1990-2012
(scale 1-10)

Cohort
1936-45
1946-60
1961-65
Source: World Values Survey.
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(1)
1990

(2)
2001

(3)
2012

7.43
7.40
6.78

6.84
6.38
6.53

7.18
6.76
6.79
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Table A3.14. Mean Subjective Well-Being by Urban-Rural Residence, 2003-2015a
(1)

(2)

(3)

Rural

Urban

Gallup (0-10)
Urban
Year
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

Y

MA

(4)
CGSS (1-5)

Y

MA

Y

Rural
MA

Y

MA

3.45
3.50

3.41
3.58

3.36
3.40

3.45

3.79

3.70

3.58

3.56

3.82
3.85
3.81
3.72

3.82
3.83
3.79

3.71
3.86
3.73
3.71

3.72
3.77
3.77

3.28

4.80
5.12
5.09
4.70
4.90
5.42
5.58
5.54
5.28
5.76

5.00
4.97
4.90
5.01
5.30
5.51
5.47
5.53

4.41
4.70
4.64
4.34
4.44
4.75
4.81
5.02
5.13
4.98

4.58
4.56
4.47
4.51
4.67
4.86
4.99
5.04

Legend: Y= yearly
MA = Three item moving average, centered
Sources: Gallup, See Table A1. CGSS (http://www.chinagss.org/index.php?r=index/index&hl=en).
a. For specific questions and response options, see Technical Box 1

Table A3.15. Mean Subjective Well-Being, Urban and Rural Hukou Holders in Urban Areas, 2003-2013a
(1)

(2)
CGSS (1-5)

UH
Year

Y

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

3.28

RH
MA

Y

MA

3.19

3.45
3.50

3.41
3.58

3.44
3.43

3.55

3.79

3.70

3.79

3.67

3.82
3.85
3.81
3.72

3.82
3.83
3.79

3.78
3.82
3.74
3.70

3.80
3.78
3.75

Legend: UH = Urban hukou holders in urban areas
RH = Rural hukou holders in urban areas
Y= yearly
MA = Three item moving average, centered
Source: CGSS (http://www.chinagss.org/index.php?r=index/index&hl=en).
a. For specific questions and response options, see Technical Box 1
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Introduction
Are the people in Africa really among the least
happy in the world? And if African countries do
have a ‘happiness deficit’, what are the prospects
of Africa achieving happiness in the near future?
These are questions we shall try to address in
this chapter.
The World Happiness Report (WHR), published
since 2012, has found that happiness is less
evident in Africa than in other regions of the
world. It reports Gallup World Poll (GWP)
ratings of happiness, measured on the ‘ladder of
life’, a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 indicating greatest
happiness. On the map of the Geography of
Happiness, published in an earlier World Happiness Report Update 2015, the happiest countries
in the world are shaded green, the unhappiest red.
Africa stands out as the unhappiest continent,
being coloured almost entirely in shades of
glaring red (See Fig. 4.1).

In 2017, the WHR reports that average ladder
scores for over four in five African countries are
below the mid-point of the scale (see Fig. 4.2).
And only two African countries have made
significant gains in happiness over the past
decade2. There are also considerable inequalities
in life evaluations in African countries, and this
inequality in happiness has increased over the
past years3.
In this chapter, we shall tentatively seek a number
of explanations for the unhappiness on the
African continent, which is home to about 16%
of the world’s population. It will be no easy
task to identify factors that may have shaped
perceptions of well-being among the 1.2 billion
African people who live in 54 nation states
with different historical, cultural, and socio-economic backgrounds. Nonetheless, we shall
attempt to describe some of the positive and
negative experiences in the lives of people in
African countries that likely impact on personal

Figure 4.1 Geography of Happiness
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Source: Helliwell, Huang, & Wang (2015, p. 20)

Figure 4.2: Ranking of Happiness in Africa, 2014-16
Figure 13: Ranking of Happiness in Africa: 2014-16

1. Algeria(6.355)
2. Mauritius(5.629)
3. Libya(5.615)
4. Morocco(5.235)
5. Somalia(5.151)
6. Nigeria(5.074)
7. South Africa(4.829)
8. Tunisia(4.805)
9. Egypt(4.735)
10. Sierra Leone(4.709)
11. Cameroon(4.695)
12. Namibia(4.574)
13. Kenya(4.553)
14. Mozambique(4.550)
15. Senegal(4.535)
16. Zambia(4.514)
17. Gabon(4.465)
18. Ethiopia(4.460)
19. Mauritania(4.292)
20. Congo (Brazzaville)(4.291)
21. Congo (Kinshasa)(4.280)
22. Mali(4.190)
23. Ivory Coast(4.180)
24. Sudan(4.139)
25. Ghana(4.120)
26. Burkina Faso(4.032)
27. Niger(4.028)
28. Uganda(4.004)
29. Malawi(3.970)
30. Chad(3.936)
31. Zimbabwe(3.875)
32. Lesotho(3.808)
33. Angola(3.795)
34. Botswana(3.766)
35. Benin(3.657)
36. Madagascar(3.644)
37. South Sudan(3.591)
38. Liberia(3.533)
39. Guinea(3.507)
40. Togo(3.495)
41. Rwanda(3.471)
42. Tanzania(3.349)
43. Burundi(2.905)
44. Central African Republic(2.693)
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well-being. We shall also try to identify the
prospects for change and development that
could spell hope for increasing the happiness of
African people in future.
The ‘patchwork of countries that make up Africa’4
Africa includes 54 countries, the largest number
of nation states on a single continent. Forty-seven of the 166 countries in the Gallup World Poll,
about a quarter, are African countries. South
Sudan, which gained its independence in 2011
following Africa’s longest civil war, is now
included in the poll. The GWP has also collected
data in Djibouti on the Horn of Africa, in the
small island state of Comoros, and in both
Somalia and Somaliland, although the latter
region is not officially recognised as an independent state but considered a part of Somalia5. The
2017 World Happiness Report tracks the happiness of 44 African countries polled by Gallup,
including the island states of Mauritius and
Madagascar located off the east coast of Africa
(see Fig. 4.36).
At the outset, it will be important to remember
that Africa is the continent with the longest
history of humankind. We all have ancestors on
the continent. Given the length of time that
Homo sapiens have dwelt in Africa, it is also
the continent with the greatest cultural diversity
and a wealth of ancient civilisations. There are a
multitude of different ethnicities and languages
spoken in Africa. The continent extends from the
Mediterranean Sea in the north to the meeting of
the Indian and Atlantic Oceans in the south, and
from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Suez
Canal and the Red Sea in the east. Climatic
regions range from temperate coastal regions,
deserts and semi-deserts, bushland and savannah,
to tropical jungles over the equator.
Africa’s turbulent history has produced an
extremely diverse cultural and linguistic landscape. Centuries of slavery, colonialism and
apartheid preceded the period of independence.
During the turbulent years following the ‘first

dance of freedom’7 in the 1960s, the new African
nation states experimented briefly with various
styles of self-rule in what has been called the
‘third wave’ of democracy8. The expansion of the
Arabian Islamic Caliphate into North Africa in
the 7th century and the European ‘scramble for
Africa’ in the late 19th century introduced several
of the European and Arabic languages that still
serve as lingua franca and national languages on
the continent. Over the centuries, African people
have adopted some of the customs, technological
advancements and new lifestyles of their former
colonial masters. In recent times, Africa has
leapfrogged older technology to embrace the
latest advancements, such as mobile phones and
solar-powered electricity.
This tumultuous history will have left its imprint
on expectations and perceptions of personal
well-being.9 Given the diversity found on the
continent, it is natural to expect, as is shown in
Figure 4.2, that there will be large differences
among African countries in both life evaluations
and likely reasons for these differences. Africa
watchers frequently note how different the
situations are from one African country to the
next. Contrary to the once commonly held view
that Africa is a single entity or ‘brand’, each
country in fact has unique features that distinguish it from its neighbours.10 For this reason,
there is likely to be a multitude of explanations
for Africa’s ‘happiness deficit’. In this chapter
we can only begin to search for plausible factors
that may have undermined Africa’s potential for
happiness and satisfaction with life.
The quality of life of African people can be
observed from a number of different perspectives.
There have been many frames of reference for
the narrative of Africa since independence
ranging from the dismissive ‘basket case’ to the
‘structural adjustment’ imposed by the International Monetary Fund during the 1980s followed
by debt forgiveness in the 1990s. The ‘Africa
Rising’ narrative in the new millennium was
followed by the global economic recession; and
lately Africa has become part of the so-called
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Figure 4.3: Map of Africa with Average Happiness Scores
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‘war on terror’. Each of these narratives homes in
on a different set of factors that may determine
the fortunes of Africa and its people.11
Twenty-first century Africa is no longer associated
only with ‘endless famine, disease, and dictatorship’. The ‘Africa Rising’ narrative, which
overturned earlier stereotypes, projected a
continent with a growing urban middle class

market with new consumer appetites.12 Africa’s
youthfulness promised to be an asset in an
increasingly ageing global society. The continent’s
rich mineral wealth had not been exhausted
and its agricultural land was still waiting to be
exploited. In the new millennium, foreign direct
investment in Africa eclipsed development aid
for the first time since the colonial era.13
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Outline of this chapter
We start our examination by first reflecting on
the paucity of data on African happiness. We
then discuss local reactions of disbelief to some
other polls that have found African countries to
be among the happiest, in contrast to the Gallup
World Poll findings reported above. We next
consider whether Africa’s happiness deficit since
independence14 may in fact be a long-standing
one, in which case, it may take more time to
remedy. Then we examine how changes in the
lives of African people under democratic rule
have affected quality of life on the continent.
In particular, we review how aspects of good
governance have affected the well-being of
citizens. Finally, we consider how African people
have managed to live with their ‘happiness
deficit’ in anticipation of the good life.

Data for Africa
The GWP data on happiness for Africa is a
valuable source of information on happiness in
developing countries in Africa and serves as our
point of departure. (See Technical Box 1: Gallup
methodology in Africa). However, a major
challenge for us when reflecting on Africa’s
well-being has been sourcing further data in
support of our arguments. Our chapter will
focus on all countries in Africa—unlike studies
that divide Africa into sub-Saharan Africa and
North Africa, or the extended region of MENA
(Middle East and North Africa). While data
coverage for Africa has improved over the past
decades, there is still a dearth of social indicators
that cover the whole of the continent. In particular, there is a shortage of trend data that would
help us track the relationship between happiness
and the factors that we think might have influenced happiness over time.15
We have opted for a practical solution. Where
possible we draw on Africa’s home-grown data.
A useful source for our purpose is the Afrobarometer, which collects subjective indicators that

give voice to ordinary citizens on the continent.16
Other home-grown initiatives that provided
useful pointers for our examination are the
Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)17
that covers all 54 countries on the continent
based mainly on objective indicators, and the
Arab Barometer, launched in 2005, which covers
countries in North Africa and the Middle East.18

Do Gallup Happiness Ratings Ring
True in Africa?
Before we consider what may be holding back
African happiness, it will be important to know
whether WHR reports on life evaluations in
African countries ring true to people living on
the continent. Measures of subjective well-being,
other than Gallup World Poll ones, have, on
occasion, ranked African countries such as
Ghana and Nigeria among the happiest in the
world. In these cases, it seems that local reactions
to media reports on such high happiness rankings were mixed. In the Ghanaian case, political
leaders reportedly took credit for promoting the
well-being in their country, while their citizens
tended to doubt that the scores were credible,
and debated their validity. Similarly, Nigerian
scholars referred to a ‘Nigerian paradox’ when
their country achieved less than credible very
high happiness rankings in international studies.
When Ghanaians heard that their country
ranked among the ten happiest countries in the
world in a news story circulating on the internet
in 2006, there was excitement but also mainly
disbelief. In her contribution to a handbook
on happiness across cultures, Vivian Afi Abui
Dzokoto recalls that the rating was received with
mixed feelings of pride and disbelief that triggered
debate on what ‘really mattered’ for well-being
in Ghana. ‘Did this statistic take into consideration
the state of life in the country: the unemployment rates, traffic, state of roads, and the price
of gasoline? Was it because Ghana was a very
religious country? Or was it family values
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Technical Box 1: Gallup Methodology in Africa

Introduced in 2005, the Gallup World Poll is
conducted in approximately 140 countries every
year worldwide, including 40 in Africa, tracking
attitudes toward law and order, institutions and
infrastructure, jobs, well-being, and other topics.
Gallup surveys approximately 1,000 residents
per country, targeting the entire civilian, non-institutionalized population, aged 15 and older. In
2016, face-to-face surveys were used in all of
Sub-Saharan Africa and most of North Africa.
In Libya, telephone survey methodology has
been used since 2015 owing to the country’s
high rate of mobile phone coverage and ongoing instability which has made it too dangerous
to use face-to-face interviewers.
In countries where face-to-face surveys are conducted in Africa, the first stage of sampling is
the identification of 100 to 125 ultimate clusters
(sampling units), consisting of clusters of
households. Sampling units are stratified by
population size and geography and clustering is
achieved through one or more stages of sampling. Where population information is available, sample selection is based on probabilities
proportional to size (PPS) sampling, otherwise
simple random sampling is used. Samples are
drawn independent of any samples drawn for
surveys conducted in previous years. In most
African countries, national coverage is at or
near 100%. However, national coverage is lower
in countries such as Nigeria (96%), Somalia
(68%), and South Sudan (56%) where insecurity
makes interviewing dangerous in specific
regions or neighbourhoods.
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Data weighting is used to ensure a nationally
representative sample for each country and is
intended to be used for calculations within a
country. First, base sampling weights are constructed to account for household size. Weighting by household size (number of residents
aged 15 and older) is used to adjust for the probability of selection, as residents in large house-

holds will have a disproportionately lower probability of being selected for the sample. Second,
post-stratification weights are constructed.
Population statistics are used to weight the data
by gender, age, and, where reliable data are
available, education. At country level in Africa,
each survey carries a margin of sampling error
ranging from a low of ±2.6 percentage points to
a high of ±5.4 percentage points.
The Gallup World Poll is translated into 85 languages throughout Africa and attempts are
made to conduct interviews in the language the
respondent speaks most comfortably. When at
least 5% of a national population considers a
language to be their most comfortable language,
a new language is added to the survey.
Where necessary, Gallup seeks the permissions
of national, regional, and local governments. In
many African locations, permission from Chiefs
and Elders must also be sought in order to gain
access to rural areas or villages. In Somalia,
permission is obtained not only from authorities
in Somaliland, Puntland, and the Central
Government in Mogadishu, but also from
so-called “emerging states” such as Jubbaland
Administration and South-West State.
Following 4-5 day training courses in capital
cities, interviewers are sent across the country
to reach ultimate clusters. While public transportation is used in many cases, it is often
necessary in some regions to rent 4x4’s owing
to poor infrastructure and the remoteness of
many sampling areas. In South Sudan, all
interviewers not working in Juba must be
flown to provincial towns immediately following
training as road networks make travel exceedingly difficult. While at least 30% of interviews
are accompanied in-person or back-checked by
supervisors in all countries, data is also monitored remotely throughout fieldwork by quality
control personnel utilising GPS data and interviewer productivity metrics.

WORLD HAPPINESS REPORT 2017

or the tropical climate?’19
In the case of the Nigerian happiness ‘paradox’,
Aaron Agbo and his colleagues, writing in the
same handbook on cross-cultural happiness,
thought that respondents who indicated that
they felt happy might not have meant they were
truly happy with their situation, but rather they
felt that reporting otherwise ‘could only aggravate the matter’. Saying you are happy might
have been a way ‘of counter-acting everyday
negative life experiences’, they speculated.20

A decade after Cantril’s study, the Gallup-Kettering study conducted in the 1970s, the largest
global study of well-being of its time, found that
African countries produced the lowest ladder
of life scores, apart from India. A combined
sample of eleven sub-Saharan African countries
scored 4.61 in the 1970s, a ladder rating not very
different from the most recent Gallup World Poll
ladder ratings reported in WHR 2017 for the
same eleven African countries that range from
3.35 to 5.07.23

Africa’s Quest for Positive Change
Africa’s History of
Depressed Happiness
Well-being may reflect the history of a region.21
This may especially be the case for Africa that
has a short history of self-rule. Low levels of
subjective well-being are likely not to be a recent
development in Africa. Indeed, the first international studies of happiness already found that
evaluations of life were less positive in African
countries south of the Sahara than elsewhere.
The WHR uses the ladder of life measure
introduced by Hadley Cantril in the early 1960s
as the yardstick for ranking countries on global
happiness. Going back in time, Cantril’s classic
study of The Pattern of Human Concerns in 13
countries conducted in the early 1960s included
two African countries: Nigeria represented an
‘underdeveloped giant’ along with Brazil and
India, while Egypt was among three samples
drawn in the Middle East. It seems that the
country evaluations reported by Cantril in the
1960s for Egypt and Nigeria have not shifted
much in fifty years. The highest score is 10 on
Cantril’s 0 to 10 ladder of life scale. Egypt’s
mean ladder score was 5.5 in Cantril’s 1960s
study and 4.735 as recorded in this year’s WHR
2017 (see Fig. 4.2). Nigeria’s ladder ratings in
the two periods are 4.8 in Cantril’s 1960s study
and 5.074 in WHR 2017 (see Fig. 4.2).22

Of importance for our discussion here is that
the Gallup-Kettering study of the 1970s also
asked respondents if they thought they would be
happier if things could be changed about their
lives. The desire for change was greatest by far
in sub-Saharan Africa. Some 90% of African
respondents wished for change in their lives and
the vast majority in this group wanted not a
‘few’, but ‘many’ things to change to improve
their lives.24
There can be no doubt that the most profound
changes in the lives of African people were
caused by the ‘winds of change’ that swept
through the continent in the late 1950s and early
1960s, bringing independence to formerly subjugated peoples. On gaining independence from
colonial rule, most countries on the continent
experimented with democratic rule that was to
restore dignity and freedom for Africa’s people.
Why should democracy be important for African
well-being? One argument is that Africa’s
approach to democracy focuses on ‘horizontal
equality’ among diverse cultural and ethnic
groups rather than on ‘individual’ or vertical
rights.25 Thus, Africa’s democracy project might
be said to be in tune with a continent that has
always nurtured collectivist values, such as
African humanism. It ensured societal well-being in the past and still continues to do so today.26
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In the next sections, we shall review attitudes
to democracy and citizen evaluations of good
governance. Later we shall return to discuss
threats to an inclusive African democracy, in the
form of authoritarian leaders (Africa’s so-called
‘Big Men’), patronage systems, and corruption,
all of which may have negative impacts on
well-being on the continent.

Democracy, Good Governance, and
the Promise of Prosperity
Africa is said to have embraced democracy ‘in
fits and starts’ since the winds of change blew
through the continent in the 1960s. Although
the newly independent states adopted the Western liberal democratic systems of their former
colonial masters, in due course authoritarian
rule became the order of the day. By the end of
the 1980s, only Botswana, The Gambia and
Mauritius still had democratic systems. Democracy
was generally restored in the 1990s, and today,
the vast majority of Africa’s countries are multiparty democracies, at least in name if not in
practice. The African Union’s Vision 2063
envisages a prosperous and peaceful Africa that
promotes democratic governance. Free and fair
elections are seen as a test of the strength of
Africa’s democracies and more than a third of
states on the continent were due to hold elections
in 2016.27
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Africa’s ‘Third Liberation’. Now that Africa has
liberated itself from both colonial and authoritarian rule, African countries are advised to
achieve the so-called ‘third liberation’, that is, to
free themselves from poor governance in order
to accelerate development and prosperity.28
International evidence suggests there is a strong
link between good governance and well-being.
Societies that have high levels of well-being tend
to be economically developed, to have effective
governments with low levels of corruption, to
have high levels of trust, and to be able to meet
citizens’ basic needs for food and health.29

Supply and demand for democracy in Africa.
Afrobarometer surveys have found that the
most common meaning of democracy in Africa
relates to civil liberties, especially freedom of
speech.30 And successive waves of the Afrobarometer show that Africans consider democracy
to be preferable to any other form of government, disapproving of authoritarian options
including one-party, military and one-man rule
(see Fig. 4.4A left). However, this demand for
democracy is not matched by supply over the
course of fifteen years. The African countries
that favour democratic rule outweigh those that
are satisfied with democracy and regard their
country as a democracy (see Fig. 4.4B right).
Importantly, Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show that
satisfaction with democracy is weakly positively
associated with happiness, while a ‘democratic
deficit’—the gap between preference for democracy and satisfaction with its functioning—
depresses levels of happiness. Looking back over
the past decade, Figure 4.7 indicates that gains
and losses in satisfaction with democracy relate
to corresponding changes in happiness.
The material underpinnings of democracy and
African well-being
It is important to note that African citizens
expect much more of their democracies than just
civil liberties such as free and fair elections. They
are just as likely to associate democracy with
better living conditions—with basic services such
as clean water, electricity, and housing—as with
regular elections, competing political parties, and
freedom to criticise government.31
Given the continent’s history of colonialism,
there was hope that democracy would restore
dignity to African people and improve their life
circumstances. Africa’s independence from
colonial rule promised material benefits—the
decent standard of living that provides dignity. It
is telling that an improved or decent standard of
living was the greatest hope expressed by Nigerians participating in Cantril’s 1960s study. Before
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Figure 4.4: Trends in the Demand for and Supply of Democracy, 12 African Countries, 1999-2015

Source: Afrobarometer Rounds 1-6, Online Appendix, Table A4.1.

Figure 4.5: Satisfaction with Democracy and Happiness, 34 African Countries, 2013-2015
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Sources: Afrobarometer Round 6 and Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.2.

Figure 4.6: Democratic Deficits and Happiness, 34 African Countries, 2013-2015a

Sources: Afrobarometer Round 6 and Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.2.
a. The democratic deficit is the percentage point difference between the share stating that democracy is preferable and those that
report satisfaction with democratic functioning. The larger the score, the greater the deficit.

Figure 4.7: Changes in Satisfaction with Democracy and Happiness, 15 African Countries, 20052015a
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Sources: Afrobarometer Rounds 3 and 6 and Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.3.
a. Changes refer to absolute changes in levels of satisfaction with democracy and happiness between the two periods. The results
are confined to those countries with available Afrobarometer and Gallup data in both time periods.
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giving their life evaluations, 69% of Nigerian
respondents stated they aspired to a better
standard of living, while 60% worried that they
might not achieve a decent standard of living.32
Waiting for the ‘end of poverty’33. The Afrobarometer uses the Lived Poverty Index34 to measure
freedom from the experience of deprivations in
everyday life. Respondents are asked whether
they have gone without six basic necessities in
the past year, ranging from food and water to
electricity in the home. There is a strong negative association between happiness and lived
poverty. African countries that have experienced
less lived poverty report higher levels of happiness
in the Gallup World Poll (see Fig. 4.8). Burundi,
one of the world’s poorest nations, that is struggling to emerge from a 12-year ethnic-based civil
war, scores highest on Afrobarometer’s lived
poverty and lowest on happiness. In contrast,

Algeria, a leading North African oil-exporting
country, and Mauritius, a strongly democratic
island state, have low lived poverty and are the
two happiest countries on the continent in the
GWP. Other North African countries follow
close behind Algeria and Mauritius in their lived
poverty and happiness ratings.
Figure 4.9 indicates that changes in lived poverty
and happiness over time are associated. For
example, Zimbabwe, formerly a breadbasket in
southern African and now often regarded as a
failed state where unemployment and poverty are
endemic and political strife and repression are
commonplace, has experienced some poverty
relief in daily life over the past decade. The drop
in Zimbabwe’s lived poverty score of 0.61 points
in Figure 4.9 is matched by a corresponding
increase of 0.64 points in its happiness score.

Figure 4.8: Happiness and Lived Poverty in 34 African Countries, 2013-15
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Sources: Afrobarometer Round 6 and Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.4.
Note: In three instances (Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland), there was no available happiness data point in the 2013-2015
period, so we instead utilized the data for the 2009-2011 period instead. In the case of Morocco, there was no lived poverty data
for the 2014-2015 period, so we relied on Afrobarometer round 5 data for 2011-2013 in this case.

Figure 4.9: Changes in Happiness and Lived Poverty in 15 African Countries, 2005-15a

Sources: Afrobarometer Rounds 3 and 6 and Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.5.
a. Changes refer to absolute changes in levels of lived poverty and happiness between the two periods. The results are confined
to those countries with available Afrobarometer and Gallup data in both time periods.
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Infrastructure development and happiness.
Developing the continent’s infrastructure is a
major challenge that has not kept pace with
population growth. The Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa estimates that
the continent would need to invest up to $93
billion a year until 2020 for capital investment
and maintenance.35 Africa’s huge backlog of
infrastructure may play a more important role in
determining personal well-being in Africa than
in the more developed countries of the West,
whose higher levels of happiness are indicated
in shades of green in the Geography of Happiness map (see Fig. 4.1 above).
Afrobarometer reports that on average across 35
African countries, only about two-thirds of the
people live in communities with an electric grid
(65%) and/or piped water infrastructure (63%),
and less than one in three have access to sewage

(30%), while more than three times as many
have access to cellular phone service (93%). Only
about half (54%) live in zones with tarred or
paved roads. Regional comparisons show that
North Africa has the best availability of all five
services36, which may be reflected in their higher
than average happiness ratings on the continent
(see Figs. 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 above).
It is telling that in 1994 the government of
South Africa, the last country on the continent to
gain its independence, promised a ‘better life’ to
meet its newly enfranchised black citizens’
aspirations for housing, running water, and
electricity. Some twenty years later, there is still
a marked difference between what determines
happiness among black and white South Africans.
Economists report that better access to infrastructure and public goods increases happiness
among black South Africans, while determinants
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Figure 4.10: Satisfaction with State Provided Infrastructural Services and Happiness in
34 African Countries, 2013-15a

Sources: Afrobarometer Round 6 and Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.6.
a. In three instances (Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland), there was no available happiness data point in the 2013-2015
period, so we instead utilized the data for the 2009-2011 period instead. The index is simple average of the percent that the
government is doing very or fairly well in handling four infrastructural services, namely: roads and bridges, electricity, water and
sanitation, and basic health.

of the happiness among mainly wealthier white
South Africans mirrors those typically found in
Western developed research settings.37
Afrobarometer surveys highlight the importance
of infrastructure development for the African
experience of everyday well-being throughout
the continent. The latest round of surveys found
that the lived poverty index had declined in
two-thirds of the 36 countries surveyed by
Afrobarometer. Countries that had made progress in developing basic infrastructure were
more likely to have experienced declines in lived
poverty.38 Figure 4.10 shows that satisfaction
with the state’s development of infrastructure
in African countries is also positively associated
with happiness.

Infrastructure and democracy. While poor
infrastructure and lack of service delivery may
contribute to lived poverty and depressed happiness, it may also undermine Africa’s democracy
project. A case in point is South Africa’s relatively
new democracy. The latest Afrobarometer survey
conducted there suggests that South African
citizens might be willing to give up their democratic rights in favour of their living conditions
being improved. While almost two-thirds (64%)
of South African respondents thought that
democracy was preferable to any other kind of
government, a similarly high percentage (62%)
stated they would be ‘very willing’ or ‘willing’
to give up regular elections to live under a
non-elected government capable of ensuring law
and order and service delivery.39 A growing
global trend towards authoritarianism could lead
to a resurgence of such regimes in Africa.40
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Africa’s ‘Big Men’, Authoritarian
Regimes, and Discontent
Three decades after its restoration in the 1990s,
Africa’s democratic process is still very fragile.
Although the era of military coups, dictatorships
and authoritarianism may be over, there are still
a number of African leaders who resort to
manipulating electoral and constitutional mechanisms and intimidating citizens in order to
prolong their stay in power.41 The Ibrahim Prize
for good governance in Africa, instituted by the
Mo Ibrahim Foundation in 2006, goes to former
African leaders who have honoured their country’s
constitutionally mandated term limits, and have
dedicated their rule to improving people’s lives.
Only five winners have been selected in the ten
years since 2007.42
Africa’s longest-ruling leaders are to be found
across the continent. Fifteen leaders of 48
African countries that hold regular elections
have served more than two terms or indicated
their intention to do so in 2016. Africa’s ‘Big
Men’, who personalise power, often have poor
human rights records and use repression to
hang on to power.43 They gain support through
Africa’s widespread patronage system.44 A
number of Africa’s authoritarian regimes have
survived because they have provided political
stability or support for the ‘war on terror’, thus
attracting the foreign aid and investment needed
for development.45
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An example of a country valued for its political
stability after years of conflict is business-friendly Rwanda. The country was chosen to host the
2016 World Economic Forum on Africa in its
capital city Kigali in recognition of its role as a
model for regional development.46 Rwanda’s
President Paul Kagame, a leader in Rwanda’s
post-genocide government since 1994, gained
approval by referendum in 2015 to stand for an
unprecedented third term in 2017. The controversial vote on the country’s constitution means
that Kagame could be in power until 2034 in a
country with unusually low life evaluations

relative to its economic success (see Fig. 4.2).
President Kagame is said to have remarked that
African countries that change their leaders too
often have not fared as well as his country. He
may not be alone in claiming that authoritarian
rule is a more efficient form of democracy in
less developed parts of the world.47
Citizens in a number of African countries
appear to share President Kagame’s view that
strong leadership is in the interest of political
stability and economic development. The latest
Afrobarometer surveys show that views are
divided on governance issues, such as one-man
rule and term limits (see Table 4.1, top). On
average, one-man rule is rejected by four out of
five citizens, while only 11% are in favour, and
three-quarters support two-term limits for their
president. However, the differences between
highest and lowest values of support and rejection are striking. Over 90% in Benin, Gabon,
and Burkina Faso were in favour of constitutional two-term limits. In Mozambique, a country
still suffering from the effects of a 16-year civil
war that ended in 1994, near-equal proportions
were against (35%) and in favour (30%) of
one-man rule and only 50% supported a term
limit. Noteworthy is that all four countries have
experience of longer-term leadership.48
Trust and Corruption
Perceptions of the trustworthiness and honesty
attributed to Africa’s leaders and civil servants
vary across the continent (see Table 4.1, middle).
Highest and lowest values differ by at least 50
percentage points between countries. Within
countries, trust in the president is consistently
greater than trust in other members of the
ruling party (Malawi and South Africa are
exceptions). Similarly, government officials are
consistently seen to be more corrupt than those
in the office of the president (Gabon is an
exception49). Nigeria was voted among the most
corrupt countries on all three indicators recorded
in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Support for Authoritarian Rule in Africa, Political Trust, and Perceived Corruption, Average and Range of Values Across 36 Countries, 2014-15 (%)
African
average

Lowest
value

Highest
value

Diff high to
low

Three most
positive
ratings

Three most
negative
ratings

Reject one-man rule

80

35

93

59

MUS, SEN,
BEN

MOZ, EGY,
ALG

Support one-man rule

11

3

30

27

MUS, SLE,
TZA

MOZ, SDN,
TUN

Agree that Constitution should limit
president to a maximum of two terms

75

50

93

43

BEN, GAB,
BFA

MOZ, LSO,
BWA

Trust President somewhat / a lot

56

29

82

53

EGY, BDI,
NER

STP, MWI,
LBR

Trust Ruling Party somewhat / a lot

47

20

72

52

BDI, NAM,
NIG

GAB, LBR,
NGA

All / most of government officials
corrupt
All / most of those in Office of
President corrupt
Corruption increased a lot / somewhat
in last year
Government doing very / fairly well in
fighting corruption

39

15

70

55

CPV, MUS,
STP

LBR, NGA,
GAB

31

13

63

51

CPV, TZA,
BDI

LBR, BFA,
NGA

58

26

83

57

MOR, BFA,
EGY

RSA, NGA,
GHA

30

10

54

44

BWA, SWZ,
LSO

MDG, GAB,
ZWE

Source: Afrobarometer Round 6, Online Appendix, Table A4.7.
Note: ALG=Algeria; BEN=Benin; BFA=Burkina Faso; BWA=Botswana; BDI=Burundi; CPV=Cape Verde; EGY=Egypt; GAB=Gabon; GHA=Ghana; LSO=Lesotho; LBR=Liberia; MDG=Madagascar; MWI=Malawi; MUS=Mauritius; MOR=Morocco; MOZ=Mozambique; NAM=Namibia; NER=Niger; NGA=Nigeria; RSA=South Africa; SLE=Sierra Leone; SEN=Senegal; STP=Sao Tome &
Principe; SDN=Sudan; SWZ=Swaziland; TZA=Tanzania; TUN=Tunisia; ZWE=Zimbabwe

On average, 58% of respondents across all
Afrobarometer countries surveyed thought
corruption had increased in their country in
the past year, while less than one in three
approved of their government’s efforts to fight
corruption (see Table 4.1 bottom). Exceptionally,
54% in Botswana, considered to be a stable
democracy, thought the government was doing
well in fighting corruption. Noteworthy is that
corruption might be easier to contain in smaller
island states, such as Cape Verde, Mauritius,
and Sao Tome & Principe, where Afrobarometer
respondents indicated there was less corruption
or approved of their governments’ fight
against corruption.
Our examination of the relationship between
happiness and corruption (not shown here)

suggests that it is not a recent increase or
decrease in perception of corruption that counts,
but rather longer-term changes. Over the past
decade, happiness improved markedly in a
number of countries where citizens saw a reduction in corruption at the top level of leadership
(see Fig. 4.11) and stronger government performance in fighting corruption (see Fig. 4.12).

‘Africa Uprising’50
The question is how long African citizens will
support their strongmen and long-serving
leaders. Five years ago, the so-called Arab Spring
of 2011 saw regime change in North African
countries that may have caused a ripple effect on
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Figure 4.11: Changes in Happiness and Perceived Corruption in the Office of the President in
15 African Countries, 2005-15a
Sources: Afrobarometer Rounds 3
and 6 and Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix,
Table A4.8.
a. Changes refer to absolute
changes in levels of perceived
corruption in the Office of the
President and happiness between
the two periods. The results are
confined to those countries with
available Afrobarometer and Gallup data in both time periods.

Figure 4.12: Changes in Happiness and Perceived Government Performance in Fighting Corruption
in 15 African Countries, 2005-15a
Sources: Afrobarometer Rounds 3
and 6 and Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix,
Table A4.8.
a. Changes refer to absolute
changes in the shares perceiving
government performed very /
fairly well in fighting corruption
and levels happiness between
the two periods. The results are
confined to those countries with
available Afrobarometer and Gallup data in both time periods.
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the continent. When Burkina Faso’s dictator of
27 years, Blaise Compaoré, was toppled in
November 2014, an Africa watcher foresaw that
a season of protest might have hitched a ride on
the Sahara’s Harmattan, a wind that blows south
every November.51 Interestingly, the Gallup
World Poll conducted a year prior to the coup in
Burkina Faso found awareness of the Arab
Spring was greater in Burkina Faso than in other
sub-Saharan countries.52
It may be significant that a further long-term
president was almost ousted in 2016. Yahya
Jammeh had boasted he would rule The Gambia
for a billion years.53 In December, his 22-year
authoritarian rule was set to end by a shock
election result. The event was initially heralded as
a triumph for African democracy until Jammeh
later disputed the election outcome. He was
finally forced to step down in early 2017.54

Youth have always been in the forefront of
protest. In the past two years, youth and student
protests have swept through many countries
south of the Sahara, including in Ethiopia where
a state of emergency was imposed in mid-2016.55
It is significant that the student protests there
and in South Africa have been interpreted as a
clash between generations.56
In 2016, Afrobarometer reported that their latest
round of surveys found 11% of youth reported
having been involved in at least one protest
action in the past year.57
The disconnect: Africa’s ‘youth bulge’ and
ageing leaders
A problem for Africans who yearn for change
and greater life chances is that there is a dramatic
disconnect between Africa’s longest serving
leaders and the continent’s youth.58 The age

Figure 4.13: Trends in Mobile Cellular Telephone Subscriptions and Individual Internet Usage
per 100 Inhabitants in Africa, 2005-16a
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Sources: ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators database, Online Appendix, Table A4.9.
a. The dashed lines represent the World average on the two ICT indicators.

difference between leaders and the youth is
striking. While the average age of Africa’s
presidents is estimated to be about 70 years,
some 70% of African citizens are younger than
30 years. Most of Africa’s leaders will have been
born before the age of television and mobile
phones and before the end of the colonial era.
Given this generation gap, there is likely to be
a mismatch between youth’s expectations of
democracy, and the reality that confronts them.59
Social media played an important role in the Arab
Spring and has continued to do so in more recent
youth protests across Africa. Figure 4.13 shows
that mobile phones have captured the imagination
of the people on the continent. Africa’s mobile-cellular telephone and internet usage is fast
catching up with the rest of the world.
Youth voting with their feet
At the heart of the Arab Spring were disgruntled youth seeking democratic representation
and economic participation. Political analysts
have warned that responses to Africa’s current
youth revolts may not necessarily meet protestors’ demands for greater access to education
and to skills that will lead to employment.60
An important question, therefore, is what will
happen to Africa’s youth who do not find jobs
in their countries of birth by their mid- to late
twenties. Will they despair, join extremist
groups, or emigrate?
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and working on the mines became a rite of
passage for young Xhosa men. Working underground, they earned both prestige and the money
to pay bride wealth in order to get married.62
Fast forward to 2016. Young men in a rural
village in The Gambia, where President Jammeh’s
authoritarian rule was challenged in the December
elections, see the need to risk a perilous 4,800
km journey across the Sahara and the Mediterranean in search of work in Europe. They hope
to earn money in order to be able to marry a
local young woman and gain respect in their
community. As many as 600 of the approximately 4,000 villagers have risked this so-called
‘Back Way’.63
Youth working overseas earn not only to benefit
themselves but also to support their families in
Africa. The remittances sent home by nearly 140
million Africans living abroad currently surpass
Western foreign aid.64 Africans fleeing conflict
in their countries or seeking a better life have
overwhelmed Europe in the past year. Since
2014, an estimated 80,000 of the passengers on
the Mediterranean people-smuggling boats have
come from sub-Saharan Africa.

‘Asinamali’ 65—we have no money!

Africa’s increasingly IT-connected youth will
have expectations of a higher standard of living
than their parents. Not all rural youth are content to till the soil as past generations have done
and will try to find greener pastures in urban
areas or, in some cases, even overseas. African
people have always been on the move.61

Africa will need to provide jobs for its youth if it
is to meet their aspirations for the good life. In
2010 there were roughly 200 million Africans
between 15 and 24 years of age and this number
could rise to over 450 million by 2050. According to an African Development Bank report,
young people aged 15 to 24 constitute 37% of
Africa’s labour force but make up 60% of the
continent’s total.66 It is estimated that 18 million
jobs will need to be created every year just to
accommodate Africa’s current jobseekers.67

Consider that South Africa’s migrant labour
system, introduced during the colonial era,
forced rural men to work on faraway mines to
earn the cash to pay a hut tax. In the twentieth
century, labour circulation became a way of life

The latest Afrobarometer identified unemployment as a top concern in African countries (see
Fig. 4.14). Some Africa watchers argue that the
continent is already falling behind in providing
education and employment for its youth. The
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Figure 4.14: The Most Important Problem Facing African Countries, 2013-15 (%)a

Drought and commodity prices as risk factors
for ‘Africa Uprising’
It might be worth considering that economic
recessions following periods of drought have
played a critical role in fueling the continent’s
discontent, as in the cases of the Arab Spring
and the Ethiopian protests. Drought may well
spark further uprisings. Africa has a long history
of extreme weather patterns70, which is likely to
be aggravated by climate change in the 21st
century.71 In 2016, countries in east and southern
Africa experienced severe drought conditions
that have negatively affected food production
and increased food prices. It was anticipated that
the drought would be followed by severe flooding in the region.72

Source: Afrobarometer (2016) Highlights of Round 6 survey
findings from 36 African countries, p.2, Online Appendix,
Table A4.10.
a. Respondents were asked: In your opinion, what are the
most important problems facing this country that government
should address? Respondents were allowed to provide up to
three responses. The bars in the figure show the percentage
of respondents who mentioned each problem among their top
three challenges.

African Development Bank has pointed out that
in 2012 only a quarter of young African men
and just 10% of young African women managed
to get jobs in the formal economy before they
reached the age of 30.68
One hopeful future scenario sees the African
continent diversifying from extractive industries
to investing in its youth. If business friendly
policies were introduced, some analysts predict
that production in China could shift to Africa69
and Africa’s ‘youth bulge’ could be ‘put to work’.
However, there are also fears of ‘Chinese neo-colonialism’ that might jeopardise Africa’s future.

A further risk factor for discontent and unrest is
the combination of lower demand for commodities and lower commodity prices, which will
call for belt-tightening in Africa’s oil-producing
countries. The latest International Monetary Fund
outlook for sub-Saharan Africa predicts a growth
of only 1.4%. A number of African countries have
already had to turn to the IMF and the World
Bank for bailouts. Sub-Saharan countries, including Angola, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe have asked for financial
assistance or are in talks to do so.73

Demography and Well-Being
Although major investment in Africa’s youth
is needed to address barriers to youth employment, there may not be time to make sufficient
investment to avert a population ‘time bomb’.
The international Children’s Worlds survey
suggests that Africa is lagging behind other
countries in investing in its youth. (See Technical
Box 2: African children’s well-being in international context). Noteworthy is that some of
Africa’s smaller nations, particularly island
states such as Mauritius, are among the happiest
(see Figure 4.2 above), a finding that suggests it
may be easier for the state to provide services for
a smaller number of people.
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Technical box 2: African Children’s Well-being in an International Context

African countries are aware that investing in
children will contribute to a better future for
their nations and their people. Over the past decade, Africa has seen significant changes that
affect child well-being, including a reduction in
infant and child mortality, and improved access
to basic health services. However, there are still
many factors that hold back the advancement of
young children, such as malnutrition and stunting, on-going conflict in some countries, and
unequal education for girls.
Research on the well-being of African children is
still in its infancy. Children’s Worlds, the International Survey of Children’s Well-Being, is so far
the largest international comparative research on
children’s own views of their lives and well-being. Children’s Worlds aims to create awareness
of the state of child well-being among children,
their parents and their communities, and to inform policy makers and the general public. The
2013-14 wave tracked just over 53,000 children
aged about 8, 10, and 12 years in 15 countries
across four continents. Country samples typically
include approximately 1,000 children attending
mainstream schools in each age group.
The survey is based solely on children’s own evaluations, perceptions and aspirations. Children
are asked to evaluate their lives relating to some
dozen domains, including their living situation,
home and family relationships, money and economic circumstances, friends and other relationships, the local area, school, time use, the self,
children’s rights, and subjective well-being.
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The survey uses a number of response formats
for its questionnaire items: Life circumstances
are captured by agreement with statements on 5
or 10-point response scales from ‘I do not agree’
to ‘I totally agree’. Responses to frequency
items, mainly time-use ones, are recorded on a
4-point scale from ‘rarely or never’ to ‘every day
or almost every day’. Domain and life satisfactions are rated on a 0 to 10-point scale from ‘not

at all satisfied’ to ‘totally satisfied’. For international comparative purposes, country standing
is variously reported as the country’s mean
score on a survey item, the standard deviation of
the mean country score to indicate dispersal of
responses, and the rank order of the country’s
score among the 15 countries.
Three African countries are included in the
Children’s Worlds 2013-14 survey: Algeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa. The samples of children
drawn are representative of the whole country
in the case of Ethiopia, the Western Cape Province in South Africa, and the Western Region of
Algeria. These three countries differ markedly
according to their objective socio-economic indicators. For example, Gross Domestic Product
per capita in Algeria and South Africa is approximately ten times higher than in Ethiopia, the
poorest country in the Children’s Worlds survey
apart from Nepal. Ethiopia ranks 173 out of 187
on the Human Development Index, the lowest
ranking among the 15 countries, compared to
somewhat higher HDI rankings for Algeria (93)
and South Africa (118) in 2013. South Africa is
the most unequal country in the survey, with a
very high Gini coefficient of 63 (100 indicates
highest inequality).
Select findings from the Children’s Worlds
2013-14 survey among approximately 36,000
children aged 10 to 12 years provide glimpses of
how African children view and evaluate their
lives compared to age peers in Colombia, Estonia, Germany, Israel, Nepal, Norway, Poland,
Romania, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom.
Home and family life: Children in all 15 countries generally viewed their home and family
life fairly positively. Algeria’s evaluations of this
domain ranked among the most favourable
while Ethiopia’s were often the least favourable.
Algerian children achieved high rankings for
satisfaction with ‘my family life’ and endorse-
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ment that parents listened to them and treated
them fairly. In contrast, children in all three African countries were among the most dissatisfied with ‘the house or flat where you live’, and
Ethiopian and South African children were
most likely not to ‘feel safe at home’ and not to
‘have a quiet place to study at home’.

Time use. Homework was one of the most common after-school activities in all countries. African
children also looked after siblings and other family members and helped with household chores.
Participation in organized spare-time activities,
such as reading for fun and sports were less common, particularly in Ethiopia and Algeria.

Local area. The African countries rated the ‘area
you live in in general’ and opportunities for ‘doing things away from home’ less favourably
than others, and were less likely to say they have
places to play and feel safe in the area where
they live.

Safety. Satisfaction with personal safety, a topic explored across the domains of home, school, local
area, and the self, attracted lower scores in South
Africa and Ethiopia than in many other countries.

Material well-being. The Children’s Worlds index of material deprivation asked children if
they had or lacked nine items including good
clothes for school, a computer at home, internet
access, a mobile phone, own room, books to
read for fun, a family car, ‘own stuff’ to listen to
music, and a television in the home. Pooled
world data indicated that, on average, children
lacked only 1.9 items. Norway’s children suffered the least material deprivation; they lacked
only 0.2 items on average. Ethiopia was the
most materially deprived of all countries, with
6.3 lacked items. There was less material deprivation in the other African countries: Algeria
lacked 3.6 items, South Africa 2.3, but the distribution of deprivation was particularly uneven in
the two countries. African children were also
among the least satisfied with ‘the things you
have’ compared to other countries.
School life. Children in all 15 countries were
mainly positive about school life. African children were no exception. For example, endorsement of ‘I like going to school’ by Ethiopian and
Algerian children was higher than in other
countries. Children in Algeria were also among
the most satisfied with ‘my life as a student’,
‘my school experience’, and ‘the things I learn
at school’. Unusually, Ethiopian children’s evaluation of school life was generally more positive
than home life, although they did not feel very
safe at school.

Subjective well-being. Three indicators measured children’s overall subjective well-being: a
satisfaction item (with ‘life as a whole’), a frequency item (‘how happy were you in the past
two weeks’), and an agreement item (‘I feel positive about the future’). Country scores on all
three measures were highly skewed towards the
positive end of the 0 to 10 point scale. In the
12-years survey, scores on the three measures
were contained in a narrow band from 9.0-9.5
in Romania down to 7.5-7.6 in South Korea.
Scores on subjective well-being varied across
the African countries with Algeria leading,
South Africa in an intermediate position, and
Ethiopia lagging behind. Algeria ranked among
the four countries with the highest scores on
life satisfaction (9.1) and happiness (8.9) for 12
year olds. South Africa’s distribution of life satisfaction scores for 10 and 12 year olds were the
most extreme: low scores (below 5) and high
scores (10) were split 7.4% to 63%. Ethiopia
ranked second-lowest, after South Korea, on life
satisfaction among 10 to 12 year olds. Only every second Ethiopian child rated life satisfaction
with a score of 10 compared to over 7 in 10 in
the four top-ranking countries.
In contrast to these widely varying present life
evaluations, African children were consistently
positive about the future. All three countries
gave a future rating of 8.7 out of 10, a score only
0.3 points lower than top-ranking Romania’s
score of 9.

105

Final Comments. The select findings from the
2013-14 Children’s World survey previewed here
expose some of the disadvantages many African
children face in early life. The most glaring hardship may be doing without the resources that
children in more developed countries take for
granted. Obviously, much needs to be done to
improve African children’s life circumstances.
Meanwhile Africa’s children, like all children
around the world, try to enjoy everyday life. Importantly, they express confidence in their future.

For centuries Africa was underpopulated. The
continent only started to reach its potential for
population growth toward the end of the 20th
century.74 Now Africa’s exploding population is
expected to double by 2050. Population growth,
together with migration to Africa’s urban areas
has put severe pressure on the state’s capacity
to provide education, health services, and infrastructure. Further population growth may
undermine progress in human development
achieved so far. It is predicted that by 2050,
Africa could have 35 cities with over 5 million
inhabitants with Kinshasa and Lagos each
exceeding 30 million.75
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Africa’s population challenge. Demographers
Jean-Pierre Guengant and John May describe
the scale of the continent’s new population
challenge. In the early 1960s, they report,
African countries had fertility rates of between
5.5 and 7.5, comparable with other developing
economies at that time. Whereas Asian and
Latin American nations saw their fertility rates
decline at a fairly steady rate over the next fifty
years, African countries’ fertility stayed high
until the 1980s, before it fell sharply. As a result,
they predict that Africa’s overall population will
rise sharply, its big cities will grow alarmingly,
and although its labour force will also expand,
its ‘youth bulge’ will be ‘hard to manage’.76

Further information: See the report on the
Children’s Worlds Survey, 2013-14, in 15
countries (Rees & Main 2015), and African
country reports on Children’s Worlds surveys
in Algeria (Tiliouine 2015b), Ethiopia
(Mekonen & Dejene 2015), and South Africa
(Savahl et al. 2015), available on the project
website: www.isciweb.org

Currently, some 78% of Africa’s people live in
countries that have not passed the demographic
transition to low fertility and low mortality; only
the countries in the far north and south of the
continent are exceptions with lower fertility
rates. Countries with the top ten fertility rates in
the world are found in sub-Saharan Africa, with
nearly all above six children per woman. Fertility
rates are particularly high among Africa’s
landlocked countries and ones with low rates
of urbanisation. Niger, a land-locked country
in the Sahel is a case in point. It has the world’s
highest fertility rate of 7.6. The rate of contraception use among child-bearing age women
in sub-Saharan Africa is lower than in other
regions of the world.77
Our examination of demographic factors
(see Figs. 4.15 and 4.16) suggests that African
countries with higher fertility rates and a large
youth population may find it harder to provide
quality of life for their citizens.
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Figure 4.15: Fertility Rates and Happiness in 34 African Countries, 2013-15a

Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators and Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.11.
a. In three instances (Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland), there was no available happiness data point in the 2013-2015 period, so we instead utilized the data for the 2009-2011 period instead.

Figure 4.16: Youth Share (under 15 years) and Happiness in 34 African Countries, 2013-15a
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Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators and Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.11.
a. In three instances (Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland), there was no available happiness data point in the 2013-2015 period, so we instead utilized the data for the 2009-2011 period instead.

The Unfinished Story:
African Resilience and Hope
for the Future
African resilience
Given the development challenges that Africa
currently faces, it may take a while before people
in Africa join the happiest people on the globe.
Meanwhile, Africa’s relative happiness deficit is
buoyed by its astonishing resilience. The West
African scholars, cited in the introduction to this
chapter, referred to African people’s coping
skills when discussing how improbable it was
for their countries to be assigned high happiness
rankings in international studies. In the case of
Nigeria, Aaron Agbo and his colleagues reason
that the country’s happiness ‘paradox’ serves as
an ‘adaptive mechanism’.78 Similarly, Vivian
Dzokoto reproduces a typical ‘emblematic’
conversation between a foreign visitor and a
local to illustrate how Ghanaians cope in everyday life. The visitor to Africa is perplexed to find
there is no running water when turning on the
tap, and asks successive questions to seek a
plausible explanation. In response, the Ghanaian,
who takes such things for granted, simply
shrugs and says: ‘My friend, this is Ghana.
Sometimes, the water runs, sometimes, it
doesn’t. That is how it is. Here, take this bucket.
There is water in the tank around the corner.’79
African optimism
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Optimism that ‘many things’ will change for the
better, to paraphrase the Gallup-Kettering question put to African respondents in its 1970s
global survey, is a further coping skill perfected
by African people. People living on the continent
have developed this skill over time, possibly over
centuries, to make daily hassles and hardships
tolerable.80 A series of studies of democracy and
happiness in the authoritarian states of Chad
and Zimbabwe, and in South Africa’s new
democracy, suggest that even when the demand
for democracy in Africa is not matched by
satisfaction with living conditions, discontent is
tempered by optimism for the future.81

The majority of African countries rate life at
present below the mid-point of the Cantril
ladder scale in the latest available Gallup World
Poll. This is not the case for average future
ratings. Projected ladder ratings in five years’
time are uniformly higher than present evaluations across all countries on the continent. In
fact, the percentage increase in future expectations of life is often higher among some of the
least contented nations.
Nigeria’s track record of such positive expectations is well documented. Cantril’s 1960s study
already reported a difference of 2.6 points
between the country’s average present (4.8) and
future (7.4) ladder ratings.82 Similarly, in 2016,
there is a difference of 2.9 points between
Nigeria’s present (5.3) and future (8.2) ratings in
the Gallup World Poll. An international study of
comparative ladder ratings in ten countries with
large populations, including China, India and
the United States, found Nigeria’s 2.6 point
difference between present and future ratings to
be by far the largest.83 Nigeria’s spirit of optimism
may be exceptional by world standards, but not
in Africa.
On average in African countries, future life
evaluations are much higher than present ones.
Optimism, the gap between present and future
ladder ratings, is greatest for Africa’s youth and
decreases with age (see Fig. 4.17). In almost all
African countries, youthful optimism is above
the national average (see Fig. 4.18). It is likely
that this belief that things may change for the
better helps African people to manage their lives
in difficult circumstances. African children may
grow up with such a sense of optimism (see
Technical Box 2 above).
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Figure 4.17: Average Cantril Present and Future Ladder Evaluations by Age Group,
37 African Countries, 2015-16

Sources: Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.12.

Figure 4.18: Comparison of Differences Between Future and Present Ladder Scores Between Youth
(15-24 years) and the National Average, 37 African Countries, 2015-16a
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Sources: Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.12.
a. The data are ranked from highest to lowest difference in ladder scores based on national averages.

Figure 4.19: Importance of Religion in Life, 9 African and 21 Other Countries, 2013a

Sources: Pew Global Attitudes & Trends Question Database, Online Appendix, Table A4.13.
a. The data are ranked from highest to lowest within each country cluster based on the percentage saying that religion is ‘very
important’ in life.

Drying tears 84—African religiosity
African people also tend to turn to religion to
find fellowship, comfort, and a sense of hope in
the future.85 A recent Pew study of religiosity86
across 30 countries found that the importance
of religion is higher, on average, in Africa than
elsewhere (see Fig. 4.19). The relationship
between religiosity and happiness among these
countries lends support to the idea that faith might
assuage Africa’s unhappiness (see Fig. 4.20).
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In this chapter we have attempted to explore the
reasons why African countries lag behind other
countries in the world in their evaluation of life.
We took as our starting point the aspirations
expressed by the Nigerian respondents in the
1970 Gallup-Kettering study who were about to
embark on their first experience of freedom

from colonialism. Nigerians stated that many
changes, not just a few, were needed to improve
their lives and those of their families. Fifty years
on, judging by the social indicators we have
presented in this chapter, people in many African
countries are still waiting for changes to improve
their lives and to make them happy. In short,
African people’s expectations that they and their
countries would flourish under self-rule and
democracy appear not to have been met.
Africa’s lower levels of happiness compared to
other countries in the world might be attributed
to this disappointment with different aspects of
development under democracy. Although most
citizens still believe that democracy is the best
political system, they are critical of good governance in their countries. While there has been
significant improvement in meeting basic needs
according to the Afrobarometer index of ‘lived
poverty’, population pressure may have stymied
infrastructure and youth development.
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Figure 4.20: Happiness and the Importance of Religion in Life, 9 African and 21 Other Countries,
2013-15a

Sources: Pew Global Attitudes & Trends Question Database and Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.14.
a. The religiosity data are based on the percentage saying that religion is ‘very important’ in life. The 2007 values for Morocco
and the Netherlands are based on 2005 data, while it is based on 2009 data for Hungary. The 2013 values are based on 2011 data
in the cases of Lithuania, Sweden and Ukraine, and 2012 data in India and the United States.

Most countries in the world project that life
circumstances will improve in future.87
However, Africa’s optimism may be exceptional.
African people demonstrate ingenuity that
makes life bearable even under less than perfect
circumstances. Coping with poor infrastructure,
as illustrated in the case of Ghana referred to in
this chapter, is just one example of the remarkable resilience that African people have perfected. African people are essentially optimistic,
most of all the youth who have their lives ahead
of them. This optimism might serve as a self-fulfilling prophecy for the continent.

What if Africa looks to its youth to realise the
continent’s dreams of prosperity? What if the
African youth’s confidence in their future and
their entrepreneurial spirit were to be matched
by substantial investment in their development? Then, no doubt, African countries would
join the ranks of the world’s prosperous and
happy nations.
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1 ‘Waiting for Happiness’ is the title of Abderrahmane
Sissako’s 2002 film that depicts the daily lives of people
living in northwest Africa’s Mauritania. See Niemiec &
Wedding (2014, p. 329).
2 E
 qual numbers of African countries gained or lost
happiness over the periods 2005-2007 to 2014-2016 as set
out in Chapter 2 of this report. However, only two African
countries out of 126 worldwide made significant gains of
0.5 point increases or more in their ladder scores. Sierra
Leone – one of the three West African countries affected by
the outbreak of the Ebola virus in 2014 – gained 1.1 points,
Cameroon 0.59 points. In contrast, six countries’ ladder
scores dropped significantly by 0.6 points or more over the
two periods. (see WHR 2017, Chapter 2).
3 In 2014-16, the average standard deviation in happiness
ratings was 2.301 for 44 African countries, ranging from
1.588 for Senegal to 3.287 for Sierra Leone (See Fig. 14 in
the Statistical Appendix WHR 2017). Average standard
deviation in happiness ratings for 39 African countries
increased from 2.132 to 2.265 over the periods 2012-15 to
2014-16.
4 D
 ianna Games (2015) at Business Advisory Africa at Work
(www.africaat-work.co.za) refers to the ‘patchwork of
countries that make up Africa’. Responsible for this
patchwork is the 19th century ‘scramble for Africa’ that created borders that cut across ethnicities and ancient polities
(see Meredith 2011). In the interest of political stability on
the continent, the African Union, formed in 2002 with the
objectives of promoting peace and democracy on the
continent, supports the maintenance of country borders
dating back to independence. South Sudan, which gained
its independence from Sudan in 2011, is an exception.
5 T
 he 2016 WHR reported ladder scores for both Somaliland
and Somali in the global distribution of happiness (see
Helliwell, Huang & Wang, 2016, Figure 2.2, pp. 20–22).
Ladder scores for two small African countries of Comoros
and Djibouti were included in earlier WHRs: Comoros in
the WHR Updates 2013 to 2016 and Djibouti in WHR
2015.
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6 T
 here were no ladder scores available for the 2014–16
period for Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania and Somaliland,
so we used the latest available data reported in earlier
WHRs instead. The map shows a 2012–14 ladder score for
Djibouti (4.369) (see Helliwell et al. 2015, Fig. 2.2, p. 28),
and 2013–15 ladder scores for Comoros (3.956), Mauritania
(4.201) and Somaliland (5.057) (see Helliwell et al. 2016,
Fig. 2.2, p. 21–2).
7 T
 he title of a chapter in Meredith’s (2011, p. 162) history of
Africa.
8 S
 ee Huntington (1991), Diamond (2008), and Diamond &
Plattner (2010).

9 F
 or reports on Africa’s quality of life and well-being from
an historical perspective, see Tiliouine (2015a) and
Tiliouine & Meziane (2017) on North Africa, and Roberts
et al. (2015) and Møller & Roberts (2017) on sub-Saharan
Africa.
10 S
 ee Furlonger (2016) commenting on access to African
markets in a South African business daily.
11 S
 ee veteran Africa journalist and University of Kent
professor Keith Somerville’s (2013) views on the different
lenses through which we can observe and evaluate Africa’s
performance.
12 S
 ee, for example, Roger Southall’s (2016) portrait of South
Africa’s emergent black middle class.
13 S
 ee the article on ‘Africa Rising’ by Aryn Baker (2015),
Time Magazine’s Africa correspondent.
14 I n this chapter we limit our examination of happiness to
Africa’s post-independence period, which coincides with
the emergence of the 1960s social indicators movement
that applied the first rigorous measures of quality of life
and well-being. It is possible that Africa’s people, or at
least those of standing, flourished in earlier times, e.g.
when the pharaohs ruled in the Nile valley (van Wyk
Smith 2009), during Islam’s golden age in Africa
(Renima, Tiliouine & Estes 2016), and at the height of the
ancient kingdoms and civilisations in West and East
Africa (see Møller & Roberts 2017). Going further back in
time, Africa’s more egalitarian hunter-gatherer societies
(Reader 1997), whose expectations of life will have been
more modest than present-day ones, might have been
more contented than contemporary African citizens.
15 R
 ichard Easterlin (2010) argues that it is important to
examine time-series as opposed to point-of-time evidence
on happiness.
16 T
 he Afrobarometer is an African-led series of public
attitude surveys on democracy and governance, whose
coverage of African countries has increased from 12 in
Round 1 (1999–2001) to 36 in Round 6 (2014–2015).
Afrobarometer’s Round 6 interviews with about 54 000
citizens in 36 countries represent the views of more than
three-fourths of the continent’s population.
17 T
 he Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) covers
all 54 countries on the continent. The tenth iteration of
the IIAG 2016 incorporates Afrobarometer public attitude
survey data for the first time. This addition means that
just over 17% of IIAG’s 95 indicators are now provided by
African sources (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2016, p. 9). See
www.afrobarometer.org and Mo Ibrahim Foundation
(2016).
18 See http://www.arabbarometer.org/
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19 S
 ee Vivian Afi Abui Dzokoto’s (2012, p. 311) chapter on
happiness in Ghana, which she contributed to a handbook
on happiness across cultures. An Associate Professor of
African America Studies at Virginia Commonwealth
University in the USA, Dzokoto was raised in Germany
and Ghana.

25 N
 oting that Africans live on the world’s ‘most ethnically
diverse and fractious continent’, John Stremlau (2016)
argues that Africa’s democracies need to cater to the
needs of multiple groups in society.

20 S
 ee the chapter on happiness in Nigeria, which University of Nigeria researchers Aaron A. Agbo, Thaddeus C.
Nzeadibe, and Chukwuedozie K. Ajaero (2012, p. 303)
contributed to a handbook on happiness across cultures.
Lead author Aaron Agbo is based in the Department of
Psychology; his colleagues Nzeadibe and Ajaero in the
Department of Geography at the University of Nigeria,
Nsukka.

27 See Akokpari (2004) and Mtimkulu (2015).

21 I nglehart and Klingemann (2000, cited in Tov & Diener
2009, p.22) suggest that, apart from economic development, national levels of well-being might also reflect
historical factors. Their research found that the number of
years living under communist rule negatively predicted
national well-being in former communist states of Eastern
Europe and the USSR. One might consider that Africa’s
history of colonial rule may have played a similar role in
shaping life evaluations on the continent. In South Africa,
we were only able to rule out the possibility that cultural
factors rather than miserable living conditions and lack of
opportunities in life might be responsible for the very low
happiness ratings of black South Africans under apartheid. Eight years into democracy, there was a sufficiently
large subsample of black respondents of economic
standing to test the notion. A 2002 study found that the
higher happiness ratings of South Africa’s emergent black
economic elites matched their better standard of living
under democracy (Møller 2004).

29 H
 ere we refer to observations on the importance of good
governance for citizen well-being in Helliwell and Huang
(2008) and the volume on well-being for public policy
edited by Ed Diener, Richard Lucas, Ulrich Schimmack &
John Helliwell (2009, p. 60) and an OECD working
paper that traces the linkages between good governance
and national well-being (Helliwell et al. 2014). Similarly,
an Institute for Security Studies African Futures scenario
links gains in effective governance with poverty reduction
on the continent (Aucoin & Donnenfeld 2016).

22 Hadley Cantril’s (1965) classic study for the 1960s reports
the mean present ladder ratings of 4.8 for Nigeria (p.78)
and 5.5 for Egypt (p. 118). Nigeria’s ladder rating of 4.875
in the WHR 2016 (Helliwell et al. 2016, pp. 20–21, Figure
2.2) is almost identical to its 1960 rating of 4.8.
23 S
 ee the Gallup-Kettering global survey (1976). The range
of Gallup World Poll ladder ratings 2014-16 for the 11
countries is taken from Figure 4.2 above.
24 O
 f the 90% in the sub-Saharan sample who wished for
change in their lives, 67% wanted ‘many things’ to
change, 22% ‘just a few’ things. The question on the
‘extent of change necessary for a happier life’ read:
‘Thinking about how your life is going now, do you think
you would be happier if things could be changed about
your life? (If yes) Would you like many things about your
life changed or just a few things? See Table VI in the
Gallup-Kettering Global Survey (1976) summary volume’s
reprint of: Human Needs and Satisfactions, Mankind:
The Global Survey and the Third World, Blue Supplement
to the “Monthly Public Opinion Surveys” of the Indian
Institute of Public Opinion, Vol. XXI, Nos. 9 & 10. http://
worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/hap_bib/freetexts/~Gallup_Kettering_1976k.pdf

26 See Møller & Roberts (2017).

28 G
 reg Mills and Jeffrey Herbst (2012) contend that Africa
has already undergone two liberations, first from
colonialism and then from the autocratic rulers that often
followed on colonial rule. Africa is now awaiting its third
liberation from bad governance so that it can accelerate
its development towards more jobs and less poverty.

30 See Afrobarometer (2002).
31 T
 he briefing paper on the first round of Afrobarometer
surveys conducted in 12 countries in 2001 reports that the
democracy concept is understood mainly as civil liberties,
such as freedom of speech. In practice, people want
democracy to deliver basic necessities of life such as food,
water, shelter and education, even more strongly than they
insist on regular elections, majority rule, competing
political parties, and freedom to criticise the government.
See Afrobarometer (2002).
32 See Cantril (1965, p. 75).
33 R
 eferring to development economist Jeffrey Sach’s (2005)
book by that title.
34 A
 frobarometer’s Lived Poverty Index is an experiential
measure that is based on a series of survey questions
about how frequently people actually go without six basic
necessities during the course of a year. Respondents
report how often (just once or twice, several times, many
times, always) they or a member of their family have gone
without enough food, clean water for home use, medicines or medical treatment, cooking fuel, cash income,
and electricity in the home. See Mattes (2008) and www.
afrobarometer.org
35 See Gernetzky (2016).
36 S
 ee Afrobarometer (2016) on highlights from Round 6
survey findings from 36 African countries and Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 69 by Mitullah, Samson, Wambua,
& Balongo (2016) on infrastructure development
challenges in Africa.
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37 B
 ookwalter (2012) reports that studies conducted by
economists found factors such as rising levels of income
and access to consumption goods were more likely to
boost happiness among white South Africans.

39 S
 ee Afrobarometer (2015, p. 22) for results relating to
conditional support for democracy in South Africa amid
rising discontent, and Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 71 by
Lekalake (2016).

48 B
 enin’s Mathieu Kérékou, in and out of power over a
thirty year period since 1972, was barred from running
for a third term as president in 2016 on constitutional
and age grounds. Gabon’s current President Ali Bongo,
sworn in for a second seven-year term in 2016, took over
from his late father who ruled the country for 41 years
until his death in 2009. In Burkina Faso, meaning ‘land
of honest men’, President Blaise Compaoré was in power
for 27 years before he was toppled in the 2014 popular
uprising. Mozambique’s Joachim Chissano, installed as
president in 1986 after President Samora Machel was
killed in a plane crash, stepped down in 2004 after 18
years in office. He was awarded the Mo Ibrahim prize for
good governance.

40 S
 ee Robert Stefan Foa and Yacha Mounk (2017) on the
global rise in citizens wishing for a strong leader in their
paper on signs of democratic deconsolidation.

49 A
 li Bongo was sworn in for a second seven-year term in
September 2016, after Gabon’s constitutional court
upheld his narrow victory in a bitterly disputed election.

41 See Maphunye (2016).

50 T
 he title is taken from a book by Adam Branch and
Zachariah Mampilly (2015) on the new wave of popular
protest in Africa.

38 R
 obert Mattes, Boniface Dulani and E. Gyimah-Boadi
(2016) report on the drop in lived poverty in African
countries in their January 2016 Afrobarometer policy
paper.

42 S
 ince being launched in 2006, the Ibrahim Prize has
been awarded to President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique (2007), President Festus Mogae of Botswana
(2008), President Pedro Pires of Cabo Verde (2011), and
President Hifikepunye Pohamba of Namibia (2014).
President Nelson Mandela of South Africa was the
inaugural Honorary Laureate in 2007. See Turianskyi
(2016) and http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/news/2016/
mo-ibrahim-foundation-announces-no-winner-2015-ibrahim-prize-achievement-african-leadership
43 See Cohen & Doya (2016).
44 M
 any scholars have written about the clientelism,
cronyism, nepotism, and rent-seeking practices that have
kept Africa’s leaders in power and retarded economic
growth and advances in democracy. See among others,
Cheeseman (2015), Meredith (2011; 2014), Mills (2014),
Mills & Herbst (2012), Ndulu & O’Connell (1999), van de
Walle (2003), and Wrong’s (2010) account of Kenya’s
whistle-blowers. Regarding corruption, Historian Martin
Meredith, visiting South Africa for the launch of his new
book on Africa (Meredith 2014), was asked why Asian
economies grew faster than African ones in spite of
corruption. He replied that Asia’s wealth was reinvested
in Asia, whereas Africa’s wealth left the continent
(Interview with Meredith on the South African Broadcasting Corporation’s After Eight morning programme, 26
November 2014, own notes).
45 See Somerville (2016)
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46 S
 ee Joffe’s (2016) report on the World Economic Forum
on Africa.
47 S
 ee Serge Schmemann’s (2016) overview of the challenges facing democratic principles in an unstable world that
include authoritarian rule and the attraction of the ‘big
man’.

51 See Adebajo (2014).
52 See Loschky (2013).
53 S
 ee BBC’s The Gambia country profile. http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-africa-13376517, Accessed 2 December
2016.
54 S
 ee Kiwuwa’s (2016) report on Jammeh’s quick acceptance of defeat that astounded the world until it was
overturned. Postscript: Mr Jammeh finally left office in
January 2017 after mediation by neighbouring countries
and the threat of armed intervention. See Pilling (2017)
on the significance of the turn of events in The Gambia
for democracy in Africa.
55 M
 ark Swilling (2016) sees the protests in South Africa and
Ethiopia as part of a wave of protests sweeping through
the continent known as ‘Africa Uprising’. In Kenya,
Elizabeth Cooper (2014; 2016) interprets high school
students’ torching of boarding schools as political protest
action.
56 A
 frican studies professor Jonny Steinberg (2016)
describes South Africa’s student protests as ‘a war against
the fathers’ and ‘inter-generational loathing’. Writing on
Ethiopia’s protests, Jeffry Gettleman (2016) cites a
university lecturer in central Ethiopia saying that: ‘If you
suffocate people and they don’t have any other options but
to protest, it breaks out. ..the whole youth.. a whole
generation is protesting’.
57 Afrobarometer (2016, p. 11).
58 S
 ee Greg Mills (2014, p. 571) on the disconnect between
the expectations of youth and their ruling parties in
authoritarian regimes in sub-Saharan Africa.
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59 S
 ee Gopaldas (2015) and Population Reference Bureau
(2016) on the age gap.
60 A
 lready in 2002, a special issue of the African Studies
Review 45(2) was devoted to the role of Africa’s universities in promoting democratic culture in Africa. Amutabi
(2002) examined the case of Kenya’s universities.
Nshimbi (2016) reviews the Nigerian experience of
clashes between students and government in the past
that led to repressive measures.
61 A
 frica has seen migration on the continent and beyond
for millions of years (see Reader 1997).
62 See Francis Wilson (1972) on South Africa’s migrant
labour system.
63 See The Daily Telegraph (2015).
64 B
 odomo (2013) reports that money sent home by Africans
surpassed foreign aid by 2013. Remittances benefit
households directly as they go towards paying school fees,
building new homes and growing businesses.
65 Z
 ulu for ‘we have no money’, the title of a play by
Mbongeni Ngema in the Athol Fugard tradition that
expresses the rage of young black men in South Africa
during the apartheid era.
66 African Development Bank (2011, p. 2)
67 S
 ee OECD (2016) for a report on youth unemployment in
North Africa.
68 S
 ee The Economist (2014), the Population Reference
Bureau (2016), and Baker (2015).
69 See Davies (2015).
70 See Reader’s (1997) biography of the African continent.
71 See Vink (2016).
72 See Chagutah (2016).
73 See Khor (2016).

79 See Dzokoto (2012, p. 319).
80 V
 eenhoven (2005) reports that happiness in hardship is
possible if people rise to the challenge of coping with
difficulties in life.
81 T
 he 2005 study conducted in Zimbabwe classified 45% of
respondents as very democratic and a further 36% as
democratic. Only 11% of Zimbabweans were satisfied with
life at present, but twice as many (22%) thought they
would feel satisfied with life in ten years’ time (Dickow
2007, pp. 111, 121–2). The 2004 study conducted in four
main cities in Chad found 60% of respondents supported
democratic principles. Only 14 percent were very happy
with their life at present, but more than twice as many
(35%) thought they would be very happy with life in future
(Dickow 2005, pp. 112, 128–9). In the 2002 South Africa
study, 51% of black and 74% of white South Africans
supported democratic values and were classified as either
very democratic or democratic. Black respondents
reported the lowest levels of current life satisfaction (37%)
and happiness (38%) in the country, but 45% projected
life satisfaction to increase in future (Møller & Hanf 2007,
p.99 ff.).
82 See Cantril (1965, p. 78).
83 See Gulyas (2015).
84 W
 ith reference to a South African evangelical church’s
promise of salvation and prosperity: ‘We are open seven
days a week and seven services a day. The God of the
Bible will dry away your tears and you will have the result
you need in your life’ (See Van Wyk 2014, p.160)
85 F
 or example, see Pokimica, Addai & Takyi (2012) on the
relationship between religion and subjective well-being in
Ghana. Helga Dickow (2012) reports on religion, personal
well-being, and attitudes to democracy among South
Africans.
86 S
 ee Pew Global Attitudes and Trends question database,
http://www.pewglobal.org/question-search/?qid=408&cntIDs=&stdIDs=
87 See Cantril (1965) and Gulyas (2015).

74 See Reader (1997).
75 S
 ee Baker (2015), The Economist (2014) and Guengant &
May (2013).
76 S
 ee Guengant & May (2013) and The Economist’s (2014)
report on their study of African demography.
77 See Guengant & May (2013) and The Economist’s (2014)
report on their study of African demography. The data we
sourced gave Niger a fertility rate of 7.6, which is higher
than the 7.5 rate reported by Guengant and May in 2013.
This might indicate that Niger’s fertility has increased
since 2013.
78 See Agbo, Nzeadibe & Ajaero (2012, p. 303).
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This chapter is directed at policy-makers of all
kinds—both in government and in NGOs. We
assume, like Thomas Jefferson, that “the care of
human life and happiness … is the only legitimate object of good government.”1 And we
assume that NGOs would have similar objectives.
In other words, all policy-makers want to create
the conditions for the greatest possible happiness in the population and, especially, the least
possible misery.
For this purpose they need to know the causes
of happiness and misery. Happiness is caused by
many factors, such as income, employment,
health and family life and we need to ask, How
much does a difference in each of these factors
change the happiness of the person affected?
There is also a prior and related question that
tries to explain the huge variation in levels of
happiness within any country. The question is
How far does the variation in each of the factors
(e.g. income inequality) explain the overall
variation of happiness?
In this chapter we concentrate mainly on the
latter question.2 We begin by looking at the
role of current circumstances, and then (in the
second part of the chapter) examine the influence
of earlier childhood experience.
To be useful to policy-makers, any analysis of the
causes of happiness and misery should satisfy
at least three criteria, which have not generally
been satisfied in the literature.
1. It must use a consistent measure of happiness
throughout.
2. It must look at the effect of all the factors
affecting happiness simultaneously, not one
by one.
3. It must check whether the factors have the
same effect on misery as they do on happiness

further up the scale. This is important if, as
many believe, it is more important to reduce
misery than to increase happiness by an equal
amount further up the scale.
We have identified five major surveys of adults
that make possible such analyses and also include
meaningful measures of mental health. They
cover the USA, Australia, Britain (two surveys)
and Indonesia. We would like to have covered
more countries, but the data are not yet there.

Life Satisfaction
The measure of happiness that we use is life
satisfaction. The typical question is “Overall how
satisfied are you with your life these days?”
measured on a scale of 0 to 10 (from ‘extremely
dissatisfied’ to ‘extremely satisfied’).
This is a democratic criterion—we do not rely on
researchers or policy-makers to give their own
weights to enjoyment, meaning, anxiety, depression, and the like. Instead we leave it to individuals
to evaluate their own well-being.
Moreover, policy-makers like the concept—and so
they should. Our work shows that in European
elections since 1970, the life satisfaction of
the people is the best predictor of whether the
government is re-elected—much more important than economic growth, unemployment or
inflation (see Table 5.1).
The task is thus to explain how all the different
factors affect our life satisfaction, entering them
all simultaneously in the same equation.
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Table 5.1. Factors Explaining the Existing
Government’s Vote Share
(Partial correlation coefficients)3

Life satisfaction
Economic growth
Unemployment
Inflation

0.64
0.36
-0.06
0.15

Source: Ward (2015).
Notes: Eurobarometer data on life satisfaction and standard
election data for most European countries since the 1970s. The
regressors include the government’s vote share in the previous
election. Life-satisfaction is from the latest survey before the
election. Other variables are for the year of the election.

When we are adults, our happiness depends
significantly on our adult situation—our economic situation (our income, education and
employment), our social situation (whether we
have a partner and whether we are involved
in crime), and our personal health (physical
and mental). These in turn depend partly on
our development as children (intellectual,
behavioural and emotional), which in turn
depend on family and schooling. As our results
show, there is scope for policy to affect a
person’s development at every age.

The Effects of the Current Situation
The Life-Course
In explaining our current life satisfaction, there
are of course immediate influences (our current
situation) but also more distant ones going back to
our childhood, schooling and family background.
This diagram gives a stylised version of how our
life satisfaction as an adult is determined.

Figure 5.1. Determinants of Adult Life Satisfaction
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We begin with the impact on adult happiness of
the person’s current situation, using the following data:4
USA: Behavioural Risk Factor Surveillance
System (BRFSS) (sample aged 25+)
Australia: Household, Income and Labour
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey (sample
aged 25+)
Britain: British Cohort Study (BCS) (surveyed at
ages 34 and 42)
Britain: British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
(sample aged 25+)
Indonesia: Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS)
(sample aged 25+)
The factors we examine are
• Income: log household income per
equivalised adult
• Education: years, except Indonesia
(higher education versus none)
• Unemployment: measured as ‘not unemployed’
• Partnership: married, or living as married
• Physical health: USA, Britain and Indonesia:
number of illnesses; Australia: SF36, lagged
one year
• Mental health: USA and Australia: has ever
been diagnosed for depression or an anxiety
disorder; Britain (BCS): has seen a doctor in
the last year for emotional problems; Britain
(BHPS): GHQ-12, lagged one year; Indonesia:
replies to 8 questions.
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Most earlier analyses of life satisfaction have
not included mental health as a factor explaining life satisfaction. The reason is that both life
satisfaction and mental health are subjective
states, and there is therefore a danger that the
two concepts are, at least in part, measuring
the same thing. To omit mental health as a
factor in the equation, however, is to leave out
one of the most potent sources of misery, in
addition to standard external causes like
poverty, unemployment, and physical illness.
The solution is, whenever possible, to record
only mental illness that has been diagnosed or
has led to treatment. That is our approach and
it shows clearly that mental illness not caused
by poverty, unemployment or ill health is a
potent influence on life satisfaction.

How far does each factor explain the variation in
life satisfaction within the population? Table 5.2
shows the results of regressing life satisfaction
on all the factors simultaneously. The coefficients given are partial correlation coefficients,
which show how far the independent variation
of each factor explains the overall variation.5

Table 5.2. How Adult Life Satisfaction is Predicted by Adult Outcomes
(Partial correlation coefficients)

Income (log)
Years of education
Not unemployed
Partnered
Physical illness
Mental illness
Female
N

USA

Australia

Britain BCS

Britain BHPS

Indonesia

0.16 (.00)
0.05 (.01)
0.05 (.00)
0.34 (.01)
-0.05 (.00)
-0.21 (.00)
0.08 (.00)

0.09 (.01)
-0.03 (.01)
0.04 (.01)
0.14 (.01)
-0.17 (.01)*
-0.18 (.01)
0.08 (.01)

0.08 (.01)
0.03 (.01)
0.03 (.01)
0.21 (.01)
-0.06 (.01)
-0.11 (.01)
0.11 (.02)

0.09 (.01)
0.02 (.00)
0.06 (.00)
0.11 (.00)
-0.11 (.00)
-0.32 (.00)*
0.05 (.00)

0.18 (.03)
0.05 (.01)
0.02 (.01)
0.04 (.01)
-0.07 (.01)
-0.07 (.01)
0.07 (.01)

268,300

16,001

17,812

139,507

31,437

Sources: USA (BRFSS); Australia (HILDA); Britain (BCS); Britain (BHPS); Indonesia (IFLS).
Notes: See Appendix C. * Lagged one year.
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In all three Western countries, diagnosed mental
illness emerges as more important than income,
employment or physical illness. In Indonesia as
well, mental health is important, though less so
than income. In every country physical health is
of course also important, but in no country is it
more important than mental health.
Having a partner is also a crucial factor in
Western countries, while in Indonesia it is less
so, perhaps reflecting the greater importance of
the extended family. Education has a positive
effect in all countries (except Australia), yet it is
nowhere near the most powerful explanatory
factor on its own.6 In every country, income is
more important than education as such.
At this point a natural question is Do different
variables impact differently on life-satisfaction at

different points on the scale? For example, how
well does Table 5.2 explain whether a person is
really unhappy? To answer this we identify in
each country people in the lowest levels of
happiness, which we call “In Misery.” Because
happiness is measured in discrete units, the
percentage identified as ‘In Misery’ varies from
5.6% in the USA to 13.9% in Indonesia.
We then run a standardised linear regression of
the dummy variable ‘In Misery’ on the same
explanatory variables as before.7 The results are
shown in Table 5.3, where they are compared
with our previous results in Table 5.2 for the full
range of life-satisfaction. The two sets of coefficients are remarkably similar. There is thus no
evidence that income, mental health, or any
other variable is any more important lower down
the well-being scale than it is higher up.

Table 5.3. Explaining the Variation of Life Satisfaction and of Misery Among Adults
(Partial correlation coefficients)
USA
Income (log)
Years of education
Not unemployed
Partnered
Physical illness
Mental illness
Female

Australia

Britain BCS

Britain BHPS

Life Sat

Misery

Life Sat

Misery

Life Sat

Misery

Life Sat

Misery

Life Sat

Misery

0.16
0.05
0.05
0.34
-0.05
-0.21
0.08

-0.12
-0.04
-0.06
-0.19
0.05
0.19
-0.06

0.09
-0.03
0.04
0.14
-0.17 *
-0.18
0.08

-0.09
-0.00
-0.06
-0.10
0.16*
0.14
-0.06

0.08
0.03
0.03
0.21
-0.06
-0.11
0.11

-0.05
-0.02
-0.03
-0.11
0.05
0.09
-0.06

0.09
0.02
0.06
0.11
-0.11
-0.32 *
0.05

-0.07
-0.01
-0.07
-0.08
0.09
0.26*
-0.04

0.18
0.05
0.02
0.04
-0.07
-0.07
0.07

-0.17
-0.06
-0.03
-0.04
0.07
0.08
-0.06

Sources: USA (BRFSS); Australia (HILDA); Britain (BCS); Britain (BHPS); Indonesia (IFLS)
Notes: See Appendix C. * Lagged one year.
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Indonesia
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In many ways a more vivid way of analysing
misery is to make all the right hand variables into
discrete variables, such as poor/non-poor or sick/
non-sick. This enables us to give an exact answer
to the question If we could eliminate each
problem, how much could we reduce misery?

By contrast, eliminating poverty in the USA
reduces misery by 1.7% points, unemployment
by 0.3% and physical illness by 0.5% out of the
total 5.6% in misery. Taken together, those three
factors barely make as much difference as
mental illness on its own.

The different risk factors are now as follows:
Poor: below 60% of the median household
income
Uneducated: USA and Indonesia: no higher
education; Australia and Britain (BHPS): less
than 10 years of education; in Britain (BCS): no
qualification
Unemployed
Not partnered
Physical illness: below the current 20th percentile of physical health
Depression/anxiety: diagnosed/treated except
Britain (BHPS) and Indonesia (below the 20th
percentile).

The pattern in Australia is very similar, but
with more problems coming from physical
illness. In Britain the role of poverty is less
than it is in the USA, but the role of mental
health as large or larger.

We then estimate an equation of the form
Is miserable (1,0) = a1 Is poor (1,0) +
a2 Is uneducated (1,0) + etc.

Finally in Indonesia, eliminating mental illness
again reduces misery by more than reducing
poverty does. Further, increased education would
also greatly help. In all countries there would be
much less misery if fewer people were living on
their own.
This set of results is repeated, for effect, in
Figure 5.3.

(1)

The results are given in Table 5.4, column (1).
This shows that in the USA, for example, a
person who is poor is 5.5 percentage points more
likely than otherwise to be miserable. By contrast
someone with depression or anxiety is 10.7
percentage points more likely to be miserable.
So how much could we reduce the prevalence
of misery in the USA if we could miraculously
abolish depression and anxiety disorders
without changing anything else? Well, around
22% of the population have this diagnosis.
If they were all cured, we could reduce the
percentage of the population in misery by 0.107
times 22%. This is 2.35% of the whole population
(see column 3). That is large portion of the total
5.6% who are in misery.
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Table 5.4. How Would the Percentage in Misery Fall if Each Problem Could be Eliminated on its
Own?

USA
Poverty (below 60% of median income)
Uneducated (no higher education)
Unemployed
Not partnered
Physical illness (bottom 20%)
Depression or anxiety, diagnosed
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Australia
Poverty (below 60% of median income)
Uneducated (below 10 years of educ.)
Unemployed
Not partnered
Physical illness lagged (bottom 20%)
Depression or anxiety, diagnosed
Britain (BCS)
Poverty
(below 60% of median income)
Uneducated (no qualification)
Unemployed
Not partnered
Physical illness (bottom 20%)
Has seen a doctor for emotional health
problems in last year
Britain (BHPS)
Poverty (below 60% of median income)
Uneducated (below 10 years of educ.)
Unemployed
Not partnered
Physical illness (bottom 20%)
Emotional health symptoms lagged
(bottom 20%)
Indonesia
Poverty (bottom 20%)
Uneducated (no qualification)
Unemployed
Not partnered
Physical illness (bottom 10%)
Emotional health symptoms (bottom 20%)

α-coefficient

×

Prevalence
(%)

=

α × Prevalence

0.055
0.012
0.079
0.034
0.027
0.107

×
×
×
×
×
×

31
11
4.0
43
20
22

=
=
=
=
=
=

1.71
0.13
0.32
1.46
0.54
2.35

0.044
0.017
0.096
0.047
0.097
0.098

×
×
×
×
×
×

30
13
3.0
37
20
21

=
=
=
=
=
=

1.32
0.22
0.29
1.74
1.94
2.06

0.025

×

30

=

0.75

0.009
0.059
0.049
0.017
0.155

×
×
×
×
×

19
2.2
47
20
14

=
=
=
=
=

0.17
0.13
2.30
0.34
2.17

0.028
0.026
0.152
0.053
0.057
0.205

×
×
×
×
×
X

29
10
3.8
36
20
20

=
=
=
=
=
=

0.81
0.26
0.41
1.90
1.14
4.10

0.063
0.055
0.152
0.044
0.071
0.078

X
X
X
X
X
X

20
27
01
30
10
20

=
=
=
=
=
=

1.26
1.48
0.15
1.32
0.71
1.56

Total in misery
(% points)

5.6

7.0

8.0

9.9

13.9

Sources: USA (BRFSS); Australia (HILDA); Britain (BCS); Britain (BHPS); Indonesia (IFLS).
Notes: People aged 25+, except for Britain (BCS) where people aged 34 and 42. The first column consists of regression coefficients in equation (1). For Indonesia the bottom quintile of the number of physical illnesses had much less explanatory power
than the composite variable used for Indonesia throughout this chapter—see Online Annex. See also Appendix C.
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Figure 5.3. How Would the Percentage in Misery Fall if each Problem Could be Eliminated on its
Own?

FPO

Sources: USA (BRFSS); Australia (HILDA); Britain (BHPS); Indonesia (IFLS)

From Figure 5.3 we can see how much misery
could be reduced if we eliminated each of the
risk factors, one at a time. But clearly none of
them can be totally eliminated. Moreover the cost
of reducing them is also relevant. So a natural
question to ask in each country is If we wanted to
have one less person in misery, what is the cost
of achieving this by different means? We attempt
a very rough calculation of this for Britain in
Table 5.5. As Table 5.5 shows, it costs money to
reduce misery, but the cheapest of the policies is
treating depression and anxiety disorders.

Table 5.5. Average Cost of Reducing the Numbers in Misery, by One Person. Britain
£k per year
Poverty.
Raising more people above the
poverty line
Unemployment.
Reducing unemployment
by active labour market policy
Physical health.
Raising more people from the
worst 20% of present-day illness
Mental health.
Treating more people for
depression and anxiety
Sources available from authors.
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The Effects of Childhood
Importantly, many of the problems of adulthood
can of course be traced back to childhood and
adolescence. So which aspects of child development best predict whether an adult is satisfied
with life? Answering this question requires
cohort data which are available for many fewer
countries. Since Britain is rich in such data, we
shall from now on use data on Britain only. We
first use data from the British Cohort Study,
which has followed children born in 1970 right
up to today.
Three key dimensions of child development are at
work. One is intellectual development, which we
measure by the highest qualification that the
individual achieved. This is turned into a single
variable using weights derived by regressing
wages on highest qualification. A second dimension is behavioural, measured in the Rutter
behaviour questionnaire by 17 questions answered
by the mother. The third dimension is emotional
health based on a malaise inventory (22 questions
answered by the child and 8 by the mother).
We now regress adult life-satisfaction on these
three variables, as well as on family background.
As Figure 5.4 shows, the strongest predictor of a
satisfying adult life is not qualifications but a
combination of the child’s emotional health and
behaviour.8 These findings have direct relevance
to policy.
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But what, in turn, determines child development?
To study this we use a very detailed survey of
all children born in the English County of Avon
in 1991/2 who have been followed intensively
up until today. Our aim is to explain the three
measures of child development. Intellectual
development is now measured by GCSE scores.
The emotional health of the child, however, has
particular significance, since it is also the best
measure we have of the child’s own quality of
life—it is a final product as well as an input into
the resulting adult.

Figure 5.4. How Adults’ Life Satisfaction
is Affected by Different Aspects of their
Development as Children: Britain.
(Partial correlation coefficients)

Sources: Britain (BCS)
Notes: Qualifications is the highest qualification that the person achieved. Behaviour at 16 is reported by the mother, and
emotional health at 16 is reported by mother and child.

Clearly both parents and schools affect a child’s
development. How, first, do parents affect their
children’s development? We have a mass of
information about parents, and in Table 5.6 we
show the family variables that have the main
effects. As is well known, family income has a
substantial effect on a child’s academic performance, but a much smaller effect on the child’s
emotional health and behaviour. Father’s unemployment has adverse effects, but is not that
common. What is the effect if the mother goes
out to work? If this happens in the first year,
there are on average very small negative effects.
If the mother works in subsequent years, however, it is positively beneficial for academic performance and further does no measured harm to
the child’s emotional health.
As regards “parenting style,” parental engagement and involvement with their children (e.g.
in reading and play) is immensely valuable,
while aggressive parenting (hitting or shouting)
only exacerbates bad behaviour. Conflict between
parents is especially disadvantageous for the
behaviour of the children. The worst thing of all
for children’s emotional health and behaviour is
a mother who is mentally ill. Indeed, the survey
suggests strongly that the mother’s mental
health matters more than the father’s.9
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Table 5.6. How Child Outcomes at 16 are Affected by Different Factors: Britain.
(Partial correlation coefficients)

Family income
Father’s unemployment
Mother worked in 1st year
Mother worked thereafter
Parents’ involvement
Aggressive parenting
Family conflict
Father’s mental health
Mother’s mental health

Emotional

Behavioural

Intellectual

0.07 (.02)
-0.04 (.03)
-0.02 (.02)
-0.01 (.02)
0.04 (.02)
-0.03 (.02)
-0.04 (.02)
0.04 (.02)
0.16 (.02)

0.08 (.02)
-0.00 (.02)
-0.01 (.02)
-0.05 (.02)
0.05 (.02)
-0.12 (.02)
-0.14 (.02)
-0.00 (.02)
0.17 (.02)

0.14 (.01)
-0.03 (.01)
-0.02 (.01)
0.04 (.01)
0.02 (.01)
-0.01 (.01)
-0.01 (.01)
-0.00 (.01)
0.03 (.01)

Source: Britain (ALSPAC)
Note: See Appendix C.

Clearly, family matters. What about the effect of
schools? In the 1960s, the Coleman Report in
the US told us that parents mattered more than
schools.10 Since then the tide of opinion has
turned. Our data strongly confirm the importance
of the individual school and the individual
teacher. This applies equally to the academic performance of the pupils and to their happiness.

Figure 5.5. How Child Outcomes at 16 are
Affected by Family and Schooling: Britain.
(Partial correlation coefficients)

In Figure 5.5, we look at child outcomes at 16 and
show how they are explained. The top bar shows
the combined effect of all observed family factors
(treated as a single weighted variable). The next
bar shows the enduring effect of the primary
school a child went to (again a single aggregate of
dummy variables), and the last is the effect of the
secondary school.11 These are big effects.
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Source: Flèche (2016). ALSPAC data.
Notes: See Appendix C.

Behaviour and Crime
We have so far focussed exclusively on the
happiness of the individual person being studied.
But each of us also has a marked impact on the
happiness of other people. This social impact
has been given insufficient weight in much of
the literature on happiness, although it is well
known that how others behave is a major influence on our own happiness.
So we must modify Figure 5.1 to take this into
account (see Figure 5.6). Unfortunately, however,
we have only limited ability to study this important determinant of the well-being of human
populations. One route is by inter-country
comparisons of the type developed in Chapter 2
of this report. The other is by studying the
effects of crime on individual happiness, and
then investigating the determinants of criminality.

Figure 5.6. The New Element: Behaviour
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Table 5.7. How the Number of Crimes Committed by an Individual up to Age 34 is Affected by
Child Development: Britain.

Qualifications (1 SD improvement)
Behaviour (1 SD improvement)
Emotional health (1 SD improvement)

-0.87
-0.25
-0.04

Source: Britain (BCS).
Notes: Controls for family background, gender and age dummies.

Using data on local crime rates from police
records, together with the corresponding local
happiness data from the British Household
Panel Survey, we can infer that each crime on
average reduces the aggregate life-satisfaction of
the local population by the equivalent of 1
point-year for one person.
If we then look at how child development affects
crime, we find that the number of crimes a
person commits is affected by child development,
as shown in Table 5.7. Thus more education has
a major benefit through the resulting reduction
of crime. From one standard deviation of qualifications comes a one-off benefit to the rest of the
population of just under 1 point-year of life-satisfaction (1 x 0.87). This can be compared to the
gain to the educated individual of 0.10 pointyear in every year of their life, as discussed
earlier. Thus the crime-reducing effect of education adds proportionately little to the total social
returns to education.

WORLD HAPPINESS REPORT 2017

Social Comparisons
There remains the elephant in the room—social
comparisons. People are constantly amazed that
aggregate happiness has not risen in the USA
and many other countries, when incomes and
educational levels have risen so much and
when income and education are associated with
greater individual happiness. This is the Easterlin paradox.

It is really no mystery, however.12 There is much
evidence that people compare their income with
other people and, if others become richer, they
feel less happy at any given level of income.13
This is confirmed in the present study. Table 5.8
shows the effect of the average of log income in
one’s region, age-group and gender upon one’s
own happiness. In all three countries the negative effect of others’ income is large, and any rise
in overall income has little effect on overall life
satisfaction. The same is true for education.

Table 5.8. How Life Satisfaction (0-10) is Affected by Own Income, Comparator Income, Own Years
of Education and Comparator Years of Education
(Partial correlation coefficients)

Own income (log)
Comparator income
Years of education
Comparator education

Britain (BHPS)

Germany

Australia

0.16 (.01)
-0.15 (.07)
0.03 (.00)
-0.09 (.02)

0.26 (.01)
-0.34 (.05)
0.05 (.00)
-0.05 (.01)

0.16 (.01)
-0.13 (.06)
-0.01 (.00)
-0.03 (.01)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls for self-employed, employed part time, unemployed, not in labour force,
partnered, separated, widowed, parent, physical health, emotional health, female, age, age-squared, comparator unemployment,
comparator partnership, year and region dummies.
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Conclusion
Policy-makers need to know the causes of happiness and misery. Some of these are factors that
affect everyone in a society (see Chapter 2), while
other vital factors differ across individuals. For the
latter, policy-makers need to know what factors
account for the huge variation across individuals
in their happiness and misery (both of these being
measured in terms of life-satisfaction).
Key factors include economic factors (such as
income and employment), social factors (such as
education and family life), and health (mental
and physical). We use surveys from the USA,
Australia, Britain and Indonesia to cast light on
the relative importance of these various factors.
In all three Western societies, diagnosed mental
illness emerges as more important than income,
employment or physical illness. In Indonesia as
well, mental health is important, though less so
than income. In every country, physical health is
also of course important. Yet in no country is it
more important than mental health.
Having a partner is also a crucial factor in
Western countries, while in Indonesia it is less
so, perhaps reflecting the greater importance of
the extended family. Education has a positive
effect in all countries (except Australia) but it is
nowhere near the most powerful explanatory
factor on its own. In every country, income is
more important than education as such.
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Even so, household income per head explains
under 2% of the variance of happiness in any
country. Moreover it is largely relative income
that matters, so as countries have become richer,
many have failed to experience any increase in
their average happiness. A similar problem
relates to education—people care largely about
their education relative to that of others.
What about the causes of misery? Do the same
factors affect misery as affect life-satisfaction

across the whole range? The answer is yes, and
the factors have the same ranking in explaining
misery as in explaining life-satisfaction. In Table
5.4 we show a novel decomposition which
illustrates how much misery could in principle
be eliminated by eliminating either poverty, low
education, unemployment, living alone, physical
illness or mental illness. In all countries the
most powerful effect would come from the
elimination of depression and anxiety disorders,
which are the main form of mental illness. This
would also be the least costly way of reducing
misery (Table 5.5).
While much could be done to improve human
life by policies directed at adults, as much or
more could be done by focussing on children.
We examine this issue using British cohort data.
We ask, Which factors in child development best
predict whether the resulting adult will have a
satisfying life? We find that academic qualifications are a worse predictor than the emotional
health and behaviour of the child.
What in turn affects the emotional health and
behaviour of the child? Parental income is a
good predictor of a child’s academic qualifications
(as is well known), but it is a much weaker
predictor of the child’s emotional health and
behaviour. The best predictor of these is the
mental health of the child’s mother.
Schools are also crucially important. Remarkably, which school a child went to (both primary
and secondary) predicts as much of how the
child develops as all the characteristics we can
measure of the mother and father. This is true of
what determines the child’s emotional health,
their behaviour and their academic achievement.
To conclude, within any country, mental health
explains more of the variance of happiness
in Western countries than income does. In
Indonesia mental illness also matters, but less
than income. Nowhere is physical illness a
bigger source of misery than mental illness.
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Equally, if we go back to childhood, the key
factors for the future adult are the mental
health of the mother and the social ambiance
of primary and secondary school. The implications for policy are momentous.
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1 Jefferson (1809).
2 T
 he relation between these two questions is shown in
Appendix A, which provides data from which the answers
to the previous question can be calculated.
3 The partial correlation coefficients are sometimes called the
standardised regression coefficients. They are the s in a
regression where all variables are divided by their standard
deviation. The overall explanatory power of the equation is
given by

4 D
 etails are in Appendix B and an online Annex at https://
tinyurl.com/WHR2017Ch5Annex
5 See Note 3.
6 T
 he total effect of education includes of course its effect via
income and other channels. If income is excluded from the
regression, the coefficient on education becomes USA
0.08, Australia 0.03, Britain BHPS 0.06, and Indonesia
0.06.
7 W
 e thus estimate a linear probability model. Almost
identical results are obtained from logit analysis.
8 T
 he coefficient for the combination of the child’s emotional health and behaviour is 0.101 (s.e. = 0.009), which
compares with 0.068 (s.e. 0.008) for qualifications—a
significant difference (p = 0.010).
9 P
 resumably since she is more present. However the
mother’s mental health is measured 8 times up to when
the child is 11, while the father’s is only measured 3 times
until the child is 2. To see if this matters, we also focused
on explaining the child’s emotional health at 5, using three
observations on both parents’ mental health. The difference between the effect of mother and father remained as
large as it is in Table 5.6. The same occurred if we focussed
on explaining the child’s emotional health at 16, using only
the first three observations on each parent’s mental health.
The mother’s mental health was measured using the
Edinburgh Post Natal Depression Scale (EDPS), and the
father’s was tested using the Crown-Crisp Experiential
Index.
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10 Coleman et al. (1966).
11 The dependent variable is regressed on two sets of dummy
variables, one for each primary school and one for each
secondary school. The set of primary school variables is
then turned into one composite variable using the
coefficients on each dummy variable. The same is done
for secondary schools.

12 F
 or an earlier discussion of the Easterlin paradox, see
WHR 2012, Chapter 3.
13 Clark et al. (2008); Layard et al. (2010).
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Appendix A: Calculating The Absolute Impact of A Factor
The equations presented in this chapter are of
the form

where measures the standard deviation of the
variable. For cost-effectiveness analysis a policymaker needs the coefficients
in the equation

Thus

The tables in the text provide the s. The following tables provide the s and the means.

Standard deviations for Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.8
Life satisfaction
Misery
Income (log)
Education
Not unemployed
Partnered
Physical illness
Mental illness
Female
Comparator income
Comparator education

USA

Australia

Britain BCS

Britain BHPS

Indonesia

0.62
0.22
0.82
1.11
0.20
0.50
1.06
0.42
0.50

1.49
0.26
0.88
2.58
0.21
0.48
4.95
2.59
0.50
0.40
1.17

1.90
0.27
0.74
1.57
0.14
0.50
1.32
0.18
0.50

2.36
0.35
1.22
2.51
0.21
0.48
1.10
5.54
0.50
1.07
0.97

0.80
0.35
7.86
0.43
0.08
0.35
0.83
4.97
0.50

USA

Australia

Britain BCS

Britain BHPS

Indonesia

3.40
0.06
9.99
4.78
0.96
0.57
1.38
0.22
0.50

7.90
0.07
7.51
12.08
0.67
0.63
22.68
0.21
0.53
7.64
12.07

7.39
0.08
9.55
3.37
0.97
0.53
2.01
0.14
0.52

6.97
0.10
6.42
12.35
0.96
0.64
0.73
23.11
0.55
6.22
12.19

3.32
0.14
15.75
0.26
0.99
0.70
0.48
18.83
0.51

Means for Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.8
Life satisfaction
Misery
Income (log)
Education
Not unemployed
Partnered
Physical illness
Mental illness
Female
Comparator income
Comparator education
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Appendix B: The Surveys Used
https://tinyurl.com/WHR2017Ch5Annex
USA (BRFSS)

Behavioural Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS)
Cross-sectional survey which includes a life-satisfaction question since 2005.
In 2006, 2008, 2010, 2013, respondents were asked whether they have ever been diagnosed with
depression or anxiety.

Australia

Sample size = 270,000
Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey
Household-based panel study which began in 2001. The panel members are followed over time and
interviewed every year. Life-satisfaction is measured throughout.
In 2007, 2009, 2013, respondents were asked whether they have ever been diagnosed with depression or
anxiety.

Britain

Sample size = 16,000
British Cohort Study (BCS)
British cohort data which began in 1970. The children are followed over time and interviewed at ages 5,
10, 16, 26, 30, 34, 38 and 42. A life satisfaction question has been included in the study from age 26.
At ages 34 and 42, respondents were asked whether they have any physical health problems.

Britain

Britain

Sample size = 18,000
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
Household-based panel study which began in 1991. The panel members are followed over time and
interviewed every year. A life satisfaction question has been included in the study from 1996.
Sample size = 140,000
Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children (ALSPAC)
Near census English cohort study. The study recruited over 14,000 pregnant women residing in the Avon
area in the UK with expected delivery dates between April 1991 and December 1992. The children have
been followed almost every year since then.
The study contains various measures of the family environment, schooling environment as well as
indicators of the development of child well-being and skills over time.

Indonesia
(IFLS)

Sample size = 8,000
Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS)
Longitudinal survey in Indonesia.
The fifth wave (ILFS-5) in 2014 includes a question on life satisfaction, emotional health and number of
health conditions diagnosed by a doctor.
Observations: 32, 000
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Appendix C: Notes on Tables and Figures
Table 2: How Adult Life-satisfaction is Predicted
by Adult Outcomes
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Controls for age, age-squared, region and year
dummies. Australia and Britain (BHPS) also
include comparison income, education, unemployment and partnership. Britain (BCS) also
includes non-criminality, child outcomes at 16
and family background. Cross-section regressions using information from BCS respondents
at ages 34 and 42. BHPS, HILDA, IFLS and
BRFSS respondents at age 25+.

proportion of time mother worked thereafter,
father’s unemployment, mother’s mental health,
father’s mental health, involvement, aggression,
family conflict, parental separation, parents’
education, mother’s age at birth, and parents’
marital status at birth. Controls for female child,
ethnicity, first born child, number of siblings,
low birth weight, and premature baby.

Table 3. Explaining the Variation of Life-Satisfaction and of Misery Among Adults
Controls for age, age-squared, region and year
dummies. Australia and Britain (BHPS), also
include comparison income, education, unemployment and partnership. Britain (BCS) also
includes non-criminality, child outcomes at 16
and family background. Cross-section regressions using information from BCS respondents
at ages 34 and 42. BHPS, HILDA and BRFSS
respondents at age 25+. Those included in
misery are USA 1-2 (on scale 1-4); Australia 0-5
(on scale 0-10); Britain (BCS) 0-4 (on scale
0-10); Britain (BHPS) 1-3 (on scale 1-7); and
Indonesia (IFLS) 1-2 (on scale 1-5).
Table 6. How Child Outcomes at 16 are Affected
by Different Factors: Britain.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Controls for parental separation, parents’ education, mother’s age at birth, parents’ marital
status at birth, female child, ethnicity, first born
child, number of siblings, low birth weight,
premature baby, and primary school and secondary school fixed effects.
Figure 5. How Child Outcomes at 16 are Affected by Family and Schooling: Britain.
Family background include family income,
proportion of time mother worked in first year,
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Introduction
Happiness is typically defined by how people
experience and evaluate their lives as a whole.1
Since the majority of people spend much of
their lives at work, it is critically important to
gain a solid understanding of the role that
employment and the workplace play in shaping
happiness for individuals and communities
around the world.
In this chapter, we focus largely on the role of
work and employment in shaping people’s
happiness, and investigate how employment
status, job type, and workplace characteristics
relate to measures of subjective wellbeing.
Nevertheless, it is important to note from the
onset that the relationship between happiness
and employment is a complex and dynamic
interaction that runs in both directions. Recent
research shows that work and employment are
not only drivers of happiness, but that happiness
can also itself help to shape job market outcomes, productivity, and even firm performance.2
The overwhelming importance of having a job
for happiness is evident throughout the analysis, and holds across all of the world’s regions.
When considering the world’s population as a
whole, people with a job evaluate the quality
of their lives much more favorably than those
who are unemployed. The importance of having
a job extends far beyond the salary attached to
it, with non-pecuniary aspects of employment
such as social status, social relations, daily
structure, and goals all exerting a strong influence on people’s happiness.
The importance of employment for people’s
subjective wellbeing shines a spotlight on the
misery and unhappiness associated with being
unemployed. In this chapter, we delve into
unemployment and build on the existing research
literature to show empirically that individuals do
not adapt over time to becoming unemployed
and that unemployment can even have a
“scarring” effect after regaining employment.

The data also show that high unemployment has
spillover effects, and negatively affects everyone—even those who are employed. These
results are obtained at the individual level but
they also come through at the macroeconomic
level, with national unemployment levels
correlating negatively with average national
wellbeing across the world.
We also consider how happiness relates to the
types of job that people do. The overarching
finding on job type is that data from around
the globe reveal an important difference in
how blue-collar and white-collar jobs are related
to happiness. Even when accounting for any
relevant covariates between these two broad
categories of job type, we find that blue-collar
labor is systematically correlated with lower
levels of happiness, and that this is true of all
labor-intensive industries such as construction,
mining, manufacturing, transport, farming,
fishing, and forestry.
In addition to considering happiness differentials
between broad categories of job type, we also
study job quality by focusing on more specific
workplace characteristics and how they relate to
employees’ happiness. As might be expected, we
find that those in well-paying jobs are happier
and more satisfied with their lives and their jobs,
but a number of further aspects of people’s jobs
are strongly predictive of varied measures of.
Work-life balance emerges as a particularly
strong predictor of people’s happiness. Further
factors include job variety and the need to learn
new things, as well the level of individual autonomy enjoyed by the employee. Moreover, job
security and social capital (as measured through
the support one receives from fellow workers)
are also positively correlated with happiness,
while jobs that involve risks to health and safety
are generally associated with lower levels of
subjective wellbeing.
The data used in this chapter are drawn mainly
from the Gallup World Poll, which covers over
150 countries worldwide and is representative of
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98% of the world’s population. Nationally
representative samples of people for these
countries have been surveyed for most years
beginning in 2006. These surveying efforts
allow the analyses reported in this chapter to
incorporate hundreds of thousands of individual
responses that enable us to investigate how
employment status and job type measures relate
to the wellbeing of respondents. The Gallup
World Poll is complemented by the European
Social Survey for the analysis of how more
specific workplace characteristics relate to
happiness, and the German Socio-Economic
Panel is used to illustrate dynamics surrounding
unemployment and happiness over time.
For the sake of ease, we use the terms happiness
and wellbeing interchangeably. However, important differences exist between the different
elements that make up subjective wellbeing, and
how these relate to employment characteristics.
Such differences are captured in this chapter by
systematically using a number of measures: life
evaluation (by way of the Cantril “ladder of
life”3), positive4 and negative5 affect to measure
respondents’ experienced positive and negative
wellbeing, as well as the more domain-specific
items of job satisfaction6 and employee engagement7. We find that these diverse measures of
subjective wellbeing correlate strongly with each
other, but that there are nevertheless important
differences in how they relate to aspects of work
and employment. For example, we find that
being self-employed is associated with higher
overall life evaluation in most developed nations,
but that self-employment is also associated with
the heightened experience of negative emotions
such as stress and worry.
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We conclude the chapter by emphasizing the
main results and by suggesting a number of
possible subsequent avenues for researchers and
policy-makers to consider. Given the importance
of employment for happiness, it is evident that
even more weight ought to be given to fostering
employment, as well as protecting people
against the damaging effects of joblessness.

Moreover, policies that promote high quality
jobs could be stimulated by, for example, incentivizing employers who provide jobs with working conditions that are conducive to people’s
wellbeing. The results reported in this chapter
provide new empirical evidence for such policies
in a global context.

Employment Status and Subjective
Wellbeing Around the World
In Figure 6.1 we present differences in the
self-reported wellbeing of individuals around
the world according to whether or not they are
employed. The bars measure the subjective
wellbeing of individuals of working age8 who
are employed (either for an employer or for
themselves regardless of whether they work
full-time or part-time) and those who are
currently unemployed. In all cases where we
present either global or regional averages such
as these, we weight the averages by national
population.9 As can be seen, the difference in
average subjective wellbeing between having
and not having a job is very large indeed. This
is the case regardless of whether one considers
wellbeing measures that gauge life evaluation
or positive and negative affective states. In fact,
the employed evaluate the quality of their lives
around 0.6 points higher on average as compared to the unemployed on a scale from 0 to
10. Equally noteworthy is that individuals who
are unemployed report approximately 30 percent
more negative affective experiences as compared
to individuals that are employed. The notion
that employment matters greatly for the wellbeing of individuals is one of the most robust
results to have come out of the economic study
of human happiness.10
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Figure 6.1: Subjective Wellbeing and Employment Status

Figure 6.1 presents simply the raw wellbeing
differentials between those in and out of work.
These descriptive statistics are corroborated in
the regression analyses, which break employment
status into finer categories and consider men
and women as well as different regions separately. Here we are able to control for a number
of additional variables in a multivariate regression analysis that may be related to both labor
market outcomes as well as subjective wellbeing. These are gender, age (and its squared
term), level of education, (the natural logarithm
of) income, marital status, and household
composition. These variables are included in
order to avoid so-called ‘omitted variable bias,’ in
case these demographic variables might be
driving both employment and happiness and
thus lead us to false conclusions on the relation-

ship between work and wellbeing. Moreover,
these regressions incorporate country and year
fixed-effects in order to account for the many
political, economic, and cultural differences
between countries as well as year-to-year
variation that would otherwise cloud our
interpretation of the relationship between
employment and happiness.
In all of our regression analyses throughout the
chapter, we standardize the various outcome
variables such that they each have a mean of 0
and a standard deviation of 1 in the whole
sample. This enables us to more easily compare
the magnitude of the coefficients across the
different outcomes. The coefficients on each of
the employment status indicator variables in
Table 6.1 estimate the difference in standard
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deviation units of each of the three outcome
variables (life evaluation, positive affect, and
negative affect) associated with holding that
status, as compared to being employed full-time
for an employer, controlling for income as well
the other demographic variables noted above.
As can be seen, the unemployed evaluate the
overall state of their lives less highly on the
Cantril ladder, and experience more negative
emotions in their day-to-day lives as well as
fewer positive ones. These are among the most
widely accepted and replicated findings in the
science of happiness.11 Here, income is being
held constant along with a number of other
relevant covariates, showing that these unemployment effects go well beyond the income loss
associated with losing one’s job.12
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While we are able to control for a number of
confounding variables in this analysis, one
further important methodological concern is the
possibility of so-called ‘reverse causality.’ Indeed,
there is some evidence that the relationship
between employment and happiness is dynamic
in nature and may run in both directions. That
is to say that happier individuals may be somewhat more likely to obtain employment in the
first place or that unhappy people may be more
likely to lose their jobs.13 This means that the
cross-sectional results reported in this chapter—
and much of the related literature—cannot be
interpreted causally and require this important
caveat. Nevertheless, while this important
methodological proviso needs to be noted, a
number of studies have shown that the damaging
effects of unemployment remain large in within-person longitudinal analyses, which hold
constant an individual fixed effect,14 while others
have leveraged external employment shocks—
namely plant closures—to further demonstrate
the causal effects of unemployment on subjective
wellbeing.15
If unemployment is so bad, what about part-time
work? As one might expect, much depends here

on whether one actually wants to work any more
hours. If the respondent is underemployed—
that is, is seeking to work more hours than they
currently do—then, in line with intuition, there
remains some scope for happiness gains
through increasing their employment. This is
not the case for individuals who report actually
preferring to be part-time employed. In fact,
part-time employed individuals who do not seek
more hours of work report greater happiness
and less negative experiences (such as stress
and worry) as compared to full-time employed
people, controlling for income and other
confounding variables. As will be noted later,
this particular finding applies mostly to women
rather than men.
Being self-employed has a complex relationship
to wellbeing.16 While the global data indicate that
self-employment is generally associated with
lower levels of happiness as compared to being
a full-time employee, the follow-up analyses
reported later in this chapter show that this very
much depends on the region of the world that is
being considered as well as which measure of
subjective wellbeing is under consideration.
In Figure 6.2 and Table 6.2 we investigate
whether the relationship between employment
and wellbeing varies by gender. Being of working
age and out of the labor force has a different
effect on the subjective wellbeing of men and
women. The data suggest that not participating
in the labor market (for example by being a
stay-at-home parent, being out of the labor force
through disability, or being retired) is worse for
the happiness of men than it is for women. Both
men and women of working age who are out of
the labor force evaluate their lives more negatively
than those in full-time work, but the effect is
much stronger for men. Moreover, while men
in this situation experience higher negative and
lower positive affect, there is no statistically
significant difference between the daily emotional
experiences of women who are out of the labor
force and those who are full-time employees.
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Table 6.1: Subjective Wellbeing and Employment Status

Employment (v. employed full-time for employer)
Employed Full-Time for Self
Employed Part-Time (does not want more hours)
Employed Part-Time (would like more hours)
Out of Labor Force
Unemployed
Control Variables
Household Income (ln)
Education: Medium (vs. low)
Education: High
Marital Status: Married (vs. single)
Marital Status: Divorced/Separated
Marital Status: Widowed
Female
Age
Age2
Children in Household
Adults in Household
Country + Year FEs
Observations
R-squared
Countries

(1)

(2)

(3)

Life Evaluation

Positive Affect

Negative Affect

-0.018***
(0.005)
0.048***
(0.006)
-0.096***
(0.007)
-0.045***
(0.005)
-0.236***
(0.008)

0.008
(0.006)
0.017***
(0.006)
-0.016***
(0.006)
-0.024***
(0.006)
-0.100***
(0.008)

0.018***
(0.006)
-0.021***
(0.006)
0.089***
(0.007)
0.022***
(0.008)
0.207***
(0.008)

0.218***
(0.005)
0.159***
(0.005)
0.308***
(0.007)
0.046***
(0.004)
-0.091***
(0.006)
-0.089***
(0.008)
0.082***
(0.003)
-0.019***
(0.001)
0.000***
(0.000)
-0.031***
(0.004)
-0.008***
(0.001)

0.124***
(0.004)
0.103***
(0.006)
0.215***
(0.008)
0.016***
(0.004)
-0.109***
(0.006)
-0.133***
(0.008)
0.012***
(0.004)
-0.024***
(0.001)
0.000***
(0.000)
-0.016***
(0.004)
-0.008***
(0.001)

-0.118***
(0.003)
-0.080***
(0.006)
-0.118***
(0.008)
-0.024***
(0.004)
0.121***
(0.006)
0.148***
(0.008)
0.072***
(0.004)
0.021***
(0.001)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.032***
(0.003)
0.010***
(0.001)

Yes
848594
0.084
162

Yes
817339
0.032
162

Yes
805839
0.032
162

Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the country level. Outcome variables are standardized to have mean=0
and SD=1. Sample is 21-60 year olds. p < * 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
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Table 6.2: Subjective Wellbeing and Employment Status by Gender
Life Evaluation
Men
Employment (v. employed full-time for employer)
Employed Full-Time for Self
-0.024***
(0.006)
Employed Part-Time
0.025***
(does not want more hours)
(0.009)
Employed Part-Time
-0.120***
(would like more hours)
(0.008)
Out of Labor Force
-0.092***
(0.006)
Unemployed
-0.281***
(0.009)
Country + Year FEs
Observations
R-squared
Countries

Yes
394629
0.084
162

Positive Affect

Negative Affect

Women

Men

Women

Men

Women

-0.009
(0.006)
0.064***
(0.007)
-0.072***
(0.008)
-0.027***
(0.005)
-0.201***
(0.009)

0.008
(0.007)
0.005
(0.008)
-0.028***
(0.008)
-0.069***
(0.007)
-0.145***
(0.010)

0.011
(0.007)
0.035***
(0.007)
0.002
(0.008)
0.003
(0.006)
-0.055***
(0.008)

0.018**
(0.007)
-0.000
(0.008)
0.094***
(0.009)
0.078***
(0.009)
0.217***
(0.010)

0.018**
(0.007)
-0.044***
(0.008)
0.079***
(0.008)
-0.008
(0.008)
0.195***
(0.009)

Yes
453965
0.084
162

Yes
377950
0.033
162

Yes
439389
0.033
162

Yes
372192
0.026
162

Yes
433647
0.032
162

Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the country level. Outcome variables are standardized to have mean=0
and SD=1. Further controls: log income, education level, marital status, household composition, gender, age and its square. Sample is 21-60 year olds. p < * 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.

Figure 6.2: Subjective Wellbeing and Employment Status by Gender
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In line with the existing body of research, the
results indicate that unemployment is devastating for the wellbeing of both men and women.
Nevertheless, the effects of joblessness tend to
be felt more strongly by men. One further
notable gender difference regards part-time
work. Women who work part-time but who do
not wish for any more hours experience fewer
negative affective states (such as stress and
worry) in their day-to-day lives and more positive
ones as compared to full-time employed women,
whereas the same is not the case for men.
In Figure 6.3 and Table 6.3 we investigate
whether the relationship between employment
and wellbeing varies by world region.17 As can
be seen in Figure 6.3, across all of the world

regions, we find that individuals in employment
generally report higher life evaluation and
positive affect than those who are unemployed.
The unemployed also report more negative
affective experiences across all regions around
the world. The magnitude of the regression
coefficients on being unemployed reported in
panel A of Table 6.3 does, however, indicate
that the strength of the relationship to life
evaluation is less pronounced in South Asia
and Southeast Asia. Furthermore, panel B in
Table 6.3 shows that for these two regions there
does not appear to be a statistically significant
relationship between unemployment and
positive affective experiences, although panel C
in Table 6.3 notes a significantly higher level of
negative affective experiences.

Figure 6.3: Subjective Wellbeing and Employment Status by World Region
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Table 6.3: Subjective Wellbeing and Employment Status Around the World
W Europe

C+E Europe

CIS

SE Asia

S Asia

E Asia

LA + Carib

NA+ANZ

MENA

SSA

Panel A: Life Evaluation
Employment (v. employed full-time for employer)
Employed
Full-Time for Self

0.019**

0.083***

0.030*

0.018

-0.008

0.025**

-0.092***

0.022

-0.001

-0.051***

(0.008)

(0.014)

(0.016)

(0.019)

(0.028)

(0.011)

(0.011)

(0.020)

(0.013)

(0.012)

Employed
Part-Time (does not
want more hours)

0.066***

0.070***

0.062***

0.063**

0.026

0.106***

0.018

0.080***

0.090***

-0.017

(0.011)

(0.019)

(0.015)

(0.025)

(0.057)

(0.015)

(0.019)

(0.022)

(0.014)

(0.014)

Employed
Part-Time (would
like more hours)

-0.174***

-0.135***

-0.014

-0.012

-0.108*

-0.002

-0.148***

-0.214***

-0.108***

-0.085***

(0.012)

(0.020)

(0.019)

(0.023)

(0.055)

(0.027)

(0.016)

(0.030)

(0.016)

(0.012)

Out of Labor Force

-0.126***

-0.068***

-0.011

0.019

0.005

0.011

-0.048***

-0.171***

-0.017

-0.087***

(0.013)

(0.012)

(0.010)

(0.016)

(0.036)

(0.014)

(0.012)

(0.025)

(0.010)

(0.014)

-0.396***

-0.306***

-0.187***

-0.113***

-0.095*

-0.180***

-0.257***

-0.434***

-0.258***

-0.156***

(0.014)

(0.023)

(0.021)

(0.030)

(0.047)

(0.025)

(0.018)

(0.041)

(0.016)

(0.016)

125659

78228

72053

47723

62986

52100

98357

18043

136099

156412

0.115

0.160

0.087

0.071

0.122

0.133

0.064

0.110

0.081

0.074

Unemployed
Observations
R-squared

Panel B: Positive Affect
Employment (v. employed full-time for employer)
Employed
Full-Time for Self
Employed
Part-Time (does not
want more hours)

0.006

0.033*

0.006

0.023

0.017

0.061***

-0.034***

0.038*

-0.012

-0.010

(0.014)

(0.018)

(0.018)

(0.018)

(0.025)

(0.013)

(0.011)

(0.021)

(0.016)

(0.010)

0.016

0.045**

0.060***

0.094***

-0.026

0.070**

-0.007

0.048

-0.002

-0.038***

(0.012)

(0.021)

(0.019)

(0.025)

(0.031)

(0.033)

(0.016)

(0.031)

(0.018)

(0.013)

Employed
Part-Time (would
like more hours)

-0.058***

-0.072***

0.006

0.082***

-0.010

0.077***

-0.043***

0.009

-0.056***

-0.027**

(0.012)

(0.024)

(0.021)

(0.023)

(0.058)

(0.017)

(0.012)

(0.034)

(0.017)

(0.012)

Out of Labor Force

-0.073***

0.027*

-0.021

0.026

0.036

0.030*

-0.018

-0.083***

-0.043***

-0.087***

(0.012)

(0.015)

(0.015)

(0.022)

(0.031)

(0.017)

(0.012)

(0.018)

(0.013)

(0.013)

-0.112***

-0.077***

-0.102***

0.013

-0.076

-0.074**

-0.058***

-0.124***

-0.231***

-0.078***

Unemployed

(0.016)

(0.024)

(0.028)

(0.033)

(0.051)

(0.028)

(0.014)

(0.040)

(0.020)

(0.015)

Observations

113004

78759

73044

47369

63685

49783

99432

15098

120161

156067

R-squared

0.027

0.082

0.058

0.020

0.058

0.033

0.020

0.027

0.038

0.028

Panel C: Negative Affect
Employment (v. employed full-time for employer)
Employed Full-Time
for Self

0.084***

0.055***

0.033**

-0.043**

-0.081***

0.001

0.027**

0.100***

0.037**

-0.012

(0.013)

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.019)

(0.019)

(0.009)

(0.013)

(0.027)

(0.015)

(0.010)

Employed
Part-Time (does not
want more hours)

-0.025*

0.035*

0.021

-0.091***

-0.047

-0.050***

-0.084***

-0.088**

-0.051***

-0.008

(0.014)

(0.019)

(0.016)

(0.023)

(0.035)

(0.018)

(0.016)

(0.032)

(0.017)

(0.013)

Employed
Part-Time (would
like more hours)

0.146***

0.136***

0.050***

-0.007

0.047

-0.007

0.104***

0.184***

0.108***

0.058***

(0.014)

(0.021)

(0.018)

(0.024)

(0.031)

(0.033)

(0.013)

(0.034)

(0.020)

(0.013)

Out of Labor Force

0.147***

0.066***

0.057***

-0.063***

-0.111***

-0.004

-0.041***

0.244***

-0.029**

0.011

(0.022)

(0.014)

(0.012)

(0.018)

(0.027)

(0.016)

(0.012)

(0.027)

(0.014)

(0.012)

0.260***

0.241***

0.176***

0.163***

0.187***

0.207***

0.205***

0.377***

0.249***

0.111***

(0.025)

(0.023)

(0.049)

(0.043)

(0.031)

(0.018)

(0.051)

(0.019)

(0.013)

113004

78759

73044

47369

63685

49783

99432

15098

111485

153243

0.041

0.052

0.031

0.026

0.054

0.027

0.042

0.050

0.036

0.041

Unemployed
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Observations
R-squared

Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the country level. Outcome variables are standardized to have mean=0
and SD=1. Further controls: log income, education level, marital status, household composition, gender, age and its square. Sample is 21-60 year olds. p < * 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
All models include country and year FEs.
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In terms of self-employment, the results reveal
an interesting reversal across regions. Being
self-employed tends to be associated with higher
life evaluation and positive affect (as compared
to being a full-time employee) across Europe,
North America, Australia, New Zealand, the
Commonwealth of Independent States, and East
Asia. However, individuals that are self-employed in Latin America, the Caribbean, and
Sub-Saharan Africa tend to report lower life
evaluation and less positive affective experience.
Interestingly, however, although in some regions
self-employment is associated with higher levels
of life evaluation, most regions do converge in
terms of showing that employing oneself and
running one’s own business is generally associated with the experience of more negative
emotions such as stress and worry.18

be seen, there is a large initial shock to becoming unemployed, and then as people stay unemployed over time their levels of life satisfaction
remain low. A second issue is scarring: several
studies have shown that even once a person
becomes re-employed, the prior experience of
unemployment leaves a mark on his or her
happiness. Comparing people who are both in
work, those who have recently experienced a
bout of unemployment are systematically less
happy than those who have not.21

Figure 6.4: Adaptation to Spells of Unemployment

Unemployment Dynamics
and Spillovers
Unemployment is damaging to people’s happiness, but how short-lived is the misery associated with being out of work? People tend to adapt
to many different circumstances, and unemployment may well be one of them. If the pain is
only fleeting and people quickly get used to
being unemployed, then we might see joblessness as less of a key public policy priority in
terms of happiness. However, a number of
studies have demonstrated that people do not
adapt much, if at all, to being unemployed.19 We
cannot show this dynamic using the Gallup
World Poll, which provides repeated snapshots
of countries across the world, but we can instead
look to longitudinal data from the German
Socio-Economic Panel, which has each year
since 1984 surveyed and re-surveyed the same
large random sample of the German population.
We are interested in two issues here: adaptation
and scarring. First, in Figure 6.4 we investigate
whether people adapt to being jobless as they
spend longer and longer out of work.20 As can

As we have seen, being out of a job is detrimental to the subjective wellbeing of the unemployed
themselves. What about everyone else? A further
canonical finding in the literature on unemployment and subjective wellbeing is that there are
so-called “spillover” effects.22 As we will see in
more detail below when we come to examine the
effects of specific job characteristics, job security
is a key driver of subjective wellbeing.23 High
levels of unemployment can have an indirect
effect on those who remain in work, as they
increase fear and heighten the sense of job
insecurity. Poor labor market conditions tend to
signal to those in work that layoffs are relatively
commonplace and that they may well be next in
line to lose their jobs.24
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Table 6.4: Social Comparison Effects of Unemployment
Life Evaluation

Positive Affect

Negative Affect

Men

Women

Men

Women

Men

Women

-0.298***

-0.236***

-0.176***

-0.073***

0.276***

0.240***

(0.015)

(0.013)

(0.015)

(0.013)

(0.014)

(0.014)

-0.449***

-0.154***

-0.014

-0.006

0.080

-0.058

(0.066)

(0.047)

(0.061)

(0.041)

(0.062)

(0.045)

0.209**

0.199***

0.219**

0.091

-0.425***

-0.218***

(0.087)

(0.060)

(0.096)

(0.056)

(0.089)

(0.057)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

394555

453285

377876

438738

372132

433055

R-squared

0.085

0.084

0.033

0.033

0.027

0.032

Countries

162

162

162

162

162

162

Unemployed
Unemployment Rate
Unemployed * Unemployment Rate
Country + Year FEs

Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the country level. Outcome variables are standardized to have mean=0
and SD=1. Further controls: log income, education level, marital status, household composition, gender, age and its square. Sample is 21-60 year olds. p < * 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
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We can investigate this by turning our attention
back to the Gallup World Poll data. We can see
in Table 6.4 that, controlling for one’s own
employment status, the unemployment of
one’s peers enters negatively into a subjective
wellbeing equation. The unemployment rate is
calculated here as the fraction of the labor force
unemployed within the respondent’s gender, age
group (20s, 30s, and so on), country, and year.
The negative effect of peers’ joblessness can be
seen in columns 1 and 2, with the comparison
unemployment rate having a negative effect on
life evaluation. An interesting new finding here,
however, is that while the overall evaluative
subjective wellbeing of those who are not unemployed seems to be negatively affected by others’
unemployment, their day-to-day experience of
life does not seem to be similarly affected in
models 3-6 which investigate effects on positive
and negative affect.
Although higher unemployment rates have
negative spillovers for those still in work, the
third row of Table 6.4 shows the opposite may
be true for those who are out of work. This
so-called “social norm” effect has been widely

shown in the literature.25 For the unemployed,
the individual effects of unemployment are
less strongly felt in situations where the local
unemployment rate is higher, as in areas of high
unemployment the social stigma of unemployment may be lessened while it may also be
easier to find social contacts. Much of the existing evidence is focused on a handful of countries and finds significant effects only for men.
We are able to show here in a worldwide sample
that this social norm effect is present for both
men and women: unemployed people evaluate
their lives less negatively on the Cantril ladder,
the higher the comparison unemployment rate.
They also experience fewer negative and more
positive emotions in their day-to-day lives. It is
worth noting, however, that even at conventionally high levels of unemployment, the overall
effect of being unemployed on the individual is
still very much negative across all three measures
of subjective wellbeing.
Our analyses have thus described the damaging
effects of unemployment on the individual as
well as the negative spillover effects on those
around them. This raises the question of whether
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these broadly negative effects of unemployment
also show up in the macroeconomic data. High
levels of unemployment have an indirect effect
on those who remain in work because they
heighten the sense of job insecurity, since
generally poor labor market conditions signal to
those in work that redundancies are relatively
commonplace. If this is the case, we may be able
to detect this in the relationship between the
unemployment rate and the average wellbeing
in a society. Figure 6.5 shows a scatterplot that
maps average wellbeing for most countries in
the world against their unemployment rate.26
Although any such bivariate treatment of the
relationship between national wellbeing and
unemployment is necessarily limited in nature,
in line with the analyses that focus on the

individual impact of falling unemployed we find
a generally negative correlation between unemployment rates and societal wellbeing at the
national level. In an online appendix (Figure
A6.8), the same cross-sectional relationship is
reported by world region. These regional results
mostly corroborate the generally negative relationship between national unemployment and
subjective wellbeing, with the exceptions of
Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. The
global relationship depicted in Figure 6.5 is not
only found in most regions, but is also present
across the entities that make up large nations.
For example, it has analogously been shown that
this cross-sectional relationship between unemployment rates and average wellbeing is also
found when considering the separate states that
make up the United States of America.27

Figure 6.5: Unemployment Rates and National Levels of Subjective Wellbeing
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Subjective Wellbeing and Job Type
In addition to investigating the importance of
having a job, the data also allow us to ask whether
different types of jobs are associated with higher
or lower levels of subjective wellbeing. The
availability of eleven different job types in the
Gallup World Poll allows us to gain a sense for
which types of employment are more or less
associated with happiness across the world. The
available categories cover many kinds of jobs,
including being a business owner, office worker,
or manager, and working in farming, construction, mining, or transport.
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Figure 6.6 represents the descriptive data on
how these varied broad job types relate to our
three main measures of subjective wellbeing—
life evaluation, positive affect, and negative
affect. The overarching finding here is that the
global data reveal an important difference in
how blue-collar and white-collar work are related
to happiness (also when controlling for any
differences in income, as shown below). We find
that labor-intensive work is systematically
correlated with less happiness and this is the
case across a number of labor-intensive industries
such as construction, mining, manufacturing,
transport, farming, fishing, and forestry. In fact,
people around the world who categorize themselves as a manager, an executive, an official,
or a professional worker evaluate the quality of
their lives at a little over 6 out of 10 whereas
people working in farming, fishing, or forestry
evaluate their lives around 4.5 out of 10 on
average. A very similar picture is obtained when
considering not only life evaluation but also the
day-to-day experience of positive affective states
such as smiling, laughing, enjoyment, or feeling
well rested. The data also show the situation is
similar when considering negative affective
states such as feelings of worry, stress, sadness,
and anger. Here we find that professionals in
senior roles (manager, executive, or official)
experience fewer negative affective states as
compared to all other job types.

It is worth noting that we are considering
average effects in all of our analyses. While
individuals doing some types of jobs are generally
more or less happy on average than those doing
another type, there will be individual heterogeneity in these effects that we are not able to
investigate fully in our analysis. People differ in
their interests and personalities, among other
things, and a large literature for example on ‘job
fit’ suggests there are few jobs that would be
ideal for everyone—certain types of people are
best suited to and more able to flourish in
different types of jobs.28
It is also of interest to note that classic economic
theory would suggest that there should be little
difference in the happiness or utility of people
with different types of jobs, holding constant
their skill level. This is because so-called “compensating wage differentials” or “equalizing
differences” should balance the happiness levels
associated with the types of jobs that an individual
chooses to take on.29 That is to say that people
willing to take on a job that they anticipate is not
going to make them happy should be compensated monetarily to the extent that it should at
least compensate for the unhappiness associated
with that particular job as compared to another
job that would have made them happier but with
a lower pay attached to it. The empirical case for
the existence of such compensating wage differentials is mixed30, and while we do not directly
address this point in our analysis, we do not
appear to observe a strong presence of such
compensating differentials in the global data
employed here.31
The descriptive statistics shown in Figure 6.6
represent the raw differences in happiness
across job types. Of course, there are likely to be
many things that differ across people working
in these diverse fields that could potentially be
driving these happiness differentials. If we want
to have a more precise view of how varied job
types actually relate to happiness than we need
to hold constant the confounding variables such
as the different wages associated with different
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Figure 6.6A: Life Evaluation and Job Type

Figure 6.6B: Positive Affect and Job Type
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Figure 6.6C: Negative Affect and Job Type
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job types as well as the age, gender, marital
status, and education level of the individual.
To account and control for these and other
differences we also report a multiple regression
analysis in Table 6.5. In terms of life evaluation
and positive affect, these regressions replicate
the broad patterns shown in the descriptive
statistics shown above. Senior professionals
(manager, executive, official) evaluate their lives
higher and report more positive affective experiences. The self-reported happiness of office
workers (clerical, sales, or service) is significantly
lower than their senior colleagues, even controlling for income and other covariates. We find
that the association of being in labor-intensive
jobs and wellbeing is even greater still.
In an online appendix (Figures A6.1-3), we also
split these descriptive and statistical analyses on
job type and happiness by gender. Although
some small differences can be observed, these
analyses do little to alter the interpretations from

the general trends reported above. The same
cannot quite be said of the relationship between
job type and happiness, however, when we split
the analysis by the world’s different regions. As
shown in Figure 6.7, there are some clear differences in life evaluation across regions and job
types, as is to be expected, but the trends are
somewhat less streamlined as compared to the
globally pooled data that was reported on above.
Other things equal, senior professionals report
the highest life evaluation across all regions (at
the notable exception of farming/forestry/fishing
workers in North America, Australia, and New
Zealand who report equal or higher life evaluation
and positive affect). Office workers and manual
laborers report lower life evaluation, a trend most
pronounced in the MENA, East Asia, and Latin
American regions in particular. The figures that
represent the relation between job type and
positive affect and negative affect are given in
the online appendix, along with accompanying
multiple regression tables by region.
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Table 6.5: Job Type and Subjective Wellbeing

Job Type (v. Professional)
Manager/Executive/Official
Business Owner
Clerical or Office Worker
Sales Worker
Service Worker
Construction or Mining Worker
Manufacturing Worker
Transportation Worker
Installation or Repair Worker
Farming/Fishing/Forestry Worker
Country + Year FEs
Observations
R-squared
Countries

(1)

(2)

(3)

Life Evaluation

Positive Affect

Negative Affect

0.033***
(0.009)
-0.050***
(0.008)
-0.021***
(0.007)
-0.070***
(0.009)
-0.096***
(0.007)
-0.153***
(0.010)
-0.128***
(0.009)
-0.113***
(0.011)
-0.131***
(0.011)
-0.136***
(0.010)
Yes
338282
0.080
153

-0.021**
(0.009)
-0.053***
(0.008)
-0.069***
(0.008)
-0.121***
(0.010)
-0.106***
(0.008)
-0.178***
(0.012)
-0.171***
(0.011)
-0.195***
(0.014)
-0.151***
(0.014)
-0.162***
(0.011)
Yes
333927
0.029
153

0.019**
(0.009)
0.031***
(0.008)
-0.009
(0.008)
0.039***
(0.009)
0.033***
(0.007)
0.069***
(0.012)
0.052***
(0.011)
0.066***
(0.011)
0.074***
(0.013)
0.032***
(0.009)
Yes
328000
0.018
153

Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the country level. Outcome variables are standardized to have mean=0
and SD=1. Further controls: log income, education level, marital status, household composition, gender, age and its square. Sample is 21-60 year olds. p < * 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 6.7: Life Evaluation and Job Type by Region

Job Satisfaction and Employee
Engagement Around the World
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The World Happiness Report is mostly concerned
with how people experience and evaluate their
lives as a whole, rather than domain-specific
wellbeing outcomes. The academic literature on
the relationship between work and wellbeing,
however, has for a long time also considered
other measures of wellbeing. The notion of job
satisfaction has been widely studied in particular, and more recently the literature has begun to
investigate other outcomes such as employee
engagement.32 The Gallup World Poll contains
data on both of these domain-specific wellbeing

items, and in Table6.6 we report the correlations
between the measures of job satisfaction and
employee engagement and the subjective wellbeing items that we have employed so far. All these
measures correlate with each other to varying
degrees and mostly in line with intuition. Being
satisfied (as opposed to dissatisfied) with your
job is strongly correlated with the Cantril ladder
measure of life evaluation, whereas feeling
actively engaged with your job is more strongly
correlated with positive affect. The strongest
relationship across all of these measures of
general and workplace wellbeing is that feeling
‘actively disengaged with one’s job’ is most
strongly correlated with low job satisfaction.
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Table 6.6: Correlation Matrix of Individual Responses to General and Domain-Specific SWB Measures
Life
Evaluation
Life Evaluation

Positive
Affect

Negative
Affect

Job
Satisfaction

Engaged

Disengaged

1

Positive Affect

0.252

1

Negative Affect

-0.189

-0.372

1

Satisfied with Job

0.280

0.253

-0.178

1

Actively Engaged with Job

0.105

0.168

-0.0672

0.156

1

Actively Disengaged with Job

-0.188

-0.257

0.140

-0.411

-0.209

1

Note: All correlations are statistically significant at at least the 0.1% level.

Whereas in Table 6.6 we correlate these measures with each other using individual-level
responses, in appendix table A6.5 we also
examine the correlation of these variables
when we consider the unit of analysis to be
country-year and look at the correlation of these
national average wellbeing measures.
In Figure 6.8 we map average job satisfaction
around the world. Here we color nations around
the globe according to job satisfaction. Unlike
the general wellbeing measures that elicit a
broader scale of responses, the data on job
satisfaction refers to a simpler yes/no question.
We map the percentage of respondents in work
by who reported to be “satisfied” (as opposed to
“dissatisfied”) with their job.33 The resulting
picture provides a general sense for job satisfaction around the world indicating that countries
across North and South America, Europe, and
Australia and New Zealand typically see more
individuals reporting satisfaction with their jobs.
In an online appendix (Table A6.13), we provide
more detailed information on the levels of job
satisfaction around the world.
In Figure 6.9 we move on to consider the global
distribution of employee engagement. This
survey measure in the Gallup World Poll asks
whether individuals feel ‘actively engaged,’ ‘not
engaged,’ or ‘actively disengaged’ in their jobs.
The results paint a bleak picture of employee
engagement around the world. The number of

people noting that they are actively engaged is
typically less than 20%, while being around 10%
in Western Europe, and much less still in East Asia.
The difference in the global results between job
satisfaction and employee engagement may
partially be attributable to measurement issues,
but it also has to do with the fact that both
concepts measure different aspects of happiness
at work. While job satisfaction can perhaps be
reduced to feeling content with one’s job, the
notion of (active) employee engagement requires
individuals to be positively absorbed by their
work and fully committed to advancing the
organization’s interests. Increased employee
engagement thus represents a more difficult
hurdle to clear.
The generally low worldwide levels of employee
engagement may also underlie why many people
do not report being happy while at work. In fact,
a recent study collected data from individuals at
different times of the day via a smartphone
app.34 Troublingly, the authors found that paid
work is ranked lower than any of the other 39
activities individuals can report engaging in,
with the exception of being sick in bed. The
more precise extent to which people are unhappy
at work varies with where they work, whether
they combine work with other activities, whether
they are alone or with others, and the time of
day or night that respondents are working.
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Figure 6.8: Job Satisfaction Around the World

Figure 6.9: Employee Engagement Around the World
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Figure 6.10: Job Satisfaction and Job Type

Figure 6.11: Employee Engagement and Job Type
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We also consider how the varied job types
studied above are related to measures of job
satisfaction and employee engagement. Figure
6.10 paints a picture for the relationship between
job type and job satisfaction that closely tracks
the trends that were reported earlier for the
links between job type and the more general
measures of subjective wellbeing. Senior professionals report much greater job satisfaction as
compared to all other job types. The relationship
between job type and employee engagement
reveals an interesting and important difference
with all other wellbeing measures looked at so
far in relation to job type. Figure 6.11 shows
clearly that business owners report being much
more actively engaged at work as compared to
all other job types.

When considering job satisfaction and engagement across the world’s regions in Figures 6.12
and 13, we observe the same general trends that
were inferred from the global data. It is worthwhile to note, however, that some regions see
much starker differences in job satisfaction
between job types. For example, in Central and
Eastern Europe and in the MENA region we find
that about 90% of senior professionals report
being satisfied with their job whereas this
number drops to little over 60% for workers in
the farming, fishing, or forestry industries. No
such large differentials in job satisfaction are
found in Western Europe or North America,
Australia, and New Zealand. In terms of job
engagement statistics, Figure 6.13 indicates that
the outlier remains being a business owner
across most regions with the exception of South
and Southeast Asia.

Figure 6.12: Job Satisfaction and Job Type by Region
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Figure 6.13: Employee Engagement and Job Type by Region

FPO
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Tables 7 and 8 report regression results of the
relationships between job types and job satisfaction and engagement by region, controlling for
the usual set of income, demographic variables,
as well as country and year fixed effects. Notwithstanding the introduction of the control
variables, we find that the results largely mirror
the descriptive statistics, the main exception
being that the correlation between being a

business owner and being actively engaged is
now only statistically significant for Western
Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. In an
online appendix (Figures A6.4-5) we also split
these descriptive statistics on job type and job
satisfaction and engagement by gender. The
separate findings for men and women do not
lead us to largely different interpretations from
the general trends reported above.

Table 6.7: Job Satisfaction and Job Type by Region
W Europe

C+E Europe

CIS

SE Asia

S Asia

E Asia

LA + Carib

NA + ANZ

MENA

SSA

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

-0.017

-0.061*

0.044

-0.051

0.022

-0.025

-0.083

-0.048

0.006

-0.030

(0.012)

(0.033)

(0.038)

(0.030)

(0.036)

(0.067)

(0.057)

(0.043)

(0.034)

(0.039)

0.021

-0.091

0.015

-0.082***

-0.022

-0.084**

-0.031

0.047

-0.071**

-0.074**

(0.015)

(0.094)

(0.051)

(0.027)

(0.028)

(0.038)

(0.024)

(0.034)

(0.032)

(0.030)

-0.032**

-0.122***

-0.064

-0.101***

0.046

-0.097**

-0.028

-0.091*

-0.086***

-0.099**

(0.014)

(0.029)

(0.047)

(0.034)

(0.034)

(0.043)

(0.026)

(0.047)

(0.024)

(0.042)

-0.076***

-0.292***

-0.232***

-0.149***

-0.127***

-0.210***

-0.162***

-0.166***

-0.261***

-0.234***

(0.020)

(0.041)

(0.036)

(0.051)

(0.043)

(0.042)

(0.029)

(0.038)

(0.041)

(0.040)

-0.055***

-0.200***

-0.162***

-0.169***

-0.049

-0.187***

-0.118***

-0.080

-0.186***

-0.291***

(0.013)

(0.036)

(0.027)

(0.044)

(0.062)

(0.047)

(0.028)

(0.059)

(0.039)

(0.031)

Construction or
Mining Worker

-0.059***

-0.273***

-0.221***

-0.216***

-0.274***

-0.286***

-0.150***

0.008

-0.462***

-0.247***

(0.019)

(0.051)

(0.039)

(0.068)

(0.038)

(0.082)

(0.034)

(0.061)

(0.057)

(0.047)

Manufacturing
Worker

-0.110***

-0.363***

-0.188***

-0.234***

-0.194***

-0.249***

-0.117***

-0.145*

-0.314***

-0.238***

(0.023)

(0.038)

(0.031)

(0.040)

(0.059)

(0.080)

(0.034)

(0.076)

(0.053)

(0.047)

Transportation
Worker

-0.039*

-0.266***

-0.083**

-0.186***

-0.096**

-0.211*

-0.177***

-0.089*

-0.355***

-0.264***

(0.020)

(0.049)

(0.031)

(0.063)

(0.045)

(0.112)

(0.044)

(0.042)

(0.051)

(0.055)

Installation or
Repair Worker

-0.068*

-0.227***

-0.162***

-0.109

-0.084**

-0.216***

-0.052

-0.047

-0.257***

-0.319***

Job Type (v. Professional)
Manager/Executive/
Official
Business Owner

Clerical or Office
Worker
Sales Worker

Service Worker

(0.034)

(0.048)

(0.048)

(0.065)

(0.035)

(0.070)

(0.046)

(0.066)

(0.051)

(0.058)

-0.039

-0.413***

-0.320***

-0.145***

-0.110***

-0.310***

-0.152***

0.004

-0.277***

-0.244***

(0.047)

(0.075)

(0.045)

(0.043)

(0.037)

(0.037)

(0.042)

(0.086)

(0.044)

(0.041)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

40544

14382

17824

15616

17296

15038

20297

5266

31289

38472

R-squared

0.008

0.047

0.046

0.024

0.066

0.043

0.026

0.014

0.053

0.047

Countries

21

17

12

9

6

6

21

4

18

33

Farming/Fishing/
Forestry Worker

166

Country + Year FEs
Observations

Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the country level. Outcome variables are standardized to have mean=0
and SD=1. Further controls: log income, education level, marital status, household composition, gender, age and its square. Sample is 21-60 year olds. p < * 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
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Table 6.8: Employee Engagement and Job Type by Region
W Europe

C+E Europe

CIS

SE Asia

S Asia

E Asia

LA + Carib

NA + ANZ

MENA

SSA

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

0.035**

0.077**

0.118*

-0.036

0.017

-0.020

-0.035

-0.043

0.054

-0.063

(0.014)

(0.038)

(0.069)

(0.063)

(0.069)

(0.056)

(0.069)

(0.043)

(0.037)

(0.054)

0.239***

0.235**

0.155

-0.074

-0.045

0.010

0.095

0.164

0.008

0.037

(0.050)

(0.097)

(0.144)

(0.092)

(0.076)

(0.039)

(0.073)

(0.131)

(0.066)

(0.066)

-0.097***

-0.159***

-0.089**

-0.145**

-0.073

-0.160***

-0.124***

-0.194***

-0.085**

-0.148***

(0.022)

(0.028)

(0.039)

(0.064)

(0.049)

(0.028)

(0.039)

(0.047)

(0.041)

(0.040)

-0.020

-0.214***

-0.147***

-0.166**

-0.068

-0.109***

-0.145**

-0.206*

-0.101**

-0.121**

(0.023)

(0.038)

(0.030)

(0.067)

(0.053)

(0.035)

(0.054)

(0.096)

(0.047)

(0.058)

-0.017

-0.193***

-0.130***

-0.130**

-0.033

-0.104***

-0.090**

-0.048

-0.003

-0.133***

Job Type (v. Professional)
Manager/Executive/
Official
Business Owner

Clerical or Office
Worker
Sales Worker

Service Worker

Construction or
Mining Worker

(0.014)

(0.038)

(0.032)

(0.057)

(0.035)

(0.027)

(0.040)

(0.070)

(0.045)

(0.033)

0.013

-0.230***

-0.086***

-0.206***

-0.101**

-0.045

0.007

0.040

-0.115**

-0.125**

(0.034)

(0.035)

(0.031)

(0.066)

(0.041)

(0.046)

(0.064)

(0.120)

(0.046)

(0.049)

Manufacturing
Worker

-0.063***

-0.195***

-0.134***

-0.180***

-0.158***

-0.108***

-0.092*

-0.222**

-0.086*

-0.151***

(0.021)

(0.031)

(0.046)

(0.048)

(0.045)

(0.029)

(0.053)

(0.077)

(0.046)

(0.054)

Transportation
Worker

-0.011

-0.205***

-0.168***

-0.199***

-0.028

-0.105*

-0.216***

-0.205**

-0.126**

-0.200***

(0.036)

(0.046)

(0.041)

(0.054)

(0.039)

(0.054)

(0.069)

(0.089)

(0.059)

(0.048)

-0.045

-0.262***

-0.101*

-0.240***

-0.140**

-0.159***

0.017

-0.085

-0.078

-0.169***

(0.031)

(0.044)

(0.058)

(0.061)

(0.065)

(0.045)

(0.085)

(0.115)

(0.072)

(0.048)

0.125**

-0.173**

-0.197***

-0.134*

-0.082**

-0.088**

-0.148*

-0.101

-0.098*

-0.203***

(0.061)

(0.067)

(0.058)

(0.075)

(0.033)

(0.031)

(0.081)

(0.173)

(0.056)

(0.039)

Installation or
Repair Worker
Farming/Fishing/
Forestry Worker
Country + Year FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

26334

14614

11291

5652

7108

8157

13711

3753

13752

13417

R-squared

0.009

0.030

0.032

0.017

0.032

0.018

0.011

0.020

0.011

0.028

Countries

21

17

12

9

7

5

21

4

16

30

Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the country level. Outcome variables are standardized to have mean=0
and SD=1. Further controls: log income, education level, marital status, household composition, gender, age and its square. Sample is 21-60 year olds. p < * 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
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Job Characteristics and Subjective
Wellbeing
We now turn to look more closely at job quality.
We have seen that being in work is a strong
predictor of higher subjective wellbeing and
that certain broad types of jobs are associated
with higher and lower levels of individual
happiness, even once we control for confounding variables such as income and education. But
what is it specifically about these different types
of jobs that produce different levels of wellbeing
across individuals?
In order to answer this question more precisely
we draw on data from the European Social
Survey (ESS), which benefits from more detailed
questions about job characteristics together with
several measures of subjective wellbeing. What
ultimately makes for a ‘good job’? For a long time
the answer to this important question was simply
how much the job paid, and occasionally also
how many hours of labor it entailed. The ever-increasing amount of survey data available now
allows us to go much further than this, and ask
what particular aspects of a job are most predictive of different measures of wellbeing. In the
ESS, for example, respondents who are in work
are asked about the amount of variety their job
entails, how much autonomy they have in how
they carry out their work, how much support
they receive from co-workers around them, along
with a number of further job characteristics.
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By regressing subjective wellbeing measures on
such measures of work design, together with
earnings and a number of other demographic
variables, we are able to infer what matters
most to people in their working lives. This is a
distinctly democratic way of investigating what
exactly makes a ‘good job.’ Rather than impose
certain ideas about which characteristics are
most important in a job, using multivariate
regression analysis in this way we allow workers
themselves to determine which aspects of their
jobs are the biggest drivers of their wellbeing.
Much of the literature in this vein focuses on the

elements of jobs that correlate with job satisfaction35, but it is also important to know what
elements of people’s jobs ultimately feed
through into how they evaluate their lives as a
whole, as well how job characteristics affect the
emotional states that people experience as they
proceed through their lives. We thus follow
much of the existing literature in estimating job
satisfaction equations, but also investigate the
effects of job characteristics on life satisfaction,
general happiness “taking all things together,”
as well as a positive affect measure referring to
emotions felt in “the last two weeks.”36
In line with the literature and general intuition,
we find that higher wages are indeed predictive
of greater wellbeing. Those in well-paying jobs
are happier and more satisfied with their lives
and jobs than those in the lower income brackets.
The relationship is roughly log-linear, however,
suggesting that there are diminishing returns to
higher income: an extra $100 of salary is worth
much more to someone at the lower end of the
income distribution than someone already
earning much more. It is still striking that a
number of further aspects of people’s jobs are
strongly predictive of the different measures of
subjective wellbeing even once we condition
upon log earnings.
As always, these regressions control for a standard
set of demographic variables, but here we also
control for industry as well as occupation dummies. That is, when we ask about having a lesser
or greater amount of a specific job characteristic—be it autonomy, security, co-worker support,
or whatever else—we are comparing workers
who have the same occupation and who work in
the same industry.
What is important, beyond income? Work-life
balance comes out in Table 6.9 as perhaps the
strongest workplace driver of an individual’s
subjective wellbeing. This turns out to be true
across the board, in terms of people’s life
and job satisfaction, general happiness, and
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Table 6.9: Subjective Wellbeing and Job Characteristics

Wages
Hours of Work
Responsible for supervising employees

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Units

Life
Satisfaction

Happiness

Job
Satisfaction

Positive Affect

(Log)

0.068**
(0.030)
0.002
(0.001)
0.030
(0.023)
0.079***
(0.024)
0.047**
(0.019)
0.042
(0.029)
0.107***
(0.019)
-0.155***
(0.045)
-0.040**
(0.016)
0.103***
(0.018)
-0.034
(0.037)
-0.015
(0.025)
0.107**
(0.040)
-0.150***
(0.019)
-0.107***
(0.025)
-0.210***
(0.022)
0.046***
(0.017)
0.085***
(0.021)
0.031
(0.026)
0.020
(0.021)
0.053
(0.034)
0.004*
(0.002)
0.038
(0.025)
-0.045***
(0.006)
0.000***
(0.000)
11555
0.287

0.041*
(0.024)
0.001
(0.001)
0.031
(0.022)
0.081***
(0.028)
0.059**
(0.023)
0.044
(0.031)
0.161***
(0.020)
-0.086*
(0.045)
-0.026
(0.028)
0.105***
(0.023)
0.018
(0.037)
-0.016
(0.028)
0.073*
(0.041)
-0.100***
(0.019)
-0.084***
(0.020)
-0.201***
(0.027)
0.088***
(0.018)
0.069***
(0.020)
0.040*
(0.022)
0.040**
(0.019)
0.008
(0.036)
0.003
(0.002)
0.037
(0.024)
-0.049***
(0.008)
0.000***
(0.000)
11555
0.229

0.084***
(0.025)
0.000
(0.001)
0.029
(0.018)
0.229***
(0.020)
0.137***
(0.018)
0.026
(0.023)
0.249***
(0.025)
-0.194***
(0.033)
-0.019
(0.031)
0.190***
(0.025)
-0.024
(0.031)
-0.132***
(0.025)
0.210***
(0.046)
-0.214***
(0.023)
-0.033
(0.029)
-0.221***
(0.024)
0.192***
(0.019)
0.091***
(0.022)
0.121***
(0.024)
0.053*
(0.029)
0.039
(0.029)
-0.010***
(0.002)
0.048*
(0.023)
-0.003
(0.006)
0.000
(0.000)
11555
0.220

0.048**
(0.019)
0.002**
(0.001)
0.025
(0.022)
0.101***
(0.021)
0.074***
(0.020)
0.062*
(0.035)
0.133***
(0.020)
-0.135***
(0.031)
-0.016
(0.029)
0.089***
(0.018)
0.029
(0.028)
-0.081**
(0.030)
0.111**
(0.040)
-0.174***
(0.021)
-0.196***
(0.028)
-0.405***
(0.033)
-0.019
(0.022)
0.066**
(0.024)
0.053**
(0.023)
0.022
(0.021)
0.026
(0.036)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.066**
(0.024)
-0.036***
(0.008)
0.000***
(0.000)
11555
0.160

(Weekly hours)
(0/1)

High variety in work

(Very True=1)

Job requires learning new things

(Very True=1)

Wages depend on effort

(Very True=1)

Can get support/help from co-workers

(Very True=1)

Job entails health/safety risk

(Very True=1)

Can decide start/finish time

(Very True=1)

Job is secure

(Very True=1)

Job requires very hard work

(Strongly Agree=1)

Never enough time to get everything done

(Strongly Agree=1)

Good opportunities for promotion

(Strongly Agree=1)

Job prevents giving time to family/partner

(Often/Always=1)

Worry about work problems when not working

(Often/Always=1)

Too tired after work to enjoy things

(Often/Always=1)

Control over how daily work is organized

(8-10/10=1)

Control over pace of work

(8-10/10=1)

Control over policy decisions of organization

(8-10/10=1)

Trade Union Member

(0/1)

Self-Employed (v. Employee)

(0/1)

Education
Female
Age
Age^2
Observations
R-squared

(Years)
(0/1)
(Years)
(Years^2)

Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the country level. All outcome variables standardised to have mean
of 0 and standard deviation of 1. Source: European Social Survey: Round 5 (2010). Further controls: marital status, household
composition, migrant status, industry and occupation dummies, country dummies. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p<0.01
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moment-to-moment emotional experiences.
Those who have a job that leaves them too tired
to enjoy the non-work elements of their lives
report levels of positive affect in their day-to-day
lives that are substantially lower than those who
do not. Furthermore, workers who report that
their job interferes with their ability to spend
time with their partner and family, as well as
those who ‘bring their job home’ with them by
worrying about work matters even when they
are not at work, report systematically lower
levels of subjective wellbeing across all four
measures, controlling as always for the usual
covariates, including the level of remuneration
they receive and the number of hours they work
per week.
We can also see in Table 6.9 that the content of
the job is important. Those with jobs that entail
high levels of variety and the need to learn new
things are more satisfied with their lives and
their jobs and experience more positive emotions day-to-day. Further, individual autonomy
in the workplace is a significant driver of happiness: having control over how the workday
is organized as well as the pace at which the
employee works is positively correlated with
higher wellbeing outcomes. Conversely, those
with jobs that involve risks to their health and
safety generally score worse on the measures of
subjective wellbeing captured in this survey.
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Social capital in the workplace is even more
important. The level of support that a worker
receives from his or her fellow workers is very
strongly predictive of all four measures of
subjective wellbeing in the sample, as is being
able to have a say in policy decisions made by
the organization for which the employee works.
Furthermore, workers who report being a
member of a trade union are generally more
satisfied with their jobs, though the differential
in life satisfaction as well as positive affect
between union and non-union workers is statistically insignificant in the sample.

As we saw earlier in our discussion of the
spillover effects of unemployment, job security
is a robust driver of individual wellbeing. Those
who feel their livelihood is at risk systematically
report lower levels of subjective wellbeing than
those who report having high levels of perceived
job security. Connected to this is the notion of
being able to ‘get on in life’: those who feel they
have a job that has good opportunities for
advancement and promotion—even controlling
for their current level of remuneration and the
current content of their job—feel more satisfied
with their jobs and lives and also tend to experience more positive affective states.
Finally, bosses have been shown to be important.
Although the data does not permit us here to
measure and quantify the importance of who
one’s boss is and how he or she affects one’s
wellbeing, recent work has demonstrated that
bosses and supervisors can play a substantial
role in determining subjective wellbeing. In
particular, the competence of bosses has been
shown to be a strong predictor of job satisfaction,
even controlling for individual fixed effects in a
longitudinal analysis that follows people who
stay in the same job as their boss gains (or loses)
competence over time.37

Conclusion
As has been shown in the various editions of
the World Happiness Report, national levels of
subjective wellbeing vary greatly across the
globe. The different kinds of work that people
in different corners of the world do may well
contribute in some way to these cross-country
differentials. After all, work makes up such an
important part of our lives. The structure of
economies differs a great deal, both across
countries at any one point in time as well as
within countries as they develop over time. Thus
the kind of work that people actually engage in
during their days differs greatly—whether they
sit in offices, work on production lines, or work
in the fields—and this can be a potentially
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contributing factor to the global differences in
wellbeing that we observe.
This chapter has aimed to bring an empirical
perspective to the relationship between happiness
and employment, job type, and job characteristics
around the world. Throughout the world, employed people evaluate the quality of their lives
much higher than those who are unemployed.
The clear importance of employment for happiness emphasizes the damage that unemployment
can do. As such, this chapter delved further into
the dynamics of unemployment to show that
individuals’ happiness adapts very little over
time to being unemployed and that past spells of
unemployment can have a lasting impact even
after regaining employment. The data also
showed that rising unemployment negatively
affects everyone, even those still employed.
These results are obtained at the individual level,
but they also come through at the macroeconomic
level, with national unemployment levels being
negatively correlated with average national
wellbeing across the world.
We also considered how happiness is related to
the broad type of job being performed. The
principal result on job type is that data from
around the world reveal a significant difference
in how manual and non-manual labor are
related to happiness. Even when accounting for
relevant covariates between these two broad categories of job type, we found that blue-collar work
is systematically correlated with less happiness.
We also investigated job quality more closely by
looking at specific workplace characteristics and
how they relate to happiness. Well-paying jobs
are conducive to happiness, but this is far from
being the whole story. A range of further aspects
were found to be strongly predictive of varied
measures of happiness. Some of the most
important job factors that were shown to be
driving subjective wellbeing included work-life
balance, autonomy, variety, job security, social
capital, and health and safety risks.

The results and inferences drawn from the
available data are far from exhaustive but aim to
inspire further research as well as provide some
empirical guidance to employees, employers,
and policy-makers. Given the importance of
employment for happiness, it is evident that
even more weight could be given to fostering
employment. Equally, policies aimed at helping
people to manage the non-monetary as well as
the monetary difficulties associated with being
unemployed, in addition to helping them back
into work, will likely help to raise societal wellbeing. In addition to the quantity of jobs, policy
instruments can be used to encourage employers
to improve the quality of jobs. In turn, recent
research suggests that high levels of worker wellbeing may even lead to gains in productivity and
firm performance,38 a finding that points toward
the benefits of engaging in what might be called
‘high-road’ employment strategies conducive to
employee wellbeing. Generally, the analyses
reported in this chapter provide additional
empirical evidence for the merit of policies that
focus on both the quantity and the quality of
employment to support worldwide wellbeing.
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1 O
 ECD Guidelines on Measuring Subjective Wellbeing
(2013)

10 S
 ee, e.g., Clark and Oswald (1994); Clark (2010); Kassenböhmer and Haisken-DeNew 2009

2 D
 e Neve and Oswald (2012), Oswald, Proto, and Sgroi
(2015), Edmans (2011)

11

3 The Cantril ladder item to survey life evaluation asks the
following question: “Please imagine a ladder, with steps
numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of
the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the
bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for
you. On which step of the ladder would you say you
personally feel you stand at this time?”

12 T
 he non-pecuniary effects of unemployment have been
the subject of decades of research in psychology and
economics. A seminal study back in the 1930s (Eisenberg
and Lazersfeld 1938), for example, found that, when
someone loses their job they lose not only their income
but also other things that are important to them such
status, social contact with others in the workplace, and
daily structure and goals.

4 T
 he measure for positive affect is an index that measures
respondents’ experienced positive wellbeing on the day
before the survey using the following five items: (i) Did you
feel well-rested yesterday?; (ii) Were you treated with
respect all day yesterday?; (iii) Did you smile or laugh a lot
yesterday?; (iv) Did you learn or do something interesting
yesterday?; (v) Did you experience the following feelings
during a lot of the day yesterday? How about enjoyment?
5 T
 he measure for negative affect is an index that measures
respondents’ experienced negative wellbeing on the day
before the survey using the following five items: (i) Did you
experience the following feelings during a lot of the day
yesterday? How about physical pain?; (ii) Did you experience the following feelings during a lot of the day yesterday? How about worry?; (iii) Did you experience the
following feelings during a lot of the day yesterday? How
about sadness?; (iv) Did you experience the following
feelings during a lot of the day yesterday? How about
stress?; (v) Did you experience the following feelings
during a lot of the day yesterday? How about anger?
6 T
 he questionnaire measure asks respondents to chose
whether they are either “satisfied” or “dissatisfied” with
their job.
7 T
 he survey measure asks respondents how engaged they
are with the job they do, with 3 response categories:
“actively engaged”, “not engaged”, and “actively disengaged”.
8 T
 hroughout this chapter we restrict our analyses to the
working age population between the ages of 21-60.
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9 W
 e follow a procedure analogous to that outlined in
Chapter 2. When calculating world or regional averages,
we in all cases use population-adjusted weighting. Gallup’s
own weights sum to the number of respondents in each
country. To produce population-adjusted weights for the
period 2014-2016 here, we first adjust the Gallup weights
such that each country has an equal weighting. We then
multiply that weight by the total population aged between
15 and 64 in 2015 (this population data is drawn from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators).

 ee, e.g., Clark and Oswald (1994); Winkelmann and
S
Winkelmann (1998); Helliwell and Huang (2014).

13 E
 vidence for this has been provided by a handful of
studies including recent work on a large-scale US panel
study that evaluated whether the wellbeing of adolescents
predicted their labor market outcomes. De Neve and
Oswald (2012) found that adolescents and young adults
who report higher life satisfaction or positive affect grow
up to earn significantly higher levels of income later in life
(controlling for socio-economic status) and significant
mediating pathways included a higher probability of
getting hired and promoted.
14 See, e.g., Blanchflower and Oswald (2004).
15 Kassenböhmer and Haisken-DeNew (2009).
16 I t is worth noting that self-employment can refer to a
huge range of things – from owning a large multinational
grocery chain all the way to being a sole-trader on a
market stall.
17 W
 e look here at 10 world regions: Western Europe (W
Europe), Central and Eastern Europe (C+E Europe), The
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), South-East
Asia (SE Asia), South Asia (S Asia), East Asia (E Asia),
Latin America and the Caribbean (LA+Carib), North
American and Australia and New Zealand (NA+ANZ ),
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA).
18 T
 he notable exceptions here are South-East Asia and
South Asia where self-employed individuals report less
negative affect as compared to being full-time employees.
19 See, e.g., Clark et al (2008); Clark and Georgelis (2013).
20 O
 ur approach here follows Clark et al (2008) and Clark
and Georgelis (2013). We take advantage of the longitudinal nature of the German Socio-Economic Panel, which
has been running since the 1980s, and take a within-person (i.e. fixed effect) approach and ask to what extent
people who become unemployed and stay unemployed
adapt to their circumstances in terms of happiness. We
look at both the 4 years prior to becoming unemployed as
well as the 4+ years following that event. Those entering
the panel already unemployed are dropped from the
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analysis (i.e. we exclude any left-censored spells). For each
individual, we look only at the first occurrence of
unemployment they experience in the panel, and
examine how the respondent’s happiness adapts as they
experience their first spell of unemployment. Specifically,
we run the following regression:
LSit = αi + θ’Xit + β-4U-4,it + β-3U-3,it + β-2U-2,it + β-1U-1,it +
β0U0it + β1U1it + β2U2it + β3U3it + β4U4it + εit
where LSit refers to the life satisfaction on a 0-10 scale of
person i in year t and X is a vector of control variables
typical to the literature. Those who are unemployed are
split into five categories: the U dummies (U0 to U4) refer
to those who have been unemployed for under a year,
those unemployed between 1-2 years, and so on up to
four (or more) years. The U-4 to U-1 dummies refer to
future entry into unemployment in the next 0-1 years, 1-2
years and so on. Figure 4 reports these lag and lead
coefficients from this equation, along with 95% confidence intervals. The omitted category in this equation is
those who will not enter into being unemployed in the
following four years. The sample is all those individuals
who are not unemployed in their first year in the panel.
The αI term is an individual fixed effect, such that the
adaptation we are examining here compares the life
satisfaction of someone who has been unemployed for 3
years with their own life satisfaction before becoming
unemployed.
21 See, e.g., Clark et al (2001); Knabe and Rätsel (2011).
22 Di Tella et al (2001).
23 E.g. Knabe and Rätsel (2011); Luechinger et al (2010).
24 In addition to job insecurity effects caused by others’
unemployment, there may be further psychological
conduits. One is that in times of high unemployment
people may be more likely to stay in jobs they do not
particularly enjoy, given the difficulty of finding a more
agreeable job when labor market conditions are poor. A
second is that those who are left in work may feel some
level of guilt being unemployed whilst those around them
are being laid off and suffering the consequences of job
loss. Finally, there may be more immediate spill-over
effects, with those close to unemployed people – spouses
and other family members in particular – suffering as
they live with and attempt to provide support for the
unemployed
25 See Clark (2003).
26 In order to present an up-to-date picture of the relationship, we calculate the 2016 unemployment rate for each
country using the Gallup World Poll sample. This is the
fraction of those participating in the labor force between
the ages of 21 and 60 who report being unemployed. The
most recent set of unemployment rate figures produced
by the World Bank (in the 2016 World Development
Indicators) pertain to 2014; an analogous analysis using
this data together with the 2014 Gallup data produce

similar results.
27 N
 ote that Helliwell and Huang (2014) obtain the negative
correlation between unemployment and wellbeing in the
cross-sectional data for the United States without even
including those individuals that are themselves unemployed.
28 See, e.g. Kristof-Brown et al (2005) for a review.
29 S
 ee, e.g., Rosen (1986).
30 S
 ee, e.g., Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009).
31 O
 ur analyses do not address the theory of “compensating
differentials” head-on but it is worthwhile noting that
there are a number of possible reasons behind why such
stark differences are observed in the happiness levels
associated with different job types even though compensating differentials in terms of income may suggest
otherwise (holding skill levels constant). One plausible
reason being that most individuals may not have a wide
range of options to choose from in terms of which type of
job to perform (even when holding skill levels constant)
and, as such, there is not as much free movement between
job types as economic theory would have it. Another
reason why we find that the classic notion of compensating differentials does not fit these data well is because
monetary compensation is really only but a part of the
overall package of job characteristics that relate job type to
happiness.
32 S
 ee, e.g., Freeman (1978); Harter et al. (2002, 2003);
Bockerman and Ilmakunnas (2012), Judge et al (2001).
33 T
 he question was incuded in the Gallup World Poll
between 2006 and 2012. Here we map the country
averages over this period. More detailed information on
these figures is provided in Table A6.13.
34 Bryson and Mackerron (2017).
35 S
 ee, e.g. Clark (2010). There are a number of approaches
to the measurement of job quality. For a useful overview,
see Osterman (2013).
36 T
 he survey questions we use are: 1) “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole
nowadays?” 2) “Taking all things together, how happy
would you say you are?” 3) “How satisfied are you in your
main job?” 4) A positive affect measure aggregated from
three questions asking how much in the last two weeks
the respondent has “felt cheerful and in good spirits”,
“felt calm and relaxed”, “felt active and vigorous”.
37 A
 rtz et al. (2016).
38 S
 ee, e.g., Oswald, Proto, and Sgroi (2015), Edmans (2011),
and Harter et al. (2002)
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The central paradox of the modern American
economy, as identified by Richard Easterlin (1964,
2016), is this: income per person has increased
roughly three times since 1960, but measured
happiness has not risen. The situation has gotten
worse in recent years: per capita GDP is still
rising, but happiness is now actually falling.
The predominant political discourse in the
United States is aimed at raising economic
growth, with the goal of restoring the American
Dream and the happiness that is supposed to
accompany it. But the data show conclusively
that this is the wrong approach. The United
States can and should raise happiness by
addressing America’s multi-faceted social
crisis—rising inequality, corruption, isolation,
and distrust—rather than focusing exclusively or
even mainly on economic growth, especially
since the concrete proposals along these lines
would exacerbate rather than ameliorate the
deepening social crisis.
Figure 7.1 shows the U.S. score on the Cantril
ladder over the last ten years. If we compare the
two-year average for 2015/6 with the two-year
average for 2006/7, we can see that the Cantril
score declined by 0.51. While the US ranked
third among the 23 OECD countries surveyed in
2007, it had fallen to 19th of the 34 OECD
countries surveyed in 2016.
To understand America’s falling happiness, we
make use of the framework from Chapter 2 of
this Report to explain the sources of subjective

Figure 7.1. US Happiness Score, 2006-2016

Source: Gallup International Cantril ladder

well-being using six underlying variables: log
income per capita (lgdp), healthy life expectancy
(hle), social support (ssup), freedom to make
life choices (freedom), generosity of donations
(donation), and perceived corruption of government and business (corruption). Of these sources,
two involve personal material conditions (lgdp,
hle); one focuses on individual values (donation);
and two involve social capital (ssup, corruption).
The last, freedom, should be interpreted as a
combination of individual factors (wealth, skills)
and social factors (democracy, civil rights, and
social rights).
As noted, the observed decline in the Cantril
ladder between 2006/7 and 2015/6 is 0.51. In
Table 7.1, we decompose this decline according
to the six factors. While two of the explanatory
variables moved in the direction of greater
U.S. happiness (lgdp, hle), the four social variables (ssup, freedom, donation, corruption) all

Table 7.1. Accounting for the Change in US Happiness, 2006/7 to 2015/6
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Source: Decomposition based on the global explanatory equation shown in Table 2.1. GDP levels are in PPP 2011 constant
dollars. Data details can be found in the Statistical Appendix for Chapter 2.

Table 7.2. Comparison of the US and the Nordic Countries in 2016

Note: All data definitions can be found in the Statistical Appendix for Chapter 2.

deteriorated—US showed less social support,
less sense of personal freedom, lower donations,
and more perceived corruption of government
and business. Applying the coefficients from the
regression model in Table 2.1 in Chapter 2, the
six factors account for a net decline of 0.27 (with
an unexplained residual of another 0.24 points
of decline).
America’s crisis is, in short, a social crisis, not
an economic crisis.
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This America social crisis is widely noted, but
it has not translated into public policy. Almost
all of the policy discourse in Washington DC
centers on naïve attempts to raise the economic
growth rate, as if a higher growth rate would
somehow heal the deepening divisions and
angst in American society. This kind of
growth-only agenda is doubly wrong-headed.
First, most of the pseudo-elixirs for growth—
especially the Republican Party’s beloved nostrum
of endless tax cuts and voodoo economics—
will only exacerbate America’s social inequalities
and feed the distrust that is already tearing
society apart. Second, a forthright attack on
the real sources of social crisis would have a
much larger and more rapid beneficial effect on
U.S. happiness.
We can see this in the following thought experiment. Suppose that the U.S. were to return to the
2006/7 baselines for the social variables. This

would boost happiness substantially. We can
then calculate the equivalent rise in U.S. GDP
that would lead to the same increase in happiness
as an improvement in social conditions. It
becomes immediately clear that restoring social
conditions would be the faster and more reliable
way to achieve the same gain in happiness.
Consider the corruption variable, for example.
The U.S. corruption index rose by 0.10 between
2006/7 and 2015/6. With a coefficient -0.53 in
the happiness regression, the negative effect on
U.S. happiness is 0.054. Reversing the rise in
perceived corruption would therefore raise
happiness by 0.054. To achieve the same gain in
happiness through higher income growth would
require a rise in lgdp equal to 0.054/0.341,
which translates into a rise in the level of GDP
from roughly $53,000 to $62,000.
The needed rise in income to offset the recent
decline in America’s social support networks
would be even greater. The decline in social
support measured 0.064, with a coefficient on
happiness of 2.332. This implies a loss of happiness of 0.15 points on the Cantril ladder. To
offset this loss, lgdp would need to rise by
0.15/0.341, which translates into a rise in GDP
from $53,000 to $82,000. Such an increase in
GDP would take decades to achieve, while an
improvement in social conditions that reverts
back to the social conditions of 2006 would
presumably be much faster. Strangely, however,
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Figure 7.2. Decline of Generalized Trust

Figure 7.3. Decline in US Trust in Government

these sociological variables are nowhere to be
seen in the U.S. political debate.

Figure 7.4. The Rise of Inequality in the
United States, 1962-2014

Putting this all together: The combined effect of
the four social variables (ssup, freedom, donation,
corruption) is a reduction of happiness of 0.31
points, implying that lgdp would have to increase
by 0.314/.341, or GDP would have to raise from
$53,000 to around $133,000 to offset the combined deterioration of social capital.
There is another way to view the ramifications
for happiness of America’s social crisis. Consider the five Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), all of which score
far higher than the U.S. in happiness. If we
compare the US with a simple average score
across the Nordic countries in 2016, shown in
Table 7.2, we can see that the Nordic countries
are 0.73 points higher on the Cantril ladder, even
though the U.S. has a higher GDP per capita—
around $53,000 compared with $47,000 in
terms of PPP constant 2011 international dollars.
The explanation is that the Nordic countries far
outpace the U.S. on personal freedom, social
support, and lower corruption, thereby accounting for the higher levels of Nordic happiness.

It is of course well-known that social capital in
the United States has been in decline for several
decades now. Robert Putnam’s1 pioneering
research played a major role in opening the eyes
of Americans to the fraying of social ties. In
recent years, the evidence of social crises has
become overwhelming, across every aspect of
social life. A small group at the top of the income
distribution has continued to make striking
gains in wealth and income, while the rest of
society has faced economic stagnation or decline,
worsening public health indicators including
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rising rates of drug addiction and suicide, and
declining social trust.
To spell this out: Generalized trust among
Americans has been falling for decades, as
illustrated in Figure 7.2. Trust in government
has plummeted to the lowest level in modern
history, as seen in Figure 7.3, consistent with
the rise in the perception of corruption (see also
Dalton, 2017). Income inequality has reached
astronomical levels, with the top 1 percent of
American households taking home almost all of
the gains in economic growth in recent decades,
while the share of the bottom 50% plummets,
as shown in Figure 7.4. The top 1 percent of
households now claims around 23 percent of
income, roughly equal to the share of the bottom
70 percent.
At the same time, the extent of pro-social
behavior among Americans seems to be on
the decline. In one well-known experiment,
stamped and addressed envelopes were dropped
in public areas (sidewalks, shopping malls,
phone booths), to see whether people pick them
up and put them in a mailbox. This is a measure
of helping behavior among strangers. A recent
study2 showed that the extent of helping behavior
by U.S. residents declined sharply between
2001 and 2011, but this was not true for Canadian residents.
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Another very stark indicator of social collapse is
the startling finding that mortality rates rose
between 1999 and 2013 for white, non-Hispanics
aged 45-54.3 For women, the rise in the age-specific mortality rate is observed over the entire
interval, while for men, the rise in the morality
rate between 1999 and 2005 was mostly reversed
during 2005-2013. This trend stands in sharp
contrast to the experience of Western Europe
and Canada, where mortality rates continue to
fall. What makes the United States case so
disturbing and revealing is that it is clearly a
social crisis as much as a health crisis—the
increased mortality rates are accounted for

mainly by drug and alcohol poisoning, suicide,
and chronic liver disease and cirrhosis. There
are several factors at work in this interconnected
destruction of social capital, and their relative
importance has not been determined with any
precision or consensus. I would point to five.
The first is the rise of mega-dollars in U.S.
politics. A typical federal election cycle now
involves at least $7 billion in campaign financing,
and billions of dollars more in corporate lobbying outlays that are indirect forms of campaign
financing. Because of profoundly damaging
Supreme Court decisions, most especially
Citizens United, billionaires and large corporations are able to make enormous and essentially
untraceable campaign contributions to candidates. There is a strong and correct feeling
among Americans that the government does
not serve their interest, but rather the interest
of powerful lobbies, wealthy Americans, and
of course, the politicians themselves. Political
scientists such as Martin Gilens have shown that
only rich Americans have real input into political
decision making.
The second, and closely related, factor is the
soaring income and wealth inequality. Since the
1980s, America has been in a new gilded age,
with tax cuts for the rich, special privileges for
the wealthy to hide income in offshore tax
havens, the destruction of union power, financial
deregulation, and other steps to shift national
income to the very top of the income distribution.
It has worked better and longer than could have
been imagined. Of course, the big money in
politics keeps the political direction towards
further tax cuts and benefits for the super-rich.
The third factor is the decline in social trust
related to the post-1965 surge in immigration to
the United States, especially the rise of the
Hispanic population. Putnam4 reported that
communities with higher ethnic diversity also
have lower measures of social trust.5 This finding seems true for the United States, but not
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consistently so for other countries (such as
Canada). Some sociologists suggest that the U.S.
high ethnic diversity is also characterized by
considerable economic and ethnic segregation,
so that the potential for inter-group contact
to diminish distrust is not as operative in the
United States as in other countries: “American
exceptionalism may be linked to relatively high
levels of heterogeneity combined with the
pronounced segregation of cities in the United
States compared with other Western countries …
and the persistence of ethnic inqualities.”6
The fourth factor relates to the aftermath of 9/11.
America’s reaction to these unprecedented
terrorist attacks was to stoke fear rather than
appeal to social solidarity. The U.S. government
launched an open-ended global war on terror,
appealing to the darkest side of human nature
by invoking a stark “us versus them” dualism,
and terrifying American citizens through the
government’s projections of fear. Since then, the
United States has been involved in non-stop
war—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and
Yemen among others—and Americans are
subject to daily indignities of searches, frisking,
body pat downs, orders barked at airports, and
terrorist alerts. In the meantime, the U.S.
government has repeatedly misled its own
citizens about the scope of its activities, whom
it is spying on, and where it is fighting.
The fifth and final factor that I would raise is the
severe deterioration of America’s educational
system. On the demand side, the market premium
for a college degree has continued to rise in the
United States, reflecting the fact that new technologies demand better technical skills. Yet on
the supply side, the share of young Americans
completing a bachelor’s degree or higher is
essentially stagnant at around 36 percent.
College tuition has soared and student aid has
been pared back dramatically. The result is a $1
trillion mountain of student debt and a generation
of young people with half-finished bachelor’s
degrees facing a precarious future.

This matters because the failure of America to
educate its young people is a major force behind
the rise in income inequality (condemning those
with less than a bachelors degree to stagnant or
falling incomes) and, it appears, to the fall of
social capital as well. The US political divide is
increasingly a divide between those with a
college degree and those without. This is reflected in the recent presidential election. According
to exit polling, college graduates backed Hillary
Clinton by a margin of 52-43, while those without
a college degree backed Trump by 52-44. If U.S.
states are ranked according to the share of 25-29
year olds with a bachelor’s degree or higher,
Clinton won 17 of the top 18 states, while Trump
won 29 of the bottom 32 states. The deep social
and economic divisions according to educational
attainment seem to be similar to the dynamics of
the Brexit vote and other anti-migrant parties in
Europe, which find their base among voters with
lower educational attainment.
In sum, the United States offers a vivid portrait
of a country that is looking for happiness “in all
the wrong places.” The country is mired in a
roiling social crisis that is getting worse. Yet the
dominant political discourse is all about raising
the rate of economic growth. And the prescriptions
for faster growth—mainly deregulation and tax
cuts—are likely to exacerbate, not reduce social
tensions. Almost surely, further tax cuts will
increase inequality, social tensions, and the
social and economic divide between those with a
college degree and those without.
To escape this social quagmire, America’s
happiness agenda should center on rebuilding
social capital. This will require a keen focus on
the five main factors that have contributed to
falling social trust and confidence in government.
The first priority should be campaign finance
reform, especially to undo the terrible damage
caused by the Citizens United decision. The
second should be a set of policies aiming at
reducing income and wealth inequality. This
would include an expanded social safety net,
wealth taxes, and greater public financing of
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health and education. The third should be
to improve the social relations between the
native-born and immigrant populations. Canada
has demonstrated a considerable success with
multiculturalism; the United States has not tried
very hard. The fourth is to acknowledge and
move past the fear created by 9/11 and its memory. The US remains traumatized to this day;
Trump’s ban on travel to the United States from
certain Muslim-majority countries is a continuing
manifestation of the exaggerated and irrational
fears that grip the nation. The fifth priority, I
believe, should be on improved educational
quality, access, and attainment. America has lost
the edge in educating its citizens for the 21st
century; that fact alone ensures a social crisis
that will continue to threaten well-being until
the commitment to quality education for all is
once again a central tenet of American society.
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